The U.S. role in the sino-japanese dispute over the diaoyu (senkaku) Islands, 1945-1971

China Quarterly

Volumn , Issue 161, 2000, Pages 95-123

  Blanchard, Jean Marc F ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002038387     PISSN: 03057410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0305741000003957     Document Type: Article

References (161)

1. "In an ocean of controversy," Time, 7 October 1996, p. 30.
2. Daniel J. Dzurek, "Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute on maritime delimitation," paper presented at the IBRU Conference on Borderlands Under Stress, University of Durham, 16 July 1998, pp. 1-9. The islands are Diaoyu (Uotsurishima), Huangwei (Kubashima or Kobishö), Chiwei (Taishojima or Akao-Sho), Beixiao (Kitakojima) and Nanxiao (Minamikojima). The rocks are Dabeixiao (Okino Kitaiwa), Dananxiao (Okino Minamiiwa) and Feilaidai (Tobise). From 1945 to 1971, the U.S. referred to the Diaoyu Islands in several ways: Sakishima Guntö (which represents the collective name for the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands); the Yaeyama Islands (which included Senkaku Rettö); Senkaku Rettö (which included Uotsurishima, other islands and Sentö Shôshû); and the Sentô Shôshû or Diaoyu islets.
3. Office of the Language Aid, HCRI./l Gazetterofthe Ryûkyii Islands, pp. 14-18, Map 5, RG 260 (USCAR), Records of the Office of HCRI, Box 6, National Archives-College Park.
4. Ying-Jeou Ma, "The East Asian seabed controversy revisited: the relevance (or irrelevance) of the Tiao-Yu-T'ai (Senkaku) Islands territorial dispute," in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 2 (I9S2) (Taipei: Chinese Society of International Law, 1983), pp. 28-33, 43-44.
5. Raul Lautenschutz, "Japan, China, and the Senkaku Islands," Swiss Review of World Affairs, July 1979, p. 32.
6. Ibid. pp. 32-33; Ying-Jeou Ma, "The East Asian seabed controversy revisited," pp. 2-4; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Would you fight for these islands?" New York Times, 20 November 1996, http://www.mtholoyoke.edu/acad/intrel/diaoyu.htrnl; and Dzurek, "Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute on maritime delimitation," p. 1. Ma presents a legal analysis that rejects the notion that the islands convey any continental shelf/EEZ rights. "The East Asian seabed controversy revisited," esp. pp. 28-33, 43-44.
7. Robert G. Sutler, "East Asia: disputed islands and offshore claims - issues for U.S. policy," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 28 July 1992, p. CRS-7; and Ji Guoxing, "Maritime jurisdiction in the three China seas: options for equitable settlement," gopher://gopher-igcc.ucsd.edu.
8. Lautenschutz, "Japan, China, and the Senkaku Islands," p. 33; and Phil Deans, "The Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute: the unwanted controversy," http://snipc.okc.ac.uk/international/ papers.dir/deans.html. This also is implied by Lam Peng Er's analysis of Japan's involvement in the South China Sea dispute, "Japan and the Spratlys dispute: aspirations and limitations,"
9. Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10 (October 1996) (online). For background on the aforementioned disputes, see respectively Eric Heyer, "The South China Sea disputes: implications of China's earlier territorial settlements," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34-54; and
10. Kimie Hara, "Hoppō, Ryōdō; Mondai (The Northern Territories problem): a territorial issue between Japan and Russia," in Carl Grundy-Warr (ed.), Eurasia: World Boundaries, Vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 163-182.
11. Hereinafter I use the term Diaoyu Islands to refer to the disputed islands.
12. Quoted in Larry A. Niksch, "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute: the U.S. legal relationship and obligations," PacNet Newsletter, No. 45 (8 November 1996), http://wwvv.csis.org/html/pac45.html. This is an U.S. Congressional Research Service analysis.
13. http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks.
14. Niksch, "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute." Apparently, an earlier Congressional Research Service Report came to the same conclusion. This is reported in Kristof, "Would you fight for these islands?" A copy of the 1960 agreement appears in J.A.S. Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, The Major International Treaties Since 1945: A History and Guide with Texts (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 124-26. In an agreed minute to the 1960 treaty, Japan stressed its residual sovereignty in the Okinawa chain and expectations of consultations and discussions with the U.S. in the event the islands were threatened or attacked. The U.S. stated it intended to take measures for the defence of the islands.
