Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 114-146

  Downs, Erica Strecker ^a   Saunders, Phillip C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039960266     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.3.114     Document Type: Article

References (195)

1. Jack Synder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 79-101.
2. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 30-33.
3. Jack Synder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
4. V.P. Gagnon, "Ethic Nationalism and International Conflict," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), 130-166.
5. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.
6. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 13-15; Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," China Quarterly, No. 141 (June 1995), p. 316; and David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 204-209.
7. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 13-15; Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," China Quarterly, No. 141 (June 1995), p. 316; and David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 204-209.
8. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 13-15; Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," China Quarterly, No. 141 (June 1995), p. 316; and David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 204-209.
9. Charles Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, Anil Bamezai, Donald P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2015: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995). Balanced assessments of military modernization can be found in David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-23; Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996), pp. 759-764; and Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.
10. Charles Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, Anil Bamezai, Donald P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2015: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995). Balanced assessments of military modernization can be found in David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-23; Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996), pp. 759-764; and Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.
11. Charles Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, Anil Bamezai, Donald P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2015: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995). Balanced assessments of military modernization can be found in David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-23; Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996), pp. 759-764; and Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.
12. Charles Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, Anil Bamezai, Donald P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2015: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995). Balanced assessments of military modernization can be found in David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-23; Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996), pp. 759-764; and Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.
13. Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-45.
14. Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" p. 205.
15. Edward Friedman, "Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy, and the Prospects of a Larger War," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 5-32; and Barry Sautman, "Racial Nationalism and China's External Behavior," World Affairs, Vol. 160, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 78-95.
16. Edward Friedman, "Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy, and the Prospects of a Larger War," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 5-32; and Barry Sautman, "Racial Nationalism and China's External Behavior," World Affairs, Vol. 160, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 78-95.
17. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
18. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
19. Most of these books are commercial ventures intended to appeal to nationalist sentiment, not government-funded propaganda. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangyang, and Qiao Bian, eds., Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu [China can say no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshan Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996); and Sai Xianwei, Zhongguo da Zhanlüe: Lingdao Shijie de Lanthu [China's grand strategy: blueprint for world leadership] (Hainan: Hainan Publishing House, 1996). For reviews and summaries in English, see Fei-Ling Wang, "Ignorance, Arrogance, and Radical Nationalism: Review of China Can Say No," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 161-165; Hongshan Li, "China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism?" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 153-160; and John W. Garver, "China as Number One," China Journal, No. 39 (January 1998), pp. 61-66.
20. Most of these books are commercial ventures intended to appeal to nationalist sentiment, not government-funded propaganda. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangyang, and Qiao Bian, eds., Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu [China can say no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshan Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996); and Sai Xianwei, Zhongguo da Zhanlüe: Lingdao Shijie de Lanthu [China's grand strategy: blueprint for world leadership] (Hainan: Hainan Publishing House, 1996). For reviews and summaries in English, see Fei-Ling Wang, "Ignorance, Arrogance, and Radical Nationalism: Review of China Can Say No," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 161-165; Hongshan Li, "China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism?" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 153-160; and John W. Garver, "China as Number One," China Journal, No. 39 (January 1998), pp. 61-66.
21. Most of these books are commercial ventures intended to appeal to nationalist sentiment, not government-funded propaganda. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangyang, and Qiao Bian, eds., Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu [China can say no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshan Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996); and Sai Xianwei, Zhongguo da Zhanlüe: Lingdao Shijie de Lanthu [China's grand strategy: blueprint for world leadership] (Hainan: Hainan Publishing House, 1996). For reviews and summaries in English, see Fei-Ling Wang, "Ignorance, Arrogance, and Radical Nationalism: Review of China Can Say No," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 161-165; Hongshan Li, "China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism?" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 153-160; and John W. Garver, "China as Number One," China Journal, No. 39 (January 1998), pp. 61-66.
22. Most of these books are commercial ventures intended to appeal to nationalist sentiment, not government-funded propaganda. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangyang, and Qiao Bian, eds., Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu [China can say no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshan Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996); and Sai Xianwei, Zhongguo da Zhanlüe: Lingdao Shijie de Lanthu [China's grand strategy: blueprint for world leadership] (Hainan: Hainan Publishing House, 1996). For reviews and summaries in English, see Fei-Ling Wang, "Ignorance, Arrogance, and Radical Nationalism: Review of China Can Say No," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 161-165; Hongshan Li, "China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism?" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 153-160; and John W. Garver, "China as Number One," China Journal, No. 39 (January 1998), pp. 61-66.
23. Most of these books are commercial ventures intended to appeal to nationalist sentiment, not government-funded propaganda. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangyang, and Qiao Bian, eds., Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu [China can say no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshan Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996); and Sai Xianwei, Zhongguo da Zhanlüe: Lingdao Shijie de Lanthu [China's grand strategy: blueprint for world leadership] (Hainan: Hainan Publishing House, 1996). For reviews and summaries in English, see Fei-Ling Wang, "Ignorance, Arrogance, and Radical Nationalism: Review of China Can Say No," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 161-165; Hongshan Li, "China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism?" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (March 1997), pp. 153-160; and John W. Garver, "China as Number One," China Journal, No. 39 (January 1998), pp. 61-66.
24. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); and John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 157-166.
25. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); and John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 157-166.
26. Beacuse our focus is on the calculations of Chinese leader, we use the Chinese name "Diaoyu Islands" for the remainder of the article. This does not imply acceptance of any side's sovereignty claims.
27. For a useful exposition and critique of the culturalism-to-nationalism thesis, see James Townsend, "Chinese Nationalism," in Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 1-30.
28. John Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism," in ibid., pp. 56-85.
29. Chih-Yu Shih, "Defining Japan: The Nationalist Assumption in China's Foreign Policy," International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 543-544.
30. Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).
31. Shih, "Defining Japan," p. 545.
32. Since the CCP's patriotic education campaign began in 1992, the Nanjing massacre exhibit at the Museum of the Revolution in Beijing has expanded dramatically, and attendance at the Nanjing museum, which features a large exhibit on the massacre, has doubled. Visits by Phillip Saunders; and Patrick Tyler, "China's Campus Model for the 90's: Earnest Patriot," New York Times, April 23, 1996, p. A4.
33. World Bank, Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997); and Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin, "Income and Inequality in China: Composition, Distribution, and Growth of Household Income, 1988 to 1995," China Quarterly, No. 154 (June 1998), pp. 221-253.
34. World Bank, Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997); and Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin, "Income and Inequality in China: Composition, Distribution, and Growth of Household Income, 1988 to 1995," China Quarterly, No. 154 (June 1998), pp. 221-253.
35. Guoming Yu and Xiayang Liu, Zhongguo Minyi Yanjiu [Research on public opinion in China] (Beijing: People's University Press, 1994), pp. 85-87; and Jie Chen, Yang Zhong, Jan Hillard, and John Scheb, "Assessing Political Support in China: Citizen's Evaliations of Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 16 (November 1997), p. 558.
36. Guoming Yu and Xiayang Liu, Zhongguo Minyi Yanjiu [Research on public opinion in China] (Beijing: People's University Press, 1994), pp. 85-87; and Jie Chen, Yang Zhong, Jan Hillard, and John Scheb, "Assessing Political Support in China: Citizen's Evaliations of Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 16 (November 1997), p. 558.
37. See Barry Sautman, "Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory," China Quarterly, No. 129 (March 1992), pp. 72-102; and Stanley Rosen, ed., "Nationalism and Neoconservatism in China in the 1990s," special issue of Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 30, No. 6 (November-December 1997).
38. See Barry Sautman, "Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory," China Quarterly, No. 129 (March 1992), pp. 72-102; and Stanley Rosen, ed., "Nationalism and Neoconservatism in China in the 1990s," special issue of Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 30, No. 6 (November-December 1997).
39. Yang Zhong, "Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimation in China," Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1996), pp. 212-218.
40. Although top Chinese leaders compete for power and sometimes have different policy prefrences, our analysis focuses on their common interest in regime survival. In the interest of parsimony and given the lack of reliable information on individual leadership preferences, we treat CCP civilian leaders as a collective, unitary actor. Our argument could be extended to analyze other relationships in which legitimacy matters, such as civil-military relations or the relationship of competing top CCP leaders to medium-level officials.
41. Legitimacy claims based on nationalism and economic performance can be conceptualized either as appealing to both sentiments in a single individual or as separate appeals to groups with differenct preferences. In reality, the two formulations overlap considerably.
42. Japan's suspension of some developmental aid after China conducted nuclear tests in May and August 1995 is one example.
43. There is an additional domestic constraint against excessive nationalism: appeals based on Han superiority would likely fuel separatism among non-Han minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet.
44. See Allen S. Whiting and Xin Jianfei, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Pragmatism and Passion," World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 109-112, 116, 129; and Kuang-Sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990).
45. See Allen S. Whiting and Xin Jianfei, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Pragmatism and Passion," World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 109-112, 116, 129; and Kuang-Sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990).
46. This interpretation differs from those that see shifts between economic reform and political orthodoxy as the product of conflicts between conservatives and reformers in the CCP leadership. Carol Lee Hamrin argues that economic difficulties strengthened conservative influence and shifted policy toward orthodoxy. See Hamrin, "Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 105-106. We agree that elite conflicts matter, but feel our analysis parsimoniously captures this dynamic by focusing on the common goal of maintaining CCP legitimacy.
47. Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995).
48. For details on recent efforts to craft nationalism into an ideology that might replace socialism, see Joseph Fewsmith, "Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 2 (July 1995), pp. 635-651; and Zhao Shuisheng, "China's Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writings in the 1990s," China Quarterly, No. 152 (December 1997), pp. 730-738.
