Availability and cost of credit for small businesses: Customer relationships and credit cooperatives

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 22, Issue 6-8, 1998, Pages 925-954

  Angelini, P ^a   Di Salvo, R ^b   Ferri, G ^a  

^a BANK OF ITALY   (Italy)

^b Inst Res Coop Credit Loc E   (Italy)

Author keywords

Credit cooperatives; Customer relationships; D82; G21; G30; Rationing; Small business

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040093583     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00008-9     Document Type: Article

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