The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the Issue of Proportionality

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 11, Issue , 2007, Pages 99-141

  Zimmermann, Andreas ^a  

^a Walther Schücking Institute   (Germany)

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EID: 85181719460     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/18757413-90000004     Document Type: Article

References (139)

1. The Israeli cabinet had, by decision of 25 March 2007, formally decided to call said conflict with Hezbollah the “Second Lebanon War”, cf. Cabinet Communiqué of 25 March 2007, available at: . In Lebanon, the conflict is also referred to as the “July war”.
2. Cf. C. Tomuschat, “Der Sommerkrieg des Jahres 2006. Eine Skizze”, Friedenswarte 81 (2006), 179 et seq.; as well as S. Weber, “Die israelischen Militäraktionen im Libanon und in den besetzten palästinensischen Gebieten 2006 und ihre Vereinbarkeit mit dem Völkerrecht”, AVR 44 (2006), 460 et seq.
3. E. Cannizzaro, “Contextualizing Proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese War”, International Review of the Red Cross 88 (2006), 779 et seq.;
4. D. Kramer, “Rechtliche Regelung asymmetrischer Konflikte? Völkerrecht und empirische Realität”, ibid., 96 et seq., but cf. for a critical analysis of their views C. Tomuschat, “Der Sommerkrieg des Jahres 2006.
5. Ein Schlusswort”, Friedenswarte 82 (2007), 107 et seq. Besides, the conflict also raised thorny issues post bellum since S/RES/1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006 adopted by the Security Council to bring about an end of the fighting, raises serious problems as to its nature and binding effect, which, however, will not be considered here.
6. cf. generally in that regard V. Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons under International Humanitarian Law”, Mich. J. Int. L. 22 (2000), 85 et seq.,
7. T.M. MacDonnell, “Cluster Bombs over Kosovo – a Violation of International Law?”, Arizona Law Review 44 (2002), 31 et seq.
8. cf. the homepage on the recent Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, February 22 - 23 2007, available at: .
9. .
10. Cf. A. Cassese, “Article 51”, in: J.P. Cot/ A. Pellet/ M. Forteau (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire article par article, 3rd edition 2005, 1329 et seq.;
11. N. Ocho-Ruiz/ E. Salamanca-Aguado, “Exploring the Limits of International Law relating to the Use of Force in Self-defence”, EJIL 16 (2005), 499 et seq.
12. Cf. J. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, 2004, 85 et seq.; Y. Dinstein, “Collateral Damage and the Principle of Proportionality”, in: D. Wippman/ M. Evangelista (eds), New Wars, New Laws? Applying the Laws of War in 21st Century Conflicts, 2005, 211 et seq.
13. Cf. generally as to the overall mandate and structure of the new Human Rights Council P. Alston, “Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime – Challenges confronting the new UN Human Rights Council”, Melbourne Journal of International Law 7 (2006), 185 et seq.;
14. M. Bossuyt, “The new Human Rights Council – a first Appraisal”, NQHR 24 (2006), 551 et seq.; W.S. Heinz, “Von der Menschenrechtskommission zum Menschenrechtsrat”, Friedenswarte 81 (2006), 129 et seq.;
15. G. Theissen, “Mehr als nur ein Namenswechsel – der neue Menschenrechtsrat der Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen 54 (2006), 138 et seq.
16. Cf. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1, Doc. A/HRC/3/2 of 23 November 2006, available at: .
17. cf. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, ibid., para. 10. Cf. also paras 14-15 of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry.
18. Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, Summary of Events, 12 July 2006, available at: .
19. Cf. also Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s War with Hezbollah – Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, April 2007, available at: .
20. Special Cabinet Communiqué: Hezbollah Attack, 12 July 2006, available at: . See also Report of the Commission page 20/21 and S/RES/1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006.
21. Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the ILC at its fifty-third session (2001) and by the General Assembly, cf. A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001.
22. (cf. lately Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
23. cf. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), ICJ Reports 1949, 4 et seq. (35 et seq.).
