India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the shadow of nuclear war

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 479-507

  Ganguly, Sumit ^a   Wagner, R Harrison ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; NUCLEAR WEAPON; PEACE PROCESS; REGIONAL SECURITY;

ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; INDIA; PAKISTAN; SOUTH ASIA; WORLD;

EID: 8744232996     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1362369042000282994     Document Type: Article

References (116)

1. For a helpful discussion of the origins of these terms and the main issues in this debate, see David J. Karl, 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers', International Security 21 /3 (Winter 1996-97) pp.87-119.
2. See also the ensuing correspondence between Karl and Peter D. Feaver and Scott D. Sagan, 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Power', International Security 22/2 (Autumn 1997) pp. 185-207.
3. One of the key early contributions to the literature was Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better' (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies 1981).
4. Waltz's views were criticized in a variety of places by Scott Sagan, and their disagreements have been published in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (NY: W.W. Norton & Company 2003).
5. A helpful early review of many of the important issues in this debate can be found in Peter R. Lavoy, 'The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp.695-753.
6. See also the debate on the subject in the same issue, with contributions by Peter D. Feaver, Steven R. David, Brahma Chellaney, Shai Feldman and Brad Roberts, and replies by Kenneth Waltz and Scott D. Sagan. An important recent contribution that focuses on South Asia is Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press 1998).
7. Sagan and Waltz also discuss South Asia specifically on pp.88-124 of the new edition of The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. For a recent review of some of the issues in this debate, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, 'Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate', Security Studies 12/1 (Autumn 2002) pp.41-96.
8. Glenn Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror', in Paul Seabury (ed.), The Balance of Power (San Francisco, CA: Chandler 1965) p.199.
9. Proliferation pessimists also emphasize that efforts to develop nuclear weapons by a country's adversary might be enough to lead that country to launch a preventive attack, but now that both India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals that possibility seems less of a cause for concern in South Asia.
10. An early discussion of this question that has been overlooked by most of the participants in the debate about the effects of nuclear proliferation is in Barry Nalebuff, 'Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation', Conflict Management and Peace Science 9/2 (Spring 1986) pp. 19-30.
11. Nalebuff showed that if the likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war is commonly known, then increasing it will make conventional war less likely, but the result will be to leave the overall probability of nuclear war unchanged. (The argument is similar to the idea that the frequency of accidents will not be much affected by whether cars have anti-lock brakes or not, if better brakes just encourage drivers to be less cautious, while poorer brakes make them more cautious.)
12. See the discussion in Karl, 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Power' (note 1) and Karl's ensuing correspondence with Feaver and Sagan.
13. This possibility was briefly but inconclusively discussed by Peter Lavoy in 'The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation', pp.739-40.
14. See, for example, Robert Jervis's discussion of the 'stability/instability paradox' in Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Possibility of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989) pp.19-22.
15. Thomas Schelling dubbed this the 'threat that leaves something to chance'. See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1996), Chap. 3. The possibility of inadvertent nuclear war is the basis for what are sometimes called 'brinkmanship' models of deterrence. Perhaps the first model of brinkmanship was in Barry Nalebuff, 'Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation' (note 4).
16. For a recent discussion of what brinkmanship models imply about the issues debated by proliferation optimists and pessimists, see Robert Powell, 'Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense', International Security 77/4 (Spring 2003) pp.86-118. The relation between our analysis and brinkmanship models will be discussed below, in the concluding section of this article.
17. That is why during the Cold War counter-force strategies were accompanied by what some people called the 'no-cities doctrine', which was really an attempt to hold the enemy's population centers hostage as a way of possibly deterring him from responding to one's initial counter-force attack. See the discussion of this point in Schelling, Arms and Influence (note 8) pp. 190-98.
18. As Robert Jervis wrote, '...it can be argued that providing incentives to strike first is one of the virtues of counterforce. By creating a degree of crisis instability, it mitigates the stability-instability paradox and deters the Russians from creating dangerous situations. Whether an advantage or not, it seems clear that the preemptive strain in American military planning is caused in large part by the belief that extended deterrence requires the United States to be prepared to respond to a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe not only with nuclear weapons but with a militarily effective counterforce thrust'. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (note 7) pp.165-6.