15. Even though an agreed minute to the 1971 reversion treaty incorporated the Diaoyu Islands as part of the Ryûkyû Islands being returned to Japan, the U.S. government took the position that "this treaty does not affect the legal status of those islands at all." See United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Hearings, 92nd Congress, first session. Ex. J. 92-1. October 27-29. 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1971), p. 11.
16. Niksch, "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute"; Kristof, "Would you fight for these islands?" and Deans, "The Diaoyutai/Senkakus dispute."
17. This does not imply that the Japanese do not have a valid legal claim.
18. See, for example, Unryu Suganuma, "The Diaoyu Islands according to Chinese record of Ming times," Chinese Historians, Vol. 9, No. 16 (1996), pp. 75-96 and the works identified innn. 1-9,21,22,25,26.
19. On China's efforts to develop a blue-water navy, see You Ji and You Xu, "In search of blue water power: the PLA Navy's maritime strategy in the 1990s," The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1991), pp. 137-149; Larry M. Wortzel, "China pursues traditional great-power status," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 157-175; Henri Labrousse, "Les ambitions maritimes de la Chine," Defense Nationale, Vol. 50 (Autumn 1994), pp. 131-141; and You Ji, "A blue water navy: does it matter?" in David S.O. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 71-89.
20. Ying-Jeou Ma, "The East Asian seabed controversy revisited," pp. 2-4; and Dzurek, "Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute on maritime delimitation," p. 5.
21. As Ma notes, it is fallacious to claim that the dispute began at this time since Chinese and Japanese nationals visited and used the islands after U.S. administration began and both sides claimed the islands as their own. It is more accurate to assert that the discovery of energy "activated" the dispute. "The East Asian seabed controversy revisited," pp. 25-26 n. 80.
22. Deans, "The Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute."
23. In Article I of the 1971 reversion treaty, the U.S. relinquished all special rights and interests in the Ryûky us it acquired pursuant to Article III of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan and returned to Japan full responsibility and authority for the exercise of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the islands. An agreed minute to the treaty provides the territorial definition of the Ryūkyūs that includes the Diaoyu Islands. The agreement is printed in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65, No. 1672, 12 July 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1971), pp. 35, 37.
24. Niksch, "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute"; Dzurek, "Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute on maritime delimitation," p. 6 n. 18; and Lautenschutz, "Japan, China, and the Senkaku Islands," p. 33. In June 1971, the ROC informed the U.S. that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to them by reason of location, geological structure, historical association and use. It asserted that it had continuously informed the U.S. and Japan that the islands belonged to it.
25. Ting Tsz Kao, The Chinese Frontiers (Aurora: Chinese Scholarly Publishing Co., 1980), p. 98.
26. United States, Department of the Army, 7th Psychological Operations Group, "Oil in troubled waters: the Senkakus," 22 May 1972, p. SR 8-3.
27. Deans, "The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute."
28. The 1978 treaty appears in Grenville and Wasserstein, The Major International Treaties Since 1945, p. 306. Among other provisions, the accord called for both sides to oppose hegemony in Asia, to develop economic and cultural relations, and to maintain relations on the basis of principles such as respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.
29. Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: the Senkaku incident prelude," Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 1978), pp. 1235-49; Lautenschutz, "Japan, China, and the Senkaku Islands," p. 32; and Deans, "The Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute."
30. This draws extensively from Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 127-131.
31. "Law passed claiming Spratly Islands," Agence-France Presse, 26 February 1992; Chang Hong, "NPC enacts law on territorial waters," China Daily, 26 February 1992, p. 1;
32. and Xinhua Domestic, 25 February 1992 all in Foreign Broadcast Service Daily Report - China (FBIS-CHI)-92-038, 26 February 1992, pp. 19-20. For an analysis of China's view of its maritime rights pursuant to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, see Su Dushu, "Lüe tan hanwei woguo haijiang wenti" ("Some notes on problems concerning defence of China's coastal areas and territorial seas)",
33. Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu (China's Borderland History and Geographic Studies) No. 1 (1992), pp. 75-81.