24. Cf. generally as to the development of the law of self-defense until 2002, A. Randelzhofer, “Article 51”, in: B. Simma et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, 2nd edition, 2002; for more recent developments cf. the comprehensive study by Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 4th edition 2005, in particular 175 et seq.
25. For an account of these actions prior to the Israeli counter-attack from an Israeli point of view cf. inter alia Hezbollah attacks along Israel’s northern border May 2000 - June 2006, 1 June 2006, available at: .
26. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, 14 et seq.
27. Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2003, 161 et seq.
28. C. Lerche, Militärische Abwehrbefugnisse bei Angriffen auf Handelsschiffe, 1993, in particular 77 et seq.
29. Oil Platforms case, see note 23, para. 78.
30. Cf. most recently for a comprehensive study of this possible “lacuna”, K. Oellers-Frahm, “Der IGH und die ‘Lücke’ zwischen Gewaltverbot und Selbstverteidigungsrecht – Neues im Fall ‘Kongo gegen Uganda’?, Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 10 (2007), 71 et seq. with ample further references.
31. C. Kreß, Gewaltverbot und Selbstverteidigungsrecht nach der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen bei staatlicher Verwicklung in Gewaltakte Privater, 1995, 172 et seq.;
32. Q. Wright, The Role of International Law in the Elimination of War, 1961, 60;
33. J. Becker, “The Continuing Relevance of Art. 2 (4)”, Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 32 (2004), 583 et seq. (589-590).
34. It is against this background that Israel did, by letter addressed to the president of the Security Council, notify the Security Council of its actions against Lebanese territory, as required by Article 51, 2nd phrase of the Charter, claiming to act in self-defense, cf. Doc. A/60/937-S/2006/515 of 12 July 2006.
35. This is true, inter alia for Muhammad Fneish and Trad Hamadeh, as well as independent Hezbollah-endorsed member Fawzi Sallouhk, cf. Heads of State and Cabinet Members, available at: .
36. Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 385.
37. Cf. ibid., para. 386, where the Court reiterates the very formulation contained in article 4 para. 2 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The Court also confirmed that, unless there is a clear lex specialis to the contrary, the general rules of attribution apply to all different forms of violations of international law, ibid., para. 401.
38. ILC Commentary to article 4 para. 1 of its Articles on State Responsibility, para. 1, referred to by the ICJ in its recent judgment in the Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 388 (emphasis added).
39. ILC Commentary to article 5 para. 7 of its Articles on State Responsibility, see note 38.
40. Nicaragua case, see note 20, para. 109/110.
41. Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 385.
42. Cf. e.g. the allegations contained in “Iranian complicity in the present Lebanese crisis – July-August 2006”, 15 August 2006, available at: .
43. Under article 3 lit. g.) of the Definition of Aggression, as contained in A/RES/3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, “The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein”, shall qualify as an act of aggression; for a detailed analysis of the definition of aggression, see B. Ferencz, “Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going”, AJIL 66 (1972), 491 et seq.
44. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 146, available at: .
45. Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 398.
46. Nicaragua case, see note 20, para. 116/117.
47. Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 143.
48. Nicaragua case, see note 20, para. 115.
49. Cf. also A. de Hoogh, “Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the Tadic case and Attribution of Acts of Bosnian Serb Authorities to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, BYIL 72 (2001), 255 et seq.
50. ILC Commentary to article 8 para. 5 of its Articles on State Responsibility, see note 38 where the ILC explicitly rejected the standard of attribution developed by the ICTY in the Tadic case.
51. Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 401.
52. Tadic case, see note 58, para. 145.
53. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, 136 et seq.
54. Ibid., para. 139 (emphasis added).
55. Oil Platforms case, see note 23.
56. Congo/Uganda case, see note 52.
57. Cf. ibid., para. 147, where the Court stated that, given the circumstances of the case, there is, “no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”
58. T. Bruha/ C. Tams, “Self-Defence Against Terrorist Attacks. Considerations in the Light of the ICJ’s ‘Israeli Wall’ Opinion”, in: K. Dicke et al. (eds), Weltinnenrecht – liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, 2005, 85 et seq. (94 et seq.).
