How size matters: The United States, China and asymmetry

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 123-150

  Womack, Brantly ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 9744228862     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390412331302565     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. The Athenian answer to the plea for mercy from the defeated island of Melos in 416 BC was, to translate freely, Of men we know, and of the gods we believe, that the strong rule when they can and the weak serve when they must.'
2. See Dale Copeland, 'Economic interdependence and war: A theory of trade expectations', International Security 20/4 (Spring 1996).
3. As Grotius puts it, 'There is no state so powerful that it may not at some time need the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to ward off the forces of many foreign nations united against it.' Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill Library of Liberal Arts 1957; original 1625) p.16.
4. Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, 'The impact of the international economy on national policies', in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (eds.) Intemationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: CUP 1996) pp.25-47.
5. Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betractungen (Berlin: Ullstein Bücher 1966 (first published posthumously in 1905 from materials dating from 1864 to 1893) p.79.
6. Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past Present and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000) esp. pp. 182-230.
7. This thesis is similar in result to Alexander Wendt's Lockean model of anarchy in Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: CUP 1999) pp.279-97. The difference is that Wendt makes a cultural argument for the modern respect for sovereignty, while I am merely asserting that a marginal advantage in capacity does not necessarily mean that domination is possible or convenient. I would expect that a Lockean culture would develop from such experiences, and along with Wendt I would think that a Kantian culture would ultimately be the most rational adjustment to long term coexistence.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 'Recent Trends in Military Expenditure', at >http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_trends.html<, p.1.
9. Let me suggest a standardization of disparity adjectives. Disparity is 'clear' when the larger exceeds the smaller by half (smaller is less than 67 per cent), it is 'great' when the larger is double (smaller is less than 50 per cent), and it is 'overwhelming' when the larger is ten times the smaller (smaller is less than 10 per cent).
10. The marginal utility of a better weapon can exceed its marginal cost.
11. If one takes into account the dispersion of military expenses necessary in a large country, then China has a smaller percentage of possibly deployable resources vis-à-vis either Japan or Taiwan and therefore its relative position is weaker than the aggregate numbers would suggest.
12. SIPRI (note 8) p.1.
13. Part of the theory is presented in more detail in my unpublished MS, 'Asymmetry and Misperception: The Cases of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia'.
14. These questions are infinitely more important in defining parity than in defining disparity, because parity requires the drawing of a thin line of equality, while disparity points to the vast spaces on either side.
15. Demographic risk here refers to problems affected by the demographic scale of the countries involved. For instance, forest fires in Indonesia might seriously threaten air quality in Singapore, but forest fires in Singapore would be merely a curiosity to Indonesia, since Singapore has only three million people and far fewer trees.
16. The best general narrative of the period is Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy (NY: Macmillan 1986). The best account of the Chinese side is Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press 2000).
17. The best general narrative of the period is Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy (NY: Macmillan 1986). The best account of the Chinese side is Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press 2000).
18. See Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History (Hanoi: Gioi Publishers 1993) p.76.
19. An example would be the American interpretation of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s as a 'proxy war' between the Soviet Union and China. The reality was not simply more detailed than this stereotype, it was far more complex.
20. Order' not in the strong sense of an enforced world rule of law, but in the sense of what Max Weber calls a system of 'sozialen Chancen' (social likelihoods).
21. The most eloquent presentation of this is Wang Gungwu, 'Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia', in John K Fairbank (ed.) The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1968) pp.34-62.
22. The Qing mentality of empire is well described in James Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar (Durham, NC: Duke UP 1995) esp. pp.30-56.
23. For a detailed description of Southeast Asia's opinion of the behavior of the United States, Japan and China during the Asian financial crisis, see Wimonkan Komumas, 'Half a Hegemon: Japan's Leadership in Southeast Asia' (Charlottesville: Foreign Affairs PhD dissertation, 2000).
24. See Nathaniel Thayer, 'Chinese City of Dreams', Phnom Penh Post, 12-25 Aug. 1994, pp.1, 8.
25. China Daily, 19 July 2000.
26. China Daily, 6 July 2000.
27. See Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1996) pp. 148-82.
28. The term 'hyperpower' was coined by French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine (with Dominique Moisi) in Les Cartes de la France a l'heure de la Mondialisation [The assets of France in the era of globalization] (Paris: Fayard 2000).
29. The best-known statement of the alarmist position is Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (NY: Knopf 1997). An analysis of the alarmist faction in Washington is provided by Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, '"Blue team" draws a hard line on Beijing; Action on Hill reflects informal group's clout', Washington Post, 2 Feb. 2000, p. 1.
30. The best-known statement of the alarmist position is Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (NY: Knopf 1997). An analysis of the alarmist faction in Washington is provided by Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, '"Blue team" draws a hard line on Beijing; Action on Hill reflects informal group's clout', Washington Post, 2 Feb. 2000, p. 1.
31. At the time, this visit was unfairly lampooned in the press as a post-election boondoggle.