34. Daniel Dzurek, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute," 18 October 1996, (mailbaseadmin@mailbase.ac.uk) (a revised and updated version of this paper appears at www-ibru.dur.ack.uk/senkaku.html); Dzurek, "Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute on maritime delimitation," pp. 1-4; and Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism," pp. 131-35.
35. The Chinese case is made in Su Dushu, "Some notes on problems concerning defence," p. 81 ; and Zliongguo zhoubian guaivciyii anquan liuanjing (China's Relations with Its Neighbours and Its Security Environment) (Shaanxi: People's Education Press, n.d.) in Joint Publications Research Sen-ice-Chma (JPRS-China)-93-037, 8 June 1993, pp. 25-26. For official comments, see "On Diaoyu Islands issue," and "History proves Diaoyu islands are China's territory," both at http://www.china-embassy.org. Other important statements of the Chinese positions appear in Kiyoshi Inoue, "Japanese militarism and Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island - a Japanese historian's view," http://www.interlog.com/~yuan/diaohist.html; and Zhong Yan, "China's claim to Diaoyu Island chain indisputable," http://ss5.ihep.ac.cn/ins/ Book/Bjreview/November/96-45-10.html. The Inoue article originally appeared in Beijing Review, Vol. 15, No. 19 (12 May 1972) while the Zhong piece appeared in Beijing Review, Vol. 39, No. 45 (4-10 November 1996).
36. A copy of the treaty is included in Fred L. Israel (ed.), Major Peace Treaties of Modem History, 1648-1967 (New York: Chelsea House and McGraw-Hill, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 1101-10, esp. p. 1102.
37. These declarations appear in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948 (Grosse Pointe: Scholarly Press, 1968), pp. 411, 413.
38. Pursuant to Article II of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, Japan renounced all claims to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kuriles, part of the Sakhalin peninsula, the Antarctic, the Spratlys and Paracels, and numerous mandated territories. Article III changed the administrative status of various Japanese islands. For the treaty, see Israel, Major Peace Treaties, Vol. IV, pp. 2641-56.
39. On Japan's claims, see "The basic view on the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands," http://www.mofa.go.jp/ja/Senkaku.html. See also Ying-Jeou Ma, "The East Asian seabed controversy revisited," pp. 31-32; J.R.V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 244-46; Dzurek, "Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute on maritime delimitation," p. 5; and Ji Guoxing, "Maritime jurisdiction in the three China seas."
40. On Japan's acquisition of the Ryukyus, see Roy Hidemichi Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936: A Short History (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1936), pp. 58-74;
41. Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970), pp. 4-8; Mark R. Peattie, "The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,"
42. in Peter Duus (ed.), The Cambridge History of Japan: Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) (hereinafter CHOJ: Vol. 6), p. 224;
43. Ting Tsz Kao, The Chinese Frontiers, pp. 91-98; and
44. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1990), p. 127.
45. A SCAP map shows that the Ryūkyū chain is not associated with Japan proper and also that it is not part of Taiwan. At this time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SCAP defined "Japan" to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryūkyū (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island). "Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government from General Headquarters, SCAP," 29 January 1946, in SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 477.
46. Fredrick L. Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan: Case Studies for Foreign Policy Theory (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 53, 56; and Alvin D. Coox, "The Pacific War," in CHOJ: Vol. 6, p. 367.
47. "Directive No. 2," 3 September 1945, in SCAP, Political Réorientation of Japan, p. 447. See also "GHQ FEC Opns Instns No. 2," 1 February 1948, which charged SCAP with an extensive programme of mapping and the procurement of terrain intelligence of Korea, Japan and the Ryükyüs. Reports of General MacArthur, MacAnhur in Japan: The Occupation: M Hilary Phase, Vol. 1. Supplement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1966), p. 84, n. 16.
48. "Memorandum from the Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Base, Okinawa, and Chief Military Government Officer, RyQkyQs," 1 July 1946, RG 260 (U.S. Civil Administration of the RyukyQ Islands or USCAR), Records of the Office of the High Commissioner of the Ryükyü Islands (HCRI), Activity Reports of the U.S. Naval Military Government of the Ryükyü Islands (April 1945-JuIy 1946), Box 38, National Archives-College Park.