59. S. Talmon, “Grenzen der ‘Grenzenlosen Gerechtigkeit’”, in: W. März (ed.), An den Grenzen des Rechts, 2003, 101 et seq. (142); cf. J. Delbrück, “The Fight Against Global Terrorism: Self-defence or Collective Security as International Police Action? Some Comments on the International Legal Implications of the ‘War Against Terrorism’”, GYIL 44 (2001), 9 et seq. (15); Dinstein, see note 15, 204 – 208. Cf. also Rule 6 of the Chatham House
60. ):
61. Cf. for such a proposition e.g. M. Bothe in: W. Vitzthum (ed.), Völkerrecht, 2004, 589 et seq. (597), as well as Randelzhofer, in: Simma, see note 15, 788 et seq. (802).
62. Judge Koijmans, in his Separate Opinion in the Congo/Uganda case, see note 72, para. 28, refers to what he calls a “generally accepted interpretation for more than 50 years”.
63. See preamble para. 3 of S/RES/1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, as well as preamble para. 4 of S/RES/1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001.
64. J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers, 2005, 184 et seq. and 196 et seq.
65. Press Release 124 (2001) of 12 September 2001, “Invocation of Article V of the Washington Treaty”, available at: .
66. Press Release E-194 (2001) of 21 September 2001, “Invocation of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance”, available at: .
67. Cf. inter alia S/RES/1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, operative para. 1, which provides that, “the Taliban [shall ....] cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice (…)”. This obligation was reconfirmed by S/RES/1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000.
68. As was rightly pointed out by R. Wolfrum/ C.E. Philipp, “The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights under International Law”, in: J.A. Frowein/ R. Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck UNYB 6 (2002), 559 et seq. (589, there footnote 114), there can be no doubt, that the attacks of 11 September 2001 were clearly of a magnitude that, if undertaken by a state or by state organs, would have constituted an armed attack and would accordingly have clearly triggered the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.
69. With regard to Afghanistan generally and the behavior of the Taliban more specifically, the Security Council had on various occasions determined that a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter did exist, cf. inter alia S/RES/1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, S/RES/1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000 and S/RES/1363 (2001) of 30 July 2001.
70. Congo/Uganda case, see note 52.
71. Congo/Uganda case, see note 52, Statement of I. Brownlie of 18 April 2005, Compte Rendue 2005/7, 30, para. 80.
72. Congo/Uganda case, see note 52, para. 301.
73. See e.g. S/RES/1614 (2005) of 29 July 2005, operative para. 6, whereby the Security Council called upon the government of Lebanon to, “fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout the south, (…) and to exert control and monopoly over the use of force on its entire territory and to prevent attacks from Lebanon across the Blue Line”. Similar requests were reiterated inter alia in S/RES/1583 (2005) of 28 January 2005, operative para. 4, as well as in operative para. 8 of S/RES/1655 (2006) of 31 January 2006.
74. Cassese, see note 4, 1333; P. Malanczuk, Akehurts’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition 1997, 315 et seq.; Randelzhofer, see note 15, marginal note 42.
75. Nicaragua case, see note 20, para. 194.
76. Ibid., para. 176, and with regard to Article 51 of the Charter, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ Reports 1996, 226 et seq. (para. 41).
77. R. Higgins, Problems and Process, 1994, 232 et seq.
78. G. Dahm, Völkerrecht II, 1961, 417; also Randelzhofer, see note 15, 788 et seq. (805).
79. Congo/Uganda case, see note 52, para. 147. The Court stated, “The Court cannot fail to observe, however, that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end.”
80. K. Doehring, Völkerrecht, 2nd edition 2004, para. 584; Gardam, see note 5, 155 et seq.
81. For further details as to the principle of proportionality as forming part of international humanitarian law cf. Gardam, see note 5, 59 et seq.
82. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, see note 92, para. 42.
