The Growth of International Law between Globalization and the Great Power

Austrian Review of International and European Law

Volumn 8, Issue , 2005, Pages 109-139

  Peters, Anne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85180968718     PISSN: 13851306     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/157365103x00144     Document Type: Chapter

References (149)

1. L. Wildhaber, “Treaties, Multilateral” 4 EPIL 949-950 (2000).
2. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (22 October 2003). Treaties concluded in the UN era are registered pursuant to Art. 102 UN Charter. About 500 of the multilateral treaties are deposited with the UN Secretary General.
3. See generally on this question: “Symposium: American Hegemony and International Law”, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 (2000);
4. “The Single Superpower and the Future of International Law”, 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings (2000);
5. “Unilateralism in International Law: A United States-European Symposium”, 11 EJIL 1 (2000);
6. M. Byers/G. Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (2003).
7. Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives Chapter 1 (1997).
8. US-American hegemony W. Pfaff, “The Question of Hegemony”, 80/1 Foreign Affairs (2001), available at http://www.cfr.org/about/mediacenter/ bush-putin/fa-pfaff.html (13 October 2003).
9. Greek hegemonia (leadership), from hegemon (leader), hegeisthai (to lead). Used first by Thukydides to describe the predominance of a Greek city state over the others. See for the modern use K. Ginther, “Hegemony”, 2 EPIL 685 (1995).
10. The classical work in legal scholarship is H. Triepel, Die Hegemonie: Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (1938, reprint 1974), on a hegemony’s political and legal foundations at 6 and 206. Triepel situates the political phenomenon of hegemony on a sliding scale between mere influence and complete domination (at 140).
11. Center for Defense Information, “World Military DataBase” 2002. available at http://www.cdi.org/products/almanac0102.pdf (23 September 2003).
12. Le Monde diplomatique, Atlas der Globalisierung 46 (2003).
13. N. Krisch, “More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law”, in M. Byers/G. Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, 135 at 163 (2003), with further references.
14. K. Zemanek, “Is the Nature of the International Legal System Changing”, 8 ARIEL 3, 10 (2003).
15. Al Odah v. US (Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 11 March 2003), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/scripts/isysweb/isyswebext.dll?op=get&uri=/isysquery/irl1e8c/3/doc#hit1 (4 October 2003), reversed by US S.Ct. Rasulv. Bush, judgement of 28 June 2004, 124 S. Ct. 2686, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03slipopinion.html (24 November 2004).
16. See Art. 5(2) Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Art. 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”
17. “US blow to Kyoto hopes”, BBC News, 28 March 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1247518.stm (7 October 2003).
18. See “War Crimes Court Created Over Fierce US Objection”, Washington Post, 12 April 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node= &contentId=A34610-2002Apr11¬Found=true (7 October 2003).
19. Declaration of 6 May 2002, adressed to the Secretary-General: “This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on 31 December 2000.
20. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary’s status lists relating to this treaty.” See ratification status of the Rome Statute, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/ chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp#N6 (24 September 2003).
21. The exact number of BIAs actually in force is currently not verifiable. As of 5 October 2004, the US State Department reports over 80 (signed) agreements. But according to the most important ICC-related NGO-coalition, only 18 BIAs have been ratified (as of 5 October 2004). Of all these states, a minority only is a member to the ICC-statute. See “Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements”, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USandlICC/BIAs.html (26 October 2004).
22. See Internal Opinion of the EU-Commission’s legal service of 13 August 2002, 23 HRLJ 158 (2002).
23. See the harsh critique by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Res. 1336 (2003): Threats to the International Criminal Court, available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FAdoptedText %2Fta03%2FERES1336.htm (24 September 2003).
24. “Three Observers Pulled Out of East Timor—US Move Underscores Vow to Shield Americans From War Crimes Court”, Washington Post, 2 July 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A108812002Jul1¬Found=true (24 September 2003). See also Human Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/asia5.html (24 September 2003).
25. “US plays aid card to fix war crimes exemption”, The Guardian, 12 June 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/yugo/article/0,2763,975476,00.html (24 September 2003).
26. Sec. 2007 of the ASPA infra note 24.
27. “US Presses Allies on War Crimes Court—Aid Wielded in Push for Immunity Pacts”, Washington Post, 27 August 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A64476-2002Aug26¬Found=true (24 September 2003); “US May Cut Aid In Court Dispute—About 35 Nations Could Lose Funds”, Washington Post, 1 July 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A54753-2003Jun30¬Found=true (24 September 2003).
28. UN Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002), prolonged for one further year by UN Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003).
