Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 2077-2120

  McLean, Richard P ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

consistency; consistent value; Egalitarian solution; Harsanyi solution; non transferable utility; potential; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 9144234263     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03018-7     Document Type: Review

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