83. Case concerning Oil Platforms, see note 23.
84. Decision of 29 June 2006, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); text to be also found at: .
85. Ibid., 2766 et seq. But cf. also the judgment by the Israeli Supreme Court in the so-called targeted killings case, HCJ 769/02, Judgment of 12 December 2006, Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of Israel et al., para. 21, (text to be found at: ), where the Court qualified the conflict between Israel and armed groups in the Gaza strip as amounting to an international armed conflict.
86. D. Schindler, “Different Types of Armed Conflicts”, RdC 163 (1979), 125 et seq. (132); M. Frostad, Jus in bello after September 11, 2001, 2004, 30 et seq.
87. Frostad, see above, 32.
88. List of State parties, available at: .
89. Unlike the United States, Israel has not even signed the First Additional Protocol to the four Geneva Conventions. For the reasons underlying Israel’s decision not to become a contracting party to the protocol cf. A. Zimmermann, “Israel and the International Criminal Court – An Outsider’s Perspective, Isr. Y. B. Hum. Rts 36 (2006), 231 et seq. (241 et seq.) with further references.
90. Arts. 51 para. 5. lit. b.); 57 para. 2, lit. a.) iii), and 85 para. 3, lit. b.) and c.) First Additional Protocol.
91. Cf. for such a proposition inter alia K. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, 2006, 241 et seq.
92. O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1999, 263 et seq.
93. Cf. C. Kreß, “War Crimes committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice”, Isr. Y. B. Hum. Rts 30 (2000), 103 et seq. (134).
94. Cf. article 25 para. 4 of the Rome Statute. As to the interrelationship between the Rome Statute and general international law, as well as international humanitarian law cf. A. Pellet, “Applicable Law”, in: A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. II (2002), 1051 et seq. (1082-1084).
95. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-95-16-T, Judgment of 14 January 2000, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., paras 521 et seq.
96. Cf. for a survey of relevant state practice in that regard J.M. Henckaerts/ L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I, 2005, 47; Gardam, see note 5, 110 et seq.
97. Cf. Henckaerts/ Doswald-Beck, see note 119, 49 et seq.; D. Casey, “Breaking the Chain of Violence in Israel and Palestine: Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings Under International Humanitarian Law”, Syracuse Journal of International Law 32 (2005), 311 et seq. (319).
98. As to the reasons why Israel is not becoming a contracting party of the First Additional Protocol cf. Zimmermann, see note 111.
99. Cf. generally as to the notion of persistent objection and its effects M. Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law”, BYIL 47 (1974-75), 1 et seq. (23 et seq.); M. Bos, “The Identification of Custom in International Law”, GYIL 25 (1982), 10 et seq. (43 et seq.).
100. Cf. for such a proposition A. Zimmermann, “Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and Human Rights Law – Synergy and Conflicts”, in: V. Epping/ W. Heintschel v. Heinegg (ed.), International Humanitarian Law – Facing new Challenges, 2006, 203 et seq. (218).
101. Cf. for example article 8 para. 2 lit. b.) i) Rome Statute; for a detailed analysis of this provision cf. W.J. Fenrick, “Other serious Violations of the Laws and Customs applicable in International Armed Conflicts”, in: Triffterer, see note 114, 186 et seq.; cf. also Zimmermann, note 111, 240.
102. Israel signed the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000, see: .
103. Communication from Israel to the Secretary General of 28 August 2002, available at: .
104. Henckaerts/ Doswald-Beck, see note 119, 302.
105. Text of this, as well as that of the other, parallel declarations to be found at: .
106. Text to be found, inter alia, at: .
107. Elements of Crimes, see above, there note 36 relating to article 8 para. 2 lit. b.) iv) of the Rome Statute.
108. For a general overview as to the notion of “military target” cf. A.P.V. Rogers, “What is a Legitimate Military Target?”, in: R. Burchill et al. (eds), International Conflict and Security Law, 2005, 160 et seq.