19. The motivation behind the French nuclear force was actually more complicated than this, though the French government often claimed greater credibility for it. For a discussion of French motivations, see Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1971).
20. An influential critique of the French rationale for an independent nuclear force can be found in Raymond Aron, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy (NY: Doubleday & Company 1965).
21. A recent account of the importance of worries about the possible development of nuclear weapons by West Germany can be found in Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999 ).
22. See Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, 'Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan: A concise report of a visit by Landau Network - Centro Volta', Landau Network - Centro Volta, Villa Olmo, Via Cantoni 1, 22100 Como, Italy, available at .
23. General Kidwai said that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons only 'if the very existence of Pakistan is at stake', and claimed that that would be true in any of the four cases he described. See Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, 'Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy' (note 12). Worries about what Pakistan might do if faced with imminent defeat have been increased by the presence of radical Islamic groups within Pakistan with close ties to Pakistan's military. See, for example, Scott Sagan's discussion in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (note 1) p.100.
24. Note that during the Cold War many people thought the only credible role for a French nuclear deterrent was as a means of forcing the early use of nuclear weapons by the US.
25. See the discussion in Rodney W. Jones, 'Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies XXV/5 (Summer 2002) pp.1-59.
26. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991).
27. Ibid. p.14.
28. The possibility of inadvertent escalation in South Asia is discussed in Stephen A. Smith, 'Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan', unpublished master's thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, CA, Dec. 2002 (available at ). This thesis is discussed in Peter R. Lavoy and Maj. Stephen A. Smith, 'The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use Between India and Pakistan', Strategic Insight, 3 Feb. 2003, Center for Contemporary Conflict, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, CA (available at . An earlier survey of Indian and Pakistani strategies and force structures can be found in Jones, 'Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia' (note 15).
29. It would also require a serious assessment of the stability of the military regime in Pakistan if it were faced with the possibility of military defeat by India.
30. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (note 1) pp.109-24. Note that brinkmanship models of deterrence assume that the risk of inadvertent nuclear war is commonly known. But the debate about the magnitude of that risk in South Asia indicates that this is not likely to be true. Our analysis explores the implications of that fact. Further comparison with brinkmanship models can be found below in the concluding section of the article.
31. See, for example, Alexander Nicoll, 'New Delhi plays waiting game on Kashmir', Financial Times, 26 July 2002.
32. The idea that limited military conflicts are best understood as a means of revealing information as part of a bargaining process is at least as old as Clausewitz. The seminal recent work on the relation between bargaining and war is James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', International Organization 49/3 (Summer 1995) pp.379-414.
33. The relation between bargaining and limited war is discussed in R. Harrison Wagner, 'Bargaining and War', American Journal of Political Science 44 (July 2000) pp.469-84.
34. For a survey of recent literature on the subject, see Robert Powell, 'Bargaining Theory and International Conflict', Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002) pp.1-30.
35. For a recent discussion of the role of third parties in mediating conflicts, see Robert W. Rauchhaus, 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation and Conflict Management', paper delivered at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 28-31 Aug. 2003.
36. See also R. Harrison Wagner, 'Bargaining and Conflict Management', in Zeev Maoz et al. (eds), Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2004).
37. A recent analysis of US interests and policies in South Asia actually said that since the main US interest was in preventing nuclear war, it was in the interest of the US that the Indian and Pakistani perceptions of the nuclear threshold 'should end up being the exact opposite of [each] other's': India needed to believe that Pakistan's threshold for nuclear use was low, while Pakistan needed to be confident enough for its threshold actually to be high. And it recommended ways by which the US government should engage the two countries in order to pursue its interest in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. Yet this study is publicly available on the Internet, and can be read by policy-makers in both Pakistan and India.
