Organization structure, contract design and government ownership: A clinical analysis of German privatization

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 265-299

  Dyck, I J Alexander ^a   Wruck, Karen Hopper ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Contract design; G32; G38; L22; Organization structure; P52; Privatization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038908094     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00008-x     Document Type: Article

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