109. Cf. H. Fischer, “The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for War Crimes: Some Observations concerning Differences between the Statute of the Court and War Crimes Provisions in Other Treaties”, in: V. Epping/ H. Fischer/ W. Heintschel v. Heinegg (eds), Brücken bauen und begehen, Festschrift für Knut Ipsen zum 65. Geburtstag, 2000, 77 et seq. (98); see also W.J. Fenrick, “Utilizing the Presence of a Protected Person to render certain Objects immune from Military Operations”, in: Triffterer, see note 114, 253.
110. Cf. M. Sassòli, “Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of ‘Military Objectives’ for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, in: D. Wippman/ M. Evangelista (eds), New Wars, New Laws? Applying the Laws of War in 21st Century Conflicts, 2005, 181 et seq. (207).
111. Cf. as to the position of the Israeli government in that regard the statement by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 25 July 2006, Responding to Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, available at: .
112. See for such a proposition also the above mentioned statement of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see above.
113. Cf. Y. Sandoz/ C. Swiniarski/ B. Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1987, 632-633, “In 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drew up the following proposed list of categories of military objectives (…):
114. For such allegation, see note 136.
115. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, available at: .
116. ICTY, NATO Final Report, ibid., para. 47. The report stated, “Whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a debatable issue. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.”
117. Cf. for a similar proposition already Tomuschat, see note 2, 187.
118. See note 142, para. 37, 50; cf. Henckaerts/ Doswald-Beck, see note 119, 36 et seq.
119. Sandoz/ Swiniarski/ Zimmermann, see note 138, para 1979.
120. ICTY, NATO Final Report, see note 141. The report stated, “It is suggested that the determination of relative values must be that of the ‘reasonable military commander’. Although there will be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to non-combatants or the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military advantage gained (…)”. Cf. also the judgment of the ICTY in the Kupreskic case, see note 118, para. 254.
121. See M. Bothe/ K.J. Partsch/ W.A. Solf (eds), New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, 1982, 677-678.
122. Kupreskic case, see note 118, para. 526.
123. For a critical view on this judgment cf. also the Final Report to the Office of the prosecutor of the ICTY, see note 141, para. 52,“This formulation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive statement of the applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians. Its practical import, however, is somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is the committee’s view that where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all of which are deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime.”
124. Ibid., para. 52, “The committee understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign.” (emphasis in the original).
125. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affaires, Responding to Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon: Issues of proportionality of 25 July 2006, available at:
126. cf. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, see note 7; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s War with Hezbollah – Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1 of April 2007, section II, available at: .
127. As to the mandate and function of the Fact-Finding Commission under article 90 of the First Additional protocol cf. A. Mokhtar, “To be or not to be: The International Humanitarian Factfinding Commission”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 12 (2002), 69 et seq.
128. The members were João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), Stelios Perrakis (Greece), as well as Mohamed Chande Othman (Tanzania).
129. Cf. in particular paras 319–322 of the report, see note 7.
130. 2nd Special Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 11 August 2006, see note 7.
131. As to the composition of the various geographic groups within the UN system cf. S. v. Schorlemer, “Blocs and Groups of States”, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, Vol. I, 1995, 69 et seq., (71).
132. At the relevant time the following Eastern European states, apart from Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, were represented in the Human Rights Council: Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Ukraine, cf. .
133. As to the (alleged) number of missiles fired into Israel by Hezbollah on a daily basis cf. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s War with Hezbollah – Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, see note 9, Appendix A.
134. Cf. in particular para. 111 of the report, see note 7.
135. Cf. in particular para. 112 of the report, see note 7.
136. See note 142, para. 37, 50; cf. Henckaerts/ Doswald-Beck, see note 119, 49 et seq.
137. See as to the parallel situation with regard to the attacks on Dubrovnik during the war in Yugoslavia the judgment of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Judgment of 31 January 2005, para. 277 et seq., text to be found at: .
138. It has to be noted, however, that any such Hezbollah attacks against civilians or civilian objects may not legitimize, under current rules of international humanitarian law, violations of international humanitarian law by Israel as constituting prohibited reprisals, cf. in that regard the overview in United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as the recent statement by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 328:
139. Frankfurter Rundschau of 1 July 2006, 15.