38. See Andrew C. Winter and Toshi Yoshihara, 'Nuclear Stability in South Asia', A Publication by The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., In Association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, p.107. Available at .
39. This possibility has been noted by Scott Sagan. See Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (note 1) p.107. However, Sagan does not elaborate on this point, or explore its implications. For a discussion of an earlier unsuccessful US attempt at mediation between India and Pakistan, see Timothy Wallace Crawford, 'Playing the Pivot in South Asia: Kennedy's Attempt to Broker Peace in Kashmir, 1962-1963', working paper, Brookings Institution, 10 July 2001. In that case, US mediation efforts led the two parties to seek additional leverage by involving the USSR and China in the process. Rodney Jones has suggested that one reason for the lack of transparency in the nuclear doctrines and force structures of India and Pakistan is that this increases 'the potential diplomatic influence they may exert over foreign interlocutors, who engage to dissuade nuclear arming, military competition, and instability, in hopes of reducing the risks of nuclear war'. Jones, 'Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia' (note 15) p.25.
40. For an analysis of the 'Brasstacks' crisis, see Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar 1994).
41. See also Scott Sagan's discussion of this crisis, in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (note 1) pp.93-5. Sagan claims that the Indian chief of staff hoped that the Brasstacks exercise would provoke a Pakistani attack.
42. For a discussion of Pakistan's involvement in this insurgency see Paul Wallace, 'Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity', in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995).
43. Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: CUP; and Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1997).
44. On the transformation of the insurgency see Ganguly, Crisis in Kashmir (note 28).
45. Personal communication between author and a senior Indian Air Force officer, Jan. 2000.
46. P.R. Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States (New Delhi: Manohar 1995).
47. Rear Admiral Raja Menon (retd.), A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage 2002) p.102.
48. For a detailed discussion of the Gates mission see Hagerty, Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (note 1)
49. See, for example, Pervez Hoodbhoy, 'Nuclear Deterrence: An Article of Faith', The News (Islamabad), 17 March 1993.
50. General Mirza Aslam Beg as quoted in Fasahat H. Syed, Nuclear Disarmament and Conventional Arms Control Including Light Weapons (Islamabad: FRIENDS 1997) p.421.
51. Beg as quoted in Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2002) p.215.
52. On this point see Lieutenant General Moti Dar (retd.), 'Blundering Through', in Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on the Kargil War (New Delhi: HarperCollins 1999).
53. The literature on the Kargil conflict is voluminous. One important work is Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights (Patiala: Motibagh Palace 1999).
54. For an excellent, if critical, account of the Kargil conflict, see Praveen Swami, The Kargil War (New Delhi: Leftword Books 1999).
55. Bruce Reidel, 'American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House', Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002.
56. The Kargil Review Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage 1999) p.77.
57. Rahul Bedi, 'A Dismal Failure', in Guns and Yellow Roses (note 37) p.159.
58. Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, 'Countdown Doomsday?' Newsline, June 2002, available at .
59. Some Pakistani commentators also argued that support to the insurgents in Kashmir keeps a large part of Indian Army bogged down there, making it difficult for India to launch a full-fledged war against Pakistan, especially on the international border; see Lt. General (retd) Javed Nasir, 'How Real is the Threat of a Nuclear War?' The Nation (Lahore), 27 Aug. 2000.
60. Quoted in Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm (note 36) p.217.
61. On the Indian use of airpower in support of ground operations in Pakistan see Richard Sission and Leo Rose, War and Secession (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1990).
62. The best available study of India's responses to the Pakistani incursions in Kashmir is Singh, A Ridge Too Far (note 38).
63. Note that there is no contradiction between saying that Pakistan's nuclear weapons have made India more cautious, and saying that Indian political leaders believe that others have exaggerated the danger of nuclear war with Pakistan. As the evidence presented below suggests, Indian leaders seem now to believe that their own caution has encouraged Pakistan to be over-confident. Hence the need to take some action that would restore some credibility to their threats to use conventional force.
64. Lieutenant General Talat Masood (retd.) as quoted by Bharat Bhusan, 'In Enemy Country', in Guns and Yellow Roses (note 37) p.101.
