Toward natural implementation

International Economic Review

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 949-980

  Saijo, Tatsuyoshi ^a   Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu ^a   Yamato, Takehiko ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347138589     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527318     Document Type: Article

References (37)

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