49. U.S. Department of Slate, Administrative Subdivisions of Japan: Atlas and Gazette er, and Appendix, RG 59 (State Department), Records of the Geographer, Series 007 331/A/08/05, National Archives-College Park.
50. Reports of General MacArthur, MacAnhur in Japan, p. 87.
51. "Liuchiu Islands (Ryukyû)" (secret), 2 July 1943; and "Japan: territorial problems: Liuchiu (Ryûkyû) Islands" (secret), 14 December 1944, both in RG 59 (State Department), Reports on World War II Topics, Box 1, National Archives-College Park. The state seemed reluctant to recommend losses of territory in other island cases as well. See e.g. "Japan: territorial problems: Bonin and Volcano Islands" (secret), 23 October 1943, pp. 2-3; and Japan: territorial problems: Bonin and Volcano Islands" (secret), 11 October 1943, pp. 2-3 both in RG 59 (State Department), Japan Mandated Islands and Territorial, Box 1, National Archives-College Park.
52. See Chiang Kai-Shek, China's Destiny (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), p. 36.
53. This is noted in Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, p. 57.
54. Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 56-57;
55. and Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, pp. 56-63.
56. See, e.g., "Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur," 20 March 1947, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). 1947: Vol. VI: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1972) (hereinafter FRUS, 1947: Vol. 6), p. 452; "The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State," 28 July 1947, p. 476; and "Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen)," 6 August 1947, p. 478, both in FRUS, 1947: Vol. 6.
57. "Memorandum by Rear Admiral E.T. Woolridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton)," 18 August 1947, p. 495; and "General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State," 1 September 1947, p. 512, both in FKUS, 1947: Vol. 6.
58. "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)" (PPS 10), 14 October 1947, in FRUS, 1947: Vol. 6, pp. 538-540. The map used in PPS 10 seems to indicate that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Nansei Shotô, but is difficult to read. See p. 539.
59. "The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State," 2 June 1948, in U.S. Department of State, FRUS. 1948: Vol. I: The Far East and Australasia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1974) (hereinafter FRUS, 1948: Vol. 1), p. 800; and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Ryükyü Islands and their significance," 6 August 1948, cited in Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, pp. 68-69.
60. "Recommendations with respect to the U.S. policy toward Japan," NSC 13/1, in FRUS, 1948: Vol. 1, pp. 877-78; and "Report by the National Security Council on recommendations with respect to United States policy toward Japan," NSC 13/3 (6 May 1949), in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1949: Vol. VII: The Far East and Australasia, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1976) (hereinafter FRUS, 1949: Vol. 7, Part 2), p. 731.
61. "The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State," 9 September 1949, p. 857; "Memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Robert A. Fearey, of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs," 2 November 1949, p. 894; and "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)," 22 December 1949, p. 923 all in FRUS, 1949: Vol. 7, Part 2.
62. Dean Acheson commented on the role of the Ryukyüs during his famous/infamous address to the National Press Club on 12 January 1950. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 551 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1950), pp. 115-18.
63. Roger Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy. 1945-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 29, 37.
64. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard)," 24 April 1950, in U.S. Department of State, FR US, 1950: Volume VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1976) (hereinafter FRUS, 1950: Vol. 6), p. 1181.
65. Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, p. 70. For a masterful analysis of the Korean War, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
66. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)," 22 August 1950, and "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," 22 August 1950, pp. 1278-82, both in FRUS, 1950: Vol. 6. For a copy of the relevant provisions in the draft peace treaty, see p. 1298.
67. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, pp. 110-13.
68. "Memorandum approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 4 October 1950, in FRUS, 1950: Vol. 6,p. 1313.
69. "Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of that Office (Johnson)," 14 November 1950, pp. 1346-47; and "The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army," both in FRUS, 1950: Vol. 6, pp. 1344-45.
70. "Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of that Office (Johnson)," p. 1347.
71. "The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)," 13 December 1950, in FRUS, 1950: Vol. 6, pp. 1364, 1367.