65. Air Commodore Jamal Hussain (ret'd), 'Would India Attack Pakistan?' Defence Journal 5/5 (Dec. 2001).
66. See, for example, the critical account in Swami, The Kargil War (note 39);
67. also see Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, 'Limited Conflict under the Nuclear Umbrella: Lessons from the Kargil Crisis' (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001).
68. See also the discussion of this point in Jeffrey W. Knopf, 'Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate' (note 1) pp.52-3. Note that, because of the lack of transparency of decision-making in Pakistan, it is impossible to determine with certainty the role that nuclear weapons have played in fostering optimism about Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir. However, early Indian statements about the implications of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons gave Pakistan ample reason for optimism. Moreover, the precise answer to this question is less important for our analysis than what Indian decision-makers believe the answer to it is. And there are many indications that this is what they believe. For an earlier discussion of the lessons India drew from the Kargil conflict, see Rodney Jones, 'Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia' (note 15) pp.33-6.
69. See also Winner and Yoshihara, 'Nuclear Stability in South Asia'.
70. Husain Haqqani, 'Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir', in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Frank Cass 2003).
71. Barry Bearak, '26 Die as Suicide Squad Bombs Kashmir Legislative Building', New York Times, 2 Oct. 2001, p.A3.
72. Celia W. Dugger, 'Suicide Raid in New Delhi: Attackers among 12 Dead', New York Times, 15 Dec. 2001, p.A1.
73. Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari, 'Bombers Kill 33 in Kashmir as US Envoy Visits India', Financial Times, 15 May 2001, p.4;
74. also see Rama Lakshmi, 'At Least 30 Killed in Raid in Kashmir', Washington Post, 15 May 2002, p.A23.
75. Edward Luce, 'Back to the Brink', Financial Times, 14 May 2002.
76. A recent discussion of the coup against Sharif can be found in Bennett Jones, Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm (note 36) pp.34-55.
77. John Kifner, 'Proxy War Threatens to Unravel U.S. Alliance', New York Times, 29 Oct. 2001, p.B5.
78. Patrick E. Tyler and Celia W. Dugger, 'Powell's Message: America's Courting of Pakistan Will Not Come at India's Expense', New York Times, 18 Oct. 2001, p.B3.
79. See, for example, the commentary by Major General (retd) Ashok K. Mehta, 'Beyond the Lull', 21 Aug. 2002, at . Alexander Nicoll reported in the Financial Times that 'there was a strong feeling in the [Indian] defence establishment that, following the December terrorist attack on parliament in New Delhi, India should call Pakistan's nuclear bluff and show it would not be deterred from conventional military retaliation by Pakistan's nuclear weapons'. Alexander Nicoll, 'New Delhi Plays Waiting Game on Kashmir', Financial Times, 26 July 2002.
80. Howard LaFranchi, 'Attacks Move Pakistan Up, India Down, on US Agenda', Christian Science Monitor, 24 Sept. 2001.
81. Joseph Kahn, 'U.S. Is Planning an Aid Package for Pakistan Worth Billions', New York Times, 27 Oct. 2001.
82. Celia W. Dugger, 'India Wants End to Group in Kashmir Attack', New York Times, 3 Oct. 2001, p.B5.
83. Agence France Press, 'Washington Trying to Strike a Balance; Pakistan-India Anti-Terrorism Role', Dawn, 5 Oct. 2001, online edn at .
84. On this point see Tunku Varadarajan, 'Overgeneralization: The Case against Pakistan's Dictator', Wall Street Journal, 20 Nov. 2001.
85. Jim Hoagland, 'An Ally's Terrorism', Washington Post, 3 Oct. 2001, p.A31;
86. also see David Makovsky, 'Pakistan's Janus Face: Having It Both Ways with Bin Laden', US News and World Report, 24 Sept. 2001, available at .
87. Khozern Merchant, 'Powell in Mission to Restrain Indian Fury over Disputed State', Financial Times, 16 Oct. 2001, p.2.