49. For details on recent efforts to craft nationalism into an ideology that might replace socialism, see Joseph Fewsmith, "Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 2 (July 1995), pp. 635-651; and Zhao Shuisheng, "China's Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writings in the 1990s," China Quarterly, No. 152 (December 1997), pp. 730-738.
50. Jiang Zemin's political weakness in early 1996 likely permitted the military a greater voice in policy, but since Deng Xiaoping's death Jiang's authority has become clear. Jiang has reasserted CCP control over the military through retirement of People's Liberation Army (PLA) elders, appointment of new senior officers, and moves to reduce PLA policy influence and prerogatives. These measures include defense cuts of an additional 500,000 men, the lack of a PLA representative on the Politburo Standing Committee, and Jiang's July 1998 order for the PLA to divest its vast business holdings. For views that emphasize military influence, see Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng"; and Garver, Face Off. For a more skeptical view, see Michael Swaine, "The PLA and Chinese National Security Policy: Leadership, Structures, Processes," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 360-393.
51. Jiang Zemin's political weakness in early 1996 likely permitted the military a greater voice in policy, but since Deng Xiaoping's death Jiang's authority has become clear. Jiang has reasserted CCP control over the military through retirement of People's Liberation Army (PLA) elders, appointment of new senior officers, and moves to reduce PLA policy influence and prerogatives. These measures include defense cuts of an additional 500,000 men, the lack of a PLA representative on the Politburo Standing Committee, and Jiang's July 1998 order for the PLA to divest its vast business holdings. For views that emphasize military influence, see Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng"; and Garver, Face Off. For a more skeptical view, see Michael Swaine, "The PLA and Chinese National Security Policy: Leadership, Structures, Processes," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 360-393.
52. Jiang Zemin's political weakness in early 1996 likely permitted the military a greater voice in policy, but since Deng Xiaoping's death Jiang's authority has become clear. Jiang has reasserted CCP control over the military through retirement of People's Liberation Army (PLA) elders, appointment of new senior officers, and moves to reduce PLA policy influence and prerogatives. These measures include defense cuts of an additional 500,000 men, the lack of a PLA representative on the Politburo Standing Committee, and Jiang's July 1998 order for the PLA to divest its vast business holdings. For views that emphasize military influence, see Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng"; and Garver, Face Off. For a more skeptical view, see Michael Swaine, "The PLA and Chinese National Security Policy: Leadership, Structures, Processes," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 360-393.
53. For an analysis of Japanese motives for stable relations and how they have affected economic relations, see Qingxin Ken Wang, "Recent Japanese Diplomacy in China: Political Alignment in a Changing World Order," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 6 (June 1993), pp. 625-641.
54. Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-58; and Gerald Segal, "The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan?" World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 27-32.
55. Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-58; and Gerald Segal, "The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan?" World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 27-32.
56. For a geological analysis of the area's oil and gas potential and review of competing claims (with maps), see Mark J. Valencia, Offshore North-East Asia: Oil, Gas, and International Relations (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988).
57. Multinational oil companies currently have little interest in drilling near the Diaoyus because of difficult terrain, political uncertainty, existence of unexploded ordnance from the use of the islands as a target range, and doubts about whether any reserves that might exist can be exploited on commercially viable terms. Western oil companies spent $5 billion drilling in geologically similar areas in the northern part of the South China Sea without discovering any significant commercial finds. See Sanqiang Jian, "Multinational Oil Companies and the Spratly Dispute," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 16 (January 1997), pp. 596-597.
58. For a detailed legal analysi of the claims, see Jeanette Greenfield, China's Practice in the Law of the Sea (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 596-597.
59. Japan argues that the continental shelf should be divided along the median line between the two countries; China advocates use of natural prolongation of the continental shelf, which would give it most of the territory.
60. Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 97-98. This estimate assumes that the Diaoyu Islands are islets or rocks that "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" and therefore do not generate a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone or separate continental shelf claim. Article 121.3 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which concerns rocks, contains ambiguities that make it possible for Japan to argue that the Diaoyus are islands that convey rights to a much broader area of the continental shelf. See Greenfield, China's Practice in the Law of the Sea, pp. 134-135.
61. Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 97-98. This estimate assumes that the Diaoyu Islands are islets or rocks that "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" and therefore do not generate a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone or separate continental shelf claim. Article 121.3 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which concerns rocks, contains ambiguities that make it possible for Japan to argue that the Diaoyus are islands that convey rights to a much broader area of the continental shelf. See Greenfield, China's Practice in the Law of the Sea, pp. 134-135.
62. For a detailed statement of the historical basis of China's sovereignty claim, see Zhong Yan, "China's Claim to Diaoyu Island Chain Indisputable," Beijing Review November 4-10, 1996, pp. 14-19.
63. Bruce Gilley, Sebastian Moffet, Julian Baum, and Matt Forney, "Rocks of Contention," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 19, 1996, p. 15.