72. "The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army," p. 1384; and "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 28 December 1950, pp. 1391-92, both in FRUS, 1950: Vol. 6.
73. "The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State," 6 January 1951, in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1951: Volume VI: Asia and the Pacific, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1977) (hereinafter FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6. Part 1, p. 786.
74. "Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)," 25 January 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 811.
75. "Undated Memorandum by the Prime Minister of Japan (Yoshida)," 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Pan 1, p. 833.
76. The National Archives, The End of the War in the Pacific: Surrender Documents in Facsimile (Washington, D.C.: U.S.GPO, 1945); and the Potsdam declaration of 26 JuIy 1945, in SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan: September 19-45 to September 1948, p. 413.
77. "Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fcarey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs," 31 January 1951, in FRUS. 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 836.
78. Buckley, U.S.- Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 34-37.
79. "Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs," 19 March 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 933.
80. "Provisional Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty," 23 March 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 945. Japanese negotiators hoped that the U.S. would not implement the trusteeship clause. Prime Minister Yoshida and others told the Japanese Diet that the peace treaty did not require Japan to renounce sovereignty over these islands. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 24-25.
81. "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," 17 April 1951, p. 991; and "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," 26 June 1951, p. 1157, both in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1. The British concurred in this separation. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, p. 138.
82. "Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency" (NIE-19), 20 April 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 999.
83. "The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State," 4 April 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 961.
84. "The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices," ISJuly 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Pan 1, p. 1200.
85. Israel, Major Peace Treaties, Vol. IV, pp. 2641-56, esp. pp. 2642-43.
86. United States Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, pp. 90, 147.
87. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1951), pp. 88-97.
88. Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, p. 127.
89. International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, "Okinawa Reversion: A Study of the Administrative Aspects" (secret), 1 April 1969, pp. 1-2, RG 260 (USCAR), Records of the HCRI, HICOM Administrative Files 1969-1972, Reversion Agreements to Pre Comm 1971-72, Box 2, National Archives-College Park.
90. "Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)," 27 June 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part I, pp. 1152-53.
91. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, pp. 88-97. During the Okinawa reversion hearings, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard confirmed that the U.S. had not taken sovereignty from Japan. United State Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, p. 57.
92. "The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State," 17 January 1952, in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954: Volume XIV, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1985) (hereinafter FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2), pp. 1089-92.
93. Ibid. p. 1092.
94. In 1951, Dulles told the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. that he could not accommodate Japanese demands about the Ryükyüs for reasons of resolve and determination. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs (Whitman)," 14 August 1951, in FRUS. 1951: Vol. 6, Pan 1, pp. 1269-70.
95. "Memorandum by Myron M. Cowcn, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State," 25 January 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14. Part 2, pp. 1116-20. This plan was communicated to Sebald in February. "The Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)," 20 February 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1184.
96. "The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)," 29 October 1951, in FRUS, 1951: Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1388-89.
97. USCAR, Ryiikyu Islands: Preliminary Notes on the Use, Distribution, and Adaptability of Native and Introduced Tree Species (November 1952), RG 260 (USCAR), Records of the HCRI, HICOM Administrative Files, Box 7, National Archives-College Park.
98. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting," 2 April 1952," in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1224-27. Watanabe believes the importance of the Ryûkyûs as a backup in case of the loss of bases in Japan was greater than their importance as a staging area for the Korean War. The Okinawa Problem, p. 27.
99. "The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State," 29 August 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1318-27. To prevent the State Department from exploiting any divisions in the military, the JCS ordered General Mark Clark, who followed Ridgway as head of FEC, not to make any concessions regarding the political control of the islands. 'The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State," 13 October 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, Part 2, p. 1342.
100. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 31-33.
101. "Memorandum of conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)," 22 September 1952, pp. 1333-35; and "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allisbn)," 12 January 1953, pp. 1376-78 both in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2.
102. "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State," 18 March 1953, in FRUS 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1397-1400.
103. "The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Department of the Army," 20 May 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Pan 2, pp. 1424-26.
104. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 151 st Meeting of the National Security Council," 25 June 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1440-44. Around this period, there were rising concerns about Japan's reliability as an ally. Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, p. 74.