88. V. Sudarshan, 'Half-a-Bargain Deal', Outlook, 21 Oct. 2001.
89. Times News Network, 'US to Resume Defence Supplies to India', Times of India, 6 Nov. 2001, online edition at .
90. Joanna Slater, 'A Tremor at the Fault Line', Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 Dec. 2001-3 Jan. 2002, available at .
91. David E, Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, 'Citing India Attack, U.S. Aims at Assets of Group in Pakistan', New York Times, 21 Dec. 2001, p.A1.
92. John F. Burns and Celia W. Dugger, 'India Builds Up Forces as Bush Urges Calm', New York Times, 30 Dec. 2001, p.A6.
93. Howard Witt and Uli Schmetzer, 'Missile Alert in Kashmir', Chicago Tribune, 27 Dec. 2001, p.1.
94. Celia W. Dugger, 'India Recalling Pakistan Envoy over Delhi Raid', New York Times, 22 Dec. 2001, p.A1.
95. Celia W. Dugger, 'India Defense Minister Belittles Pakistan's Latest Gestures', New York Times, 3 Jan. 2002, p.A3.
96. Paul Watson, 'India Calls for Action, Not Just Gestures', Los Angeles Times, 6 Jan. 2002, p.A5.
97. English rendering of President General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, 12 Jan. 2002.
98. Praveen Swami, 'The Collapse of an Initiative', Frontline 20 July-2 Aug. 2002, available at .
99. For Musharraf's propensity to take risks, see Jim Hoagland, 'Misreading Musharraf', Washington Post, 23 May 2002, p.A33.
100. Edward Luce, 'India Prepares for Strike on Camps', Financial Times, 17 May 2002, available at .
101. Barry Bearak, 'Indian Leader's Threat of War Rattles Pakistan and the US', New York Times, 23 May 2002, p.A12.
102. Omar Abdullah as quoted in Hoagland, 'Misreading Musharraf' (note 80).
103. Howard W. French, 'Pakistan Seeks Monitors to Cool the Simmering Crisis in Kashmir', New York Times, 21 May 2002.
104. Barry Bearak, 'Kashmir Leader Is Killed, Bringing Tensions to Boil', New York Times, 22 May 2002, p.A10.
105. Edward Luce, 'Kashmir Killing Seen as Talks Warning', Financial Times, 21 May 2002, available at .
106. Seth Mydans, 'Toehold on a Long Trek to Heal India-Pakistan Rift', 17 June 2002, p.A2.
107. Author's personal communication with a senior American intelligence official. For a discussion of how American diplomacy helped defuse this crisis see Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2002) pp. 263-5.
108. See, for example, Mehta, 'Beyond the Lull' (note 62).
109. It also has implications for debates about the possible effect of the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, but we will not develop them here. See, for example, Kenneth Pollack's discussion of the effects of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons in his well-known book about US policy toward Iraq, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (NY: Random House 2002) p.251.
110. A similar thesis can be found in Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, 'Countdown Doomsday?'. However, it is not as well-developed or theoretically grounded as the argument presented here.
111. Compare, for example, the statements by Pakistan's General Khalid Kidwai about Pakistan's possible use of nuclear weapons quoted in Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, 'Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy' (note 12), with the Indian views reported in Edward Luce, 'India & Pakistan - Crisis: A cold war with some alarming hot spots', Financial Times, 23 May 2002.
112. See Powell, 'Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense' (note 8).
113. Brinkmanship models are typically vague about what generates the risk of accidental war, and some assume that it exists even in a crisis like the Cuban Missile Crisis. But if the risk of accidental nuclear war can be made arbitrarily large merely by prolonging a crisis, a conventional war would never occur. It seems plausible that if there is a genuine risk of inadvertent nuclear war, a conventional war would increase it. But then one must consider what that implies for the decision to move from crisis to war. That was the subject of Nalebuff, 'Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence' (note 4).
114. See Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (note 22).
115. See Haqqani, 'Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir' (note 53).
116. See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace (note 11).