Performance bounded reinforcement learning in strategic interactions

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 2-7

  Banerjee, Bikramjit ^a   Peng, Jing ^a  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGENT TECHNOLOGIES; MUTLIAGENT LEARNING (MAL); REINFORCEMENT LEARNING; SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT;

AUTOMATION; GAME THEORY; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; MATRIX ALGEBRA; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PERFORMANCE; USER INTERFACES;

LEARNING SYSTEMS;

EID: 9444299000     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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