64. Zhong, "China's Claim to Diaoyu Island Chain Indisputable," pp. 17-18. The islands were not explicitly mentioned in the treaty and were first defined as part of the Okinawa archipelago by a 1953 U.S. administrative order. See Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "The Contemporary Origins of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands: The U.S. Role," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998.
65. Zhong, "China's Claim to Diaoyu Island Chain Indisputable," pp. 17-18. The islands were not explicitly mentioned in the treaty and were first defined as part of the Okinawa archipelago by a 1953 U.S. administrative order. See Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "The Contemporary Origins of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands: The U.S. Role," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998.
66. For an analysis of the Diaoyu dispute and U.S. policy during this period, see Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Details of the U.S. diplomatic position on the status of the Diaoyus are in Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 27-29, 1971, pp. 88-93, 144-154.
67. For an analysis of the Diaoyu dispute and U.S. policy during this period, see Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Details of the U.S. diplomatic position on the status of the Diaoyus are in Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 27-29, 1971, pp. 88-93, 144-154.
68. Zhong, "China's Claim to Diaoyu Island Chain Indisputable," p. 14.
69. Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude," Asian Survey, Vol. 18 No. 12 (December 1978), pp. 1235-1249.
70. David Bachman, "Structure and Process in the Making of Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 40-41.
71. It is fair to ask how much the average Chinese knows or cares about the Diaoyu Islands. A 1992 poll of over 1,000 Beijing college students found that 98.6 percent supported the overseas movements to protect the Diaoyu Islands. "Beijing Campuses Are Permeated with Anti-Japanese Feelings," China Times Weekly, October 18-24, 1992, pp. 22-23. A December 1995 poll conducted for the China Youth Daily found that 91.5 percent agreed that Japanese militarists had issued a strong challenge to China by erecting a lighthouse on the Diaoyus. Xinhua, "Youth Polled on Japan's Invasion of China," February 16, 1997, in World News Connection (WNC). WNC is the electronic version of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The authors also encountered a number of Chinese analysts and students in Beijing in 1996 and 1997 who expressed nationalistic and anti-Japanese views and were both informed and concerned about the Diaoyus.
72. It is fair to ask how much the average Chinese knows or cares about the Diaoyu Islands. A 1992 poll of over 1,000 Beijing college students found that 98.6 percent supported the overseas movements to protect the Diaoyu Islands. "Beijing Campuses Are Permeated with Anti-Japanese Feelings," China Times Weekly, October 18-24, 1992, pp. 22-23. A December 1995 poll conducted for the China Youth Daily found that 91.5 percent agreed that Japanese militarists had issued a strong challenge to China by erecting a lighthouse on the Diaoyus. Xinhua, "Youth Polled on Japan's Invasion of China," February 16, 1997, in World News Connection (WNC). WNC is the electronic version of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The authors also encountered a number of Chinese analysts and students in Beijing in 1996 and 1997 who expressed nationalistic and anti-Japanese views and were both informed and concerned about the Diaoyus.
73. It is fair to ask how much the average Chinese knows or cares about the Diaoyu Islands. A 1992 poll of over 1,000 Beijing college students found that 98.6 percent supported the overseas movements to protect the Diaoyu Islands. "Beijing Campuses Are Permeated with Anti-Japanese Feelings," China Times Weekly, October 18-24, 1992, pp. 22-23. A December 1995 poll conducted for the China Youth Daily found that 91.5 percent agreed that Japanese militarists had issued a strong challenge to China by erecting a lighthouse on the Diaoyus. Xinhua, "Youth Polled on Japan's Invasion of China," February 16, 1997, in World News Connection (WNC). WNC is the electronic version of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The authors also encountered a number of Chinese analysts and students in Beijing in 1996 and 1997 who expressed nationalistic and anti-Japanese views and were both informed and concerned about the Diaoyus.
74. David Shambaugh, "China in 1990," Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 36-49.
75. "Patriotism and the Mission of Chinese Intellectuals - Speech by Jiang Zemin at a Report Meeting Held by Youth in the Capital to Commemorate 'May 4th,'" Xinhua, May 3, 1990, in FBIS, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS-CHI), May 4, 1990, pp. 8-13.
76. Xinhua, June 3, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, June 4, 1990, p. 44.
77. Xinhua, "Anti-Japanese War Exhibition Opens in Beijing," July 7, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, July 10, 1990, p. 6.
78. According to Walter Fauntroy, chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on International Development, Institutions, and Finance, loans pending or in the pipeline to China in 1989 included $4.7 billion at the World Bank, $1.1 billion at the Asian Development Bank, and $5.6 billion in bilateral development loans from Japan. "Congressmen Urge Block on World Bank Lending to China," Journal of Commerce, June 21, 1989, p. 7A.
79. Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 163-168.
80. Whiting and Xin, "Sino-Japanese Relations," pp. 108-115; and Fan Chuek-wan, Hong Kong Standard, November 3, 1990, p.1.
81. Whiting and Xin, "Sino-Japanese Relations," pp. 108-115; and Fan Chuek-wan, Hong Kong Standard, November 3, 1990, p.1.