29. “US Vetoes Bosnia Mission, Then Allows 3-Day Reprieve”, New York Times, 1 July 2002, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0B1FF8345A0C728 CDDAE0894DA404482 (24 September 2003). “Collateral Costs in Fighting a New Court”, New York Times, 2 July 2002, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res= F20C14FA3D550C718CDDAE0894DA404482 (24 September 2003); “Dispute Threatens UN Role In Bosnia—US Wields Veto In Clash Over War Crimes Court”, Washington Post, 1 July 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A5514-2002Jun30¬Found=true (24 September 2003).
30. “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002” (ASPA), entry into force 2 August 2002, Sec. 2002 and 2004 (repr. in 27 HRLJ 275 (2002)).
31. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms Burton Act), P. L. 104-114, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm (2 November 2003). Title III (creation of a private right of action in US courts that will allow US nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government to sue Cuban governmental entities or foreign investors who use or profit in any way from those properties) currently suspended. See Fact Sheet of the US Department of State: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ ar/us-cuba/helmsbur.htm (2 November 2003).
32. A Bill to prohibit cooperation with or assistance to any investigation or prosecution under a universal jurisdiction was referred to the House Committee on International Relations on 9 May 2003 (H. R. 2050): Universal Jurisdiction Rejection Act of 2003, available at http://www.theorator.com/bills108/hr2050.html. See for the status: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.02050 (26 September 2003).
33. See Court of Cassation of Belgium, H. S. A et al. v. S. A. et al., 12 February 2003, 42 ILM 596 (2003), holding criminal action inadmissible.
34. “US attacks Belgium war crimes law”, BBC News, 12 June 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2985744.stm (8 October 2003).
35. Belgian Act of 5 August 2003 (Amending the Code of Criminal Procedure). See “Nouvelles dispositions du titre préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale”, Art. 10 Abs. 1bis and Art. 12bis nouveau, available at http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/Codepp2003.html (6 October 2003).
36. See R. Foot, “Credibility at Stake: Domestic Supremacy in America’s Human Rights Policy”, in D. Malone and Y. F. Khong (eds.), Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Pespectives 95-115 (2003);
37. A. Moravcsik, “Why is US Human Rights Policy so Unilateralist?”, in S. Patrick/S. Forman (eds.), Mulilateralism and US Foreign Policy 345-376 (2002);
38. H. Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts 389-412 (2003).
39. ICCPR of 1966 (ratified in 1992, but not the optional protocol on individual complaints); CERD of 1966 (ratified by the USA in 1994);
40. CAT of 1984 (ratification in 1994 and acceptance of individual communications to the Committee (under Art. 21 CAT));
41. Genocide Convention of 1948 (ratified by the USA in 1988).
42. See C. Redgwell, “US reservations to human rights treaties: all for one and none for all?” in M. Byers/G. Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 392-415 (2003).
43. See, for example, 102d Congress, 2d Sess., US Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. III. (1), in 138 Cong Rec, S4781, at S483 (2 April 1992), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r102:./temp/~r102nqa4yi (18 October 2003). For the WTO: Sec. 102(a) and (b)(2) of the Urugay Round Agreements Act, 19 USCA 3512.
44. See 102d Congress, 2d Sess., US Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. I. (2), in 138 Cong Rec, S4781, at S483 (2 April 1992), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r102:./temp/~r102nqa4yi (18 October 2003).
45. See H. Keller, “Todesstrafe vorbehalten: Zulässige Einschränkungen internationaler Menschenrechtsgarantien durch die Vereinigten Staaten?”, 13 SZIER 113, at 139 (2003).
46. See H. Keller, supra note 30, at 144-163.
47. See on the Genocide Convention of 1948 the US reservation in Multilateral Treaties as Deposited with the Secretary-General—Status as at 31 December 2002, Vol. 1, part I, Chapter IV, at 124: “nothing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.” Objections against this reservation were lodged by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands and Sweden on the grounds that no State party may invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty (id., at 125 et seq.) Such objections led the US to formulate the identical statement not in a “reservation”, but in less visible special notes. See on the CAT of 1984, Communication of the United States of America to the Secretary-General requesting that a notification should be made to all ratifying parties. Available at http://untreaty.un.org ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty14.asp (9 October 2003). Positive signals in the opposite direction are two recent Supreme Court decisions in which the US Constitution is interpreted by reference to international law (Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), concurring opinion Justice Ginsburg).
48. See Senator Jesse Helms, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Address before the UN Security Council, 20 January 2000: “Under our system, when international treaties are ratified they simply become US law. As such, they carry no greater or lesser weight than any other domestic US law. Treaty obligations can be superseded by a simple act of Congress. ... Thus, when the United States joins a treaty organization, it holds no legal authority over us.” Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/unmonth/t0012005.htm (18 October 2003).
49. See K. Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, paras. 127-130 (1996). I am indebted to Ferdinand Kirchhof of the university Tübingen for this information.