105. "The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Embassy in Korea," 4 August 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol. 16, Part 2, pp. 1468-69.
106. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)," 13 August 1953, in FRUS. 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1481-82.
107. Ibid. p. 1482.
108. "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)," 29 October 1953, in FRUS. 1952-1954: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1543-44.
109. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council," 23 December 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1953: Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1568-71.
110. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 2 January 1954, quoted in Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, p. 34.
111. See USCAR Facts Notebook (various years), RG 260 (USCAR), Records of the HCRI, HICOM Administrative Files, Boxes 8, 16, National Archives-College Park. In my view, this was done because the Amami reversion required that the U.S. and Japan decide where the Amami Islands end and the Ryûkyûs began and ended.
112. "Draft Directive for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," 11 January 1954, in FRUS. 1952-1954: Vol. 14. Part 2, p. 1586.
113. "U.S. Policy toward Japan" (NSC 5516/1 ), 9 April 1955, in U.S. Department of State, FRUS. 1955-1957: Volume XXIII. Part 1, Japan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1991) (hereinafter FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23. Part 1, p. 60.
114. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, p. 35.
115. "A position paper on Ryûkyû and Bonin Islands," (secret), 22 August 1955, RG 59 (State Department), General Records of the State Department Executive Secretariat Conference Files 1949-1963, Box 82, National Archives-College Park. Yet in a report from the State Department's Division of Research for the Far East, it was noted that Japan would drift away from the West unless it was treated equally and the Ryûkyûs and Bonins were returned. Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 76-77.
116. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State," 31 August 1955, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, pp. 115-16.
117. "Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Ambassador Aldrich's Residence," 19 August 1956, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23. Part 1, pp. 202-203.
118. Wolf Mendl, Japan's Asia Policy (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 30-31. For a discussion of U.S. economic relations (and frictions) around this time, see, Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), ch. 6.
119. "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State," 7 January 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 28, Part 1, pp. 240-43.
120. "Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)," 8 January 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, pp. 244-45 and pp. 245 n. 2.
121. Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President," 12 June 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, pp. 346-48. Rather than being unsympathetic to Japanese demands, Dulles feared that if anything was renegotiated there was a risk of precipitating such a rash of demands that the entire security treaty arrangement would be endangered. Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 81-85.
122. "Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)," 13 June 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Pan I, pp. 349-351.
123. "Memorandum of a Conference with the President," 18 June 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, p. 359.
124. "Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Kishi," 20 June 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, pp. 383-85.
125. (Emphasis added) "Memorandum of a Conversation," 21 June 1957, in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, pp. 408-410.
126. "Memorandum of a Conversation," 2 Uune l95T, in FRUS,1955-1957: Vol. 23, Part 1, p. 411.
127. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, p. 39. On the summit as a whole, see Schaller, Altered States, pp. 132-35.
128. Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 69-99; and Schaller, Altered States, ch. 6.
129. Timothy P. Maga, Hands Across the Sea? U.S.-Japan Relations. 1961-1981 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997), pp. 4-17; and Schaller, Altered Stales, pp. 169, 171.
130. The U.S. confronted problems in Indo-China and was building intermediate range ballistic missile launching sites on Okinawa. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 47-48. On USCAR General Paul Caraway's opposition to reversion or the liberalization of the U.S. administration of the Ryükyüs, see Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 51-53; Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, p. 178; and Schaller, Altered States, pp. 171-72.
131. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 46-48.
132. Apparently, Ikeda and his adviser Kiichi Miyazawa did not want to press too hard because they feared it would result in damage to U.S.-Japan economic relations. Maga, Hands Across the Sea? p. 17.
133. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 1150 (10 July 1961) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1961), pp. 57-58.
134. According to one source, Kennedy did this not only to improve U.S.-Japan relations, but also to get rid of the "ugly American" image that he thought was damaging U.S. relations with the Third World, a bloc whose support was vital for winning the Cold War. Maga, Hands Across the Sea?, pp. 18-20.
135. "Okinawa reversion: a study of the administrative aspects," enclosure 3.
136. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 51-53.
137. Maga, Hands Across the Sea?, pp. 62-65; and Schaller, Altered States, ch. 11.
138. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, p. 61; and Schaller, Altered States, pp. 189-190.
139. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 62-65; Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, p. 117; Maga, Hands Across the Sea? pp. 70-72; and Schaller, Altered States, p. 196.
140. Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, pp. 79, 178-79.
141. Ibid. pp. 80-81, 177-181; and Schaller, Altered States, pp. 205-206. In August and September, the U.S. contemplated asking Japan for a quid pro quo in exchange for returning the islands to Japan. Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, p. 114; and Schaller, Altered States, p. 204.
142. Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, pp. 66-68; Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, pp. 207-211 ; and Schaller, Altered States, p. 207.
143. See Department of State ZIH//e/;Vi, Vol. 65, No. 1686 (17 October 1971) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1971), pp. 431-35; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65, No. 1690 (15 November 1971) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1971), pp. 565-68; Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Touchstone, 1990), p. 343; and statements by retired U.S. State Department personnel in "The Okinawa reversion: ending the post-war period," Foreign Service Journal, May 1992, pp. 18-22. For background on Nixon administration debates over the return of the Ryûkyûs,
144. see Shiels, America, Okinawa, and Japan, pp. 81-83; Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 115,118-120; Maga, Hands Across the Sea? pp. 78-84; and Schaller, Altered States, pp. 211-220.
145. See n. 20.
146. United States Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, p. 11.
147. Ibid. p. 91.
148. On 19June 1971, Japanese Foreign Minister KiichiAichi publicly stated that the 1971 reversion accord has settled the issue of the Diaoyu Islands as far as Japan and the U.S. were concerned. United States Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, p. 76.
149. United States Institute of Peace, "The South China Sea Dispute: prospects for preventive diplomacy," August 1995, pp. 16-17.
150. One only has to look at the Navy's obstinate stand with respect to the return of the strategically meaningless Bonin Islands to get a flavour for this thinking. Schaller, Altered Slates, p. 204.
151. United States Senate, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, pp. 93,115,147. See also Schaller, Altered Slates, pp. 214-15, 229-231.
152. This explanation is suggested inter alia by John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), p. 310; Schaller, Altered States, pp. 243-44; and Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism," p. 125. Despite the appeal of an explanation based on realpolitik, a conclusive answer must await the declassification and publication of more archival material by the U.S. government.
153. For an attempt to conduct analyses of the interests involved in territorial disputes, see Masato Kimura and David A. Welch, "Specifying 'interests': Japan's claim to the northern territories and its implications for international relations theorizing," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1998), pp. 213-244; and Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism."
154. See nn. 5-7.
155. 'Trouble in paradise: maritime risks and threats in the Western Pacific," Jane's Intelligence Review-Special Report,No. 7 (1995), p. 11; and Kristof, "Would you fight for these islands?"
156. Mendl, Japan's Asia Policy, pp. 51, 81.
157. See East Asian Diplomacy and Defence Review, No. 2 (1997), http:// www.eecg.toronto.edu/syxu/kan wa/e9702.html.
158. Thomas Forsberg, "Explaining territorial disputes: from power politics to normative reasons," Journal of Peace Research; Vol. 33, No. 4 (1996), pp. 433-449; Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Borders as institutions: a new framework for understanding border disputes," paper presented the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, 3-6 September 1998; and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Borders and borderlands: an institutional approach to territorial disputes in the Asia Pacific," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, December 1998.
159. See, for example, Avery Goldstein, "Great expectations: interpreting China's arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for rivalry: prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33.
160. The view that economic interdependence will constrain East Asian countries is noted in Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 107; and Goldstein, "Great Expectations," pp. 69-70. On the limitations of the commercial liberal argument, see Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Commercial liberalism under fire: evidence from 1914 and 1936," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 4-50. The evidence is also lacking that the level of economic interdependence between China and Japan is really that great. For a conceptual treatment of the topic of measuring economic interdependence, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and
161. Norrin M. Ripsman, "Measuring economic interdependence: a geopolitical perspective," Geopolitics and International Boundaries, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 1996), pp. 225-246; and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Rethinking sensitivity interdependence: assessing trade, investment, and monetary links between states," paper presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, 17-21 March 1998.