82. Kyodo, September 29, 1990, in FBIS, Daily Report: East Asia (herafter FBIS-EAS), October 2, 1990, pp. 11-12. According to a former U.S. diplomat who questioned Japanese official directly, the safety agency's intention to recognize the lighthouse was based on its utility as a navigational aid and was not intended to press Japanese sovereignty claims.
83. Kyodo, October 23, 1990, in FBIS-EAS, October 23, 1990, p. 5; and Sebastian Moffet, "The Right and Its Wrongs," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 21, 1996, p. 30.
84. Kyodo, October 23, 1990, in FBIS-EAS, October 23, 1990, p. 5; and Sebastian Moffet, "The Right and Its Wrongs," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 21, 1996, p. 30.
85. Taipei Central News Agency (CNA), October 19, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, pp. 55-56; and Japanese broadcast from Beijing, October 19, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, p. 7.
86. Taipei Central News Agency (CNA), October 19, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, pp. 55- 56; and Japanese broadcast from Beijing, October 19, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, p. 7.
87. "Both Sides of the Straits Unite in Dealing with the Foreign Country and Safeguarding China's Sovereignty over Diaoyu Island," Wen Wei Po, October 23, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 23, 1990, p. 11; and Can Cheng, "The Storm over Diaoyu Island," Zhongguo Tongxun She [China News Agency], October 24, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 24, 1990, p. 3.
88. "Both Sides of the Straits Unite in Dealing with the Foreign Country and Safeguarding China's Sovereignty over Diaoyu Island," Wen Wei Po, October 23, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 23, 1990, p. 11; and Can Cheng, "The Storm over Diaoyu Island," Zhongguo Tongxun She [China News Agency], October 24, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 24, 1990, p. 3.
89. "Both Sides of the Straits Unite in Dealing with the Foreign Country and Safeguarding China's Sovereignty over Diaoyu Island," Wen Wei Po, October 23, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 23, 1990, p. 11; and Can Cheng, "The Storm over Diaoyu Island," Zhongguo Tongxun She [China News Agency], October 24, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 24, 1990, p. 3.
90. "Japan Casts Greedy Eyes on Diaoyutai," Wen Wei Po, October 20, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, pp. 8-9; and Hsieh Ying, "Diaoyu Island Is China's Sacred Territory," Wen Wei Po, October 22, 1990, p. 2 , in FBIS-CHI, October 25, 1990, pp. 3-4.
91. "Japan Casts Greedy Eyes on Diaoyutai," Wen Wei Po, October 20, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, pp. 8-9; and Hsieh Ying, "Diaoyu Island Is China's Sacred Territory," Wen Wei Po, October 22, 1990, p. 2 , in FBIS-CHI, October 25, 1990, pp. 3-4.
92. "Japan Casts Greedy Eyes on Diaoyutai," Wen Wei Po, October 20, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, pp. 8-9; and Hsieh Ying, "Diaoyu Island Is China's Sacred Territory," Wen Wei Po, October 22, 1990, p. 2 , in FBIS-CHI, October 25, 1990, pp. 3-4.
93. "Japan Casts Greedy Eyes on Diaoyutai," Wen Wei Po, October 20, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, October 22, 1990, pp. 8-9; and Hsieh Ying, "Diaoyu Island Is China's Sacred Territory," Wen Wei Po, October 22, 1990, p. 2 , in FBIS-CHI, October 25, 1990, pp. 3-4.
94. Taipei Domestic Service, October 21, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, October 24, 1990, p. 68.
95. Taipei Domestic Service, October 22, 1990, in ibid., p. 69; and Willy Wo-lap Lam, South China Morning Post, October 30, 1990, p. 9.
96. Taipei Domestic Service, October 22, 1990, in ibid., p. 69; and Willy Wo-lap Lam, South China Morning Post, October 30, 1990, p. 9.
97. Kyodo, October 23, 1990, in FBIS-EAS, October 23, 1990, p.3.
98. Kyodo, October 24, 1990, in FBIS-EAS, October 24, 1990, p. 2.
99. Tai Ming Cheung and Charles Smith, "Rocks of Contention," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1, 1990, p. 19.
100. "Qi Huaiyuan Makes an Urgent Appointment with the Japanese Ambassador to China to Discuss Issues of Territorial Rights and Military Policy," Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, October 29, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, October 29, 1990, pp. 8-9.
101. "Qi Huaiyuan Makes an Urgent Appointment with the Japanese Ambassador to China to Discuss Issues of Territorial Rights and Military Policy," Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, October 29, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, October 29, 1990, pp. 8-9.
102. Lam, October 30, 1990, p. 9.
103. Bellette Lee and Shirley Yam, "Protests Continue," South China Post, October 29, 1990, pp. 1-2.
104. "Addressing the Tiaoyutai Issue," China Post, October 24, 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 56. The announcement was probably intended to score political points by taking a tougher line on nationalist issues than the ruling Nationalist Party; the Taiwanese government prevented the fihing-boat flotilla from sailing.