50. See in detail infra part IV.A.
51. “US Dollars Yielded Unanimous UN Vote Against Iraq”, Inter Press Service, 11 November 2002, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2002/1111dollars.htm (20 October 2004).; “Focus on non-permanent members of UNSC”, The Hindu, 21 February 2003, available at http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/02/21/stories/2003022102681400.htm (20 October 2004).; “War Resolution Puts Mexico in Bind—Fox Weighs Political Costs of Supporting US, Economic Costs of Not”, Washington Post, 1 March 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A19057-2003Feb28¬Found=true (20 Ocotber 2004); “Analysis: Africa’s Iraq swing votes”, BBC News, 10 March 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2835913.stm (20 Ocotber 2004).; “War on Iraq: Britain, France target African states”, Voice of America News, 11 March 2003, available at http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,52377.jsp (20 October 2004).
52. See Official White House list of the Coalition members, published 21 March 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-4.html (20 October 2004).
53. “US builds war coalition with favors—and money”, USAToday, 24 February 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-24-unwilling-cover_x.htm (20 October 2004).
54. “Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced?: How the Bush Administration Influences Allies in its War on Iraq”, by S. Anderson/P. Bennis/J.Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies, 26 February 2003, quotes at 10, available at http://www.ips-dc.org/COERCED.pdf (20 October 2004).
55. BBCNews, 22 September 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3130504.stm (4 October 2003). However, the initial decision to deploy Turkish troops in Iraq, as desired by the US, was after two months reversed by the Turkish government, inter alia in reaction to fierce opposition of the population both in Turkey and in Iraq.
56. “US Makes Arrest of Milosevic A Condition of Aid to Belgrade”, New York Times 10 March 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F4091 EFD3E5E0C 738DDDAA0894D9404482 (20 October 2004); “Yugoslavia: Pressure Mounts To Transfer Milosevic To The Hague”, Radio Free Europe, 27 June 2001, available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/06/27062001111624.asp (4 October 2003). Another example: The USA has made a 1.3 Billion Dollar military aid contribution to “Plan Colombia” conditional on Colombia’s agreement to test a decease-causing fungus against Colombian coca plantations. “US Pressures Colombia To Use Biological Drugs Warfare”, Irish Times, 8 July 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/070800-104.htm (4 October 2003).
57. To give but one recent example: Negotiations to seal a 30 billion US Dollar energy resources deal between Australia and East Timor were completed in March 2003, amid accusations of blackmail and acrimony. East Timor is believed to have agreed to sign under pressure from the Australian government which was stalling another deal vital to Dili’s economic future, the Timor Sea Treaty. G. Holloway, “Timor energy deal finally sealed”, CNN.com of 6 March 2003, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/03/05/ australia.timor.gasdeal/ (4 October 2003).
58. The UN Secretary-General spoke of “a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years.” UN Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly, 23 September 2003, available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sgeng030923.htm (3 November 2003).
59. “.... that would be the end of the current world order” (C. Tomuschat, “Das Ende der Weltordnung”, Der Spiegel 24, at 25 (2003/4), transl. by the author, available at http://www. spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,232200,00.html (7 October 2003)). Rainer Merkel opines that the US are laying an axe at the roots of international law as a legal order (R. Merkel, “Amerikas Recht auf die Welt”, in D. S. Lutz/H. J. Giessmann (eds.), Die Stärke des Rechts gegen das Recht des Stärkeren 37, at 39 (2003)). Mary-Ellen O’Connor writes: “If the US claims for itself imperial privileges, privileges not available to other States, international law may be fundamentally altered” (M.- E. O’Connor, “Pre-Emption and Exception—The USA Moves Beyond Unilateralism”, in D. S. Lutz/H. J. Giessmann (eds.), Die Stärke des Rechts 148, at 157 (2003)). Anthony Clark Arend asserts: “For all practical purposes, the UN Charter framework is dead” (A. Arend, “International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Military Force”, 26 Washington Quarterly 89, at 101 (Spring 2003). See also T. M. Franck, “What happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq”, 97 AJIL 607, at 608, 614, 617, 630 (2003); R. Herzinger, “Siamesische Zwillinge: Amerika und Europa streiten sich heftig—und gehören doch untrennbar zusammen”, 58 Internationale Politik 1, at 8 (2003/6).
60. “We need not mourn for the destroyed international law.” S. Tönnies, “Ist das Völkerrecht noch zu retten?” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 778, at 780 (transl. by the author) (7/2003). H. Münkler, “Das Ende des ‘klassischen’ Krieges”, Neue Züricher Zeitung No. 213, 14/15 September 2002, at 73, arguing that the American attack on Iraq was the death blow for international law. See also G. Nolte, “Weg in eine andere Rechtsordnung”, in D. S. Lutz/H. J. Giessmann (eds.), Die Stärke des Rechts 187, supra note 49, at 190 (2003): “Step into a different legal order”.