105. "Addressing the Tiaoyutai Issue," China Post, October 24, 1990, p. 4 in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 56. The announcement was probably intended to score political points by taking a tougher line on nationalist issues than the ruling Nationalist Party; the Taiwanese government prevented the fihing-boat flotilla from sailing.
106. Catherine Beck and Daniel Kwan, "Diaoyu Islands Campaign Called 'Ruse,'" South China Morning Post, October 26, 1990, p. 2; and Taipei CNA, November 12, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, November 15, 1990, p. 73.
107. Catherine Beck and Daniel Kwan, "Diaoyu Islands Campaign Called 'Ruse,'" South China Morning Post, October 26, 1990, p. 2; and Taipei CNA, November 12, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, November 15, 1990, p. 73.
108. Lin Pao-hua, "New Trends in Beijing's Relations toward Japan, " Ming Pao, October 30, 1990, p. 9, in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 9; Chao Han-ching, "We want Diayou Islands; We Do Not Want Japanese Yen" Cheng Ming, November 1, 1990, pp. 8-9, in FBIS-CHI, November 2, 1990, p. 7.
109. Lin Pao-hua, "New Trends in Beijing's Relations toward Japan, " Ming Pao, October 30, 1990, p. 9, in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 9; Chao Han-ching, "We want Diayou Islands; We Do Not Want Japanese Yen" Cheng Ming, November 1, 1990, pp. 8-9, in FBIS-CHI, November 2, 1990, p. 7.
110. Lin Pao-hua, "New Trends in Beijing's Relations toward Japan, " Ming Pao, October 30, 1990, p. 9, in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 9; Chao Han-ching, "We want Diayou Islands; We Do Not Want Japanese Yen" Cheng Ming, November 1, 1990, pp. 8-9, in FBIS-CHI, November 2, 1990, p. 7.
111. Lin Pao-hua, "New Trends in Beijing's Relations toward Japan, " Ming Pao, October 30, 1990, p. 9, in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 9; Chao Han-ching, "We want Diayou Islands; We Do Not Want Japanese Yen" Cheng Ming, November 1, 1990, pp. 8-9, in FBIS-CHI, November 2, 1990, p. 7.
112. Willy Wo-lap Lam, "China: Beijing Turns a Blind Eye," South China Morning Post, October 31, 1990, p. 15.
113. Lin, "New Trends in Beijing's Relations toward Japan," p. 7, in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 9.
114. Lin, "New Trends in Beijing's Relations toward Japan," p. 7, in FBIS-CHI, October 30, 1990, p. 9.
115. "Firm Stand, Prudent Attitude," Wen Wei Po, November 1, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, November 1, 1990, p. 7.
116. "Firm Stand, Prudent Attitude," Wen Wei Po, November 1, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, November 1, 1990, p. 7.
117. Lo Ping, "Bowing to Japanese Yen Has Angered the Masses," Cheng Ming, November 1, 1990, pp. 6-7, in FBIS-CHI, November 5, 1990, p. 7.
118. Lo Ping, "Bowing to Japanese Yen Has Angered the Masses," Cheng Ming, November 1, 1990, pp. 6-7, in FBIS-CHI, November 5, 1990, p. 7.
119. Lam, "China: Beijing Turns a Blind Eye," p. 15; Chao, "We Want Diaoyu Islands," p. 7; and Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
120. Lam, "China: Beijing Turns a Blind Eye," p. 15; Chao, "We Want Diaoyu Islands," p. 7; and Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
121. Lam, "China: Beijing Turns a Blind Eye," p. 15; Chao, "We Want Diaoyu Islands," p. 7; and Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
122. Document cited in Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
123. Fan Chuek-Lam and Alan Nip, "Intellectuals Criticize Government," Hong Kong Standard, October 31, 1990, p. 10;
124. and Chueng Po-ling, "Request for Anti-Japanese Rally Probe," Hong Kong Standard, December 19, 1990, p. 6.
125. Fan and Nip, Hong Kong Standard, p. 10.
126. Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
127. Chao, "We Want Diaoyu Islands," p. 7; and Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
128. Chao, "We Want Diaoyu Islands," p. 7; and Lo, "Bowing to Japanese Yen," p. 7.
129. Chao, "We Want Diaoyu Islands," p. 7.
130. Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" pp. 190-191; Garver, Face Off, pp. 60-62; and Robert G. Sutter, "China Policy: Crisis over Taiwan, 1995 - A Post-Mortem," Congressional Research Service Report 95-1173 F, December 5, 1995, pp. 5-6.
131. Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" pp. 190-191; Garver, Face Off, pp. 60-62; and Robert G. Sutter, "China Policy: Crisis over Taiwan, 1995 - A Post-Mortem," Congressional Research Service Report 95-1173 F, December 5, 1995, pp. 5-6.
132. Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" pp. 190-191; Garver, Face Off, pp. 60-62; and Robert G. Sutter, "China Policy: Crisis over Taiwan, 1995 - A Post-Mortem," Congressional Research Service Report 95-1173 F, December 5, 1995, pp. 5-6.
133. Phillip Saunders's interviews with Chinese analysts in Beijing and Shanghai, August-September 1996 and June-July 1997.
134. "State Adopts UN's Maritime Law," Beijing Review, June 3-9, 1996, p. 5; and "News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," ibid., p. 10. In 1992 China's inclusion of the Diaoyu Islands in its domestic territorial waters law (reportedly at the behest of the PLA) had triggered Japanese protests. By not specifying baselines around Taiwan, China avoided provoking Japan without weakening its sovereignty claim.
135. "State Adopts UN's Maritime Law," Beijing Review, June 3-9, 1996, p. 5; and "News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," ibid., p. 10. In 1992 China's inclusion of the Diaoyu Islands in its domestic territorial waters law (reportedly at the behest of the PLA) had triggered Japanese protests. By not specifying baselines around Taiwan, China avoided provoking Japan without weakening its sovereignty claim.
136. Maggie Farley, "China Enlists WWII Fervor to Foster National Strength," Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1995, p. A1; and Sheila Tefft, "China Remembers a Cruel Japan," Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1995, p. 1.
137. Maggie Farley, "China Enlists WWII Fervor to Foster National Strength," Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1995, p. A1; and Sheila Tefft, "China Remembers a Cruel Japan," Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1995, p. 1.
138. Japan imported 20 percent of China's total exports in 1996. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997), p. 157.
139. Christopher B. Johnstone, "East Asian Dispute Sparks Regional Jitters," JEI (Japan Economic Institute of America) Report No. 37, October 4, 1996, in LEXIZ/NEXIS.
140. Taipei CNA, August 22, 1996, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 24, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
141. "No Japanese Challenge against Chinese Sovereignty Allowed," Wen Wei Po, September 2, 1996, in WNC.
142. Kyodo, "China Blasts Ikeda's Remarks on Senkaku Islands," August 29, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
143. "Japan, Do Not Do Foolish Things," Xinhua, August 30, 1996, in WNC
144. Kyodo, September 2, 1996, in WNC.
145. Zhongguo Tongxun She, September 3, 1996, in WNC.
146. Xinhua, September 11 and 12, 1996, in WNC.
147. 26quot;Party Leaders, Generals to Discuss Diaoyu Islands at Plenum," Hong Kong Standard, September 23, 1996, p. 1.
148. Nicholas D. Kristof, "An Asian Mini-Tempest over Mini-Island Group," New York Times, September 16, 1996, p. A8.
149. Kyodo, September 25, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS; and Xinhua, September 25, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
150. Kyodo, September 25, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS; and Xinhua, September 25, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
151. "Democrats Start Week of Action over Diaoyu Islands," Hong Kong Standard, October 1, 1996, p. 3; and "Diaoyu Activists Storm Japanese Consulate," South China Morning Post, October 10, 1996, p. 1.
152. "Democrats Start Week of Action over Diaoyu Islands," Hong Kong Standard, October 1, 1996, p. 3; and "Diaoyu Activists Storm Japanese Consulate," South China Morning Post, October 10, 1996, p. 1.
153. "Tong Zeng Reveals That Protect Diaoyu Activities Are Still Being Carried Out on the Mainland," Hsin Pao, October 1, 1996, p. 10, in WNC.
154. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "China Reluctant to Help," South China Morning Post, September 27, 1996, p. 2.
155. Kyodo, "Premeir Li Slams Japan on Chinese National Day," September 30, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
156. "Vice Froreign Minister Interviewed on Island Dispute with Japan," NHK TV, October 9, 1996, in BBC Summary of World Broadcast, October 11, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
157. "China's Qian Calls for Joint Exploration of Senkakus," Kyodo, October 13, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS; and "Qian Urges Tokyo to Keep Pledge on Senkakus," Jiji Press Ticker Service, October 14, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
158. "China's Qian Calls for Joint Exploration of Senkakus," Kyodo, October 13, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS; and "Qian Urges Tokyo to Keep Pledge on Senkakus," Jiji Press Ticker Service, October 14, 1996, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
159. In fact, the Japanese owner had not given permission for construction of either lighthouse and regarded landings on the islands as illegal entry. "Islands of Extremism," South China Morning Post, September 22, 1996, p. 16.
160. Kyodo, October 30, 1996 in LEXIS/NEXIS; and Kwan Weng Kin, "No Legal Power to Remove Lighthouse: Hashimoto," Staits Times, October 31, 1996, p. 3, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
161. Kyodo, October 30, 1996 in LEXIS/NEXIS; and Kwan Weng Kin, "No Legal Power to Remove Lighthouse: Hashimoto," Staits Times, October 31, 1996, p. 3, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
162. Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Keeping Western Influence at Bay," South China Morning Post, October 2, 1996, p. 17; and Steven Munson," Chinese Protest Finds a Path on the Internet," Washington Post, September 17, 1996, p. A9.
163. Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Keeping Western Influence at Bay," South China Morning Post, October 2, 1996, p. 17; and Steven Munson," Chinese Protest Finds a Path on the Internet," Washington Post, September 17, 1996, p. A9.
164. Marylois Chan, "Jiang Issues Campus Gag Order on Diaoyu Incident," Hong Kong Standard, September 17, 1996, p. 1; and Lin Chin-yi, "State Education Commission Sends a Message to Institutions of Higher Education Nationwide Warning Them Against Too-Drastic Words and Deeds," Ming Pao, September 17, 1996, p. A4, in WNC.
165. Marylois Chan, "Jiang Issues Campus Gag Order on Diaoyu Incident," Hong Kong Standard, September 17, 1996, p. 1; and Lin Chin-yi, "State Education Commission Sends a Message to Institutions of Higher Education Nationwide Warning Them Against Too-Drastic Words and Deeds," Ming Pao, September 17, 1996, p. A4, in WNC.
166. "Diaoyu Protesters Told to Stop Their Activities," Hong Kong Standard, September 13, 1996, p. 1.; and" Activists: 'Military Confrontation' with Japan 'Possible,'" Hong Kong Standard, October 1, 1996, p. 3.
167. "Diaoyu Protesters Told to Stop Their Activities," Hong Kong Standard, September 13, 1996, p. 1.; and" Activists: 'Military Confrontation' with Japan 'Possible,'" Hong Kong Standard, October 1, 1996, p. 3.
168. "Beijing Said Ordering Cities to Curb Diaoyu Protests," South China Morning Post, October 18, 1996, p. 12.
169. "Beijing Moves to Keep Lid on Protests," Daily Yomiuri, October 7, 1996, p. 1, in LEXIS/NEXIS.
170. Lo Ping, "Army,Civilians Call Jiang Zemin to Account," Cheng Ming, October 1, 1996, pp. 6-8, in WNC.
171. Jasper Becker, "Students in Beijing 'To Scared' to Protests," South China Morning Post, September 26, 1996, p. 8; and aothors' interview with a participation in the protests, Princeton, New Jersey, March 1998.
172. Jasper Becker, "Students in Beijing 'To Scared' to Protests," South China Morning Post, September 26, 1996, p. 8; and aothors' interview with a participation in the protests, Princeton, New Jersey, March 1998.
173. Huang Ling, "Leaflets Spread on Fudan Campus Calling for 'Breaking the Ice' on Diaoyu Islands," Ming Pao, September 17, 1996, p. A4, in WNC.
174. Lo, "Army, Civilians Call Jiang Zemin to Account."
175. Jen Hui-wen, "Zhongnanhai Points Out Three Aspects Which Should Not Be Ignored in Dealing with Japan and the United States,"m Hsin Pao, September 13, 1996, p.14, in WNC.
176. "Party Leaders, Generals to Discuss Diaoyu Issue at Plenum," Hong Kong Standard, September 23, 1996, p.1.
177. Lo Ping, "Jiang Zemin Seen Facing over Diaoyutai Issue," Cheng Ming, October 1, 1996, pp. 6-8, in WNC.
178. This restrained policy may be correlated with Jiang Zemin replacing Li Peng as head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, China's top foreign policy coordinating group, in late 1996. Bachman, "Structure and Process in the Making of Chinese Foreign Policy," pp 37-39.
179. The incident occured when China erected territorial markers and structures on a reef also claimed by the Philippines; the Philippine government protested the Chinese action and later sent warships to demolish the structures.
180. World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), pp. 1-4, 43-59; and Khan and Raskin, "Income and Enequality in China."
181. World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), pp. 1-4, 43-59; and Khan and Raskin, "Income and Enequality in China."
182. Zhong, "Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimation in China," p. 214-215.
183. Chen et al., "Assessing Political Support in China," p. 565.
184. Zhong, "Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimation in China," p. 215.
185. Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea," pp. 1018-1020.
186. "Calmer Waters," South Morning Post, September 18, 1997, p. 22.
187. Thomas W. Robinson, "Interdependence in China's Foreign Relations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: China Foreign Relationship in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colo.: Westviewt Press, 1994), pp. 187-201.
188. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Richard Rosencrane, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autum 1997), p. 522.
189. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Richard Rosencrane, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest int the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autum 1997), p. 522.
190. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Richard Rosencrane, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest int the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autum 1997), p. 522.
191. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Richard Rosencrane, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest int the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autum 1997), p. 522.
192. Wang Xu, " Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development, Vol. 25, No. 9 (September 1997), pp. 1413-1442.
193. A more responsive Chinese government might be pressured even harder by popular nationalist demands, but this would be less worrying than current deliberate government efforts to maintain legitimacy by stirring up nationalism.
194. For similar argument that emphasizes China's current international weakness, see Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
195. "Beijing Takes the Long View," Asia Times, October 31, 1996, p. 8.