61. In a widely noticed article of summer 2002 discussing the usefulness of pre-emptive strikes on Iraq, Henry Kissinger wrote: “The new approach is revolutionary. Regime change as a goal for military intervention challenges the international system established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia”. H. Kissinger, “Pre-emptive strike on Iraq to improve peace prospects”, The Manila Times Internet Edition, 11 August 2002, available at http://www. manilatimes.net (7 October 2003). See also U. Preuss, “Krieg auf Verdacht oder imperialer Gründungskrieg: Reflexionen über Kriegsgründe”, Stuttgarter Zeitung, Wochenendbeilage, 1 February 2003, at 1, available at http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/stz/index.php (7 October 2003).
62. “So sehen wir also, dass der Krieg nicht bloss ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln.” C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege 210 (1980, original 1832).
63. M. Walzer, “Es muss einen Ausweg geben”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 August 2003, at 9. See also G. Haller, Die Grenzen der Solidarität: Europa und die USA im Umgang mit Staat, Nation und Religion 83-95 (2002), asserting that the United States’ attitude towards international law differs fundamentally from the European one, because it is fundamentally moralist and does not separate law from morals.
64. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law 564 (1966).
65. See the US President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, 12 September 2002 with the veiled announcement to act unilaterally: “If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must more deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will be unavoidable.” Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html (13 October 2003) (emphasis added). See also Secretary of State Colin Powell: “And keep in mind that even though we’re talking about resolutions and we’re trying to get the collective will of the United Nations through the Security Council behind this resolution, the President still retains all of his options to act in any manner that he believes appropriate to protect American interests and American lives.” Interview on CNN’s Late Edition, 15 September 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/13481.htm (13 October 2003).
66. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, in Chapter II under the heading “The decision to Employ Military Forces” at 27 (December 1999), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/natsec2k.htm (8 October 2003). Apparently, the slogan “With the UN, whenever possible, without it when necessary”, already appeared as the title of an internal memorandum (“non-paper”) presented by the US Embassy at NATO to its Allies in Brussels as early as summer of 1993.
67. Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/ 351). http://www.un.int/usa/s2003_351.pdf (25 September 2003).
68. In this sense also A.- M. Slaughter, “Good Reasons for Going Around the UN”, The New York Times, 18 March 2003, at A 33: “What is most important here is that the contenting sides continue to regard United Nations approval as a necessary component of the use of force.”
69. Among the pre-1989 world order treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Law of the Sea Convention have not been ratified by the US either.
70. Krisch, supra note 8, at 154.
71. See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 92 (1961).
72. G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 338-344 (1914).
73. See also infra part V.
74. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment of 27 June 1986, Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, at 190; YILC (1966-II), at 247; A. Randelzhofer, “Article 2”, 63, at 66, para. 12, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. I (2002).
75. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of 17 September 2002, Chapter V: “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction”, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (7 October 2003). See already the President’s Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, 1 June 2002, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/060102.pdf/ (9 October 2003).
76. See for good discussions of anticipatory self-defense M. N. Shaw, International Law 789-790 (1997); C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 111-115 (2001); A. Cassese, International Law 307-311 (2001).
77. See the Caroline-test (1841/42), according to which self-defense is limited to cases in which the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”. Mr. Webster, US Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British plen., 6 August 1842, repr. in J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. II, at 412 (1906). Reaffirmed by the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment of 1 October 1946, 41 AJIL 172, at 205 (1947).
78. In favor of anticipatory self-defense seminally M. S. McDougall, “The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense”, 57 AJIL, 597, at 600-601 (1963); see also B.- O. Bryde, “Self-Defence”, 4 EPIL 361, at 362 (2000); Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 172 (2001); M. Sapiro, “Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Pre-emptive Self-Defense”, 97 AJIL 599, at 604 (2003); J. E. Stromseth, “Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment”, 97 AJIL 628, at 637-638 (2003). Prior to 9/11, many authors negated the lawfulness of anticipatory strikes, for example, I. Brownlie: “The Use of Force in Self-Defence”, 37 BYIL 183, at 242-244 (1961); A. Cassese, supra note 66; A. Randelzhofer, “Article 51”, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. I, 788, 803-804, paras. 39-40; Gray, supra note 66, at 112 (“doubtful status of this justification”).
79. See also “‘New’ Europe Distances Itself From War,” Independent, 1 April 2003, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0401-07.htm (25 September 2003).
80. See “The PM And Pre-Emption Politics”, australianpolitics.com, 14 March 2003, quoting PM Howard: “Possession of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by terrorists would constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people [...]. That more than any other reason is why Iraq must be effectively and comprehensively disarmed.” Available at http://australianpolitics.com/words/daily/archives/00000219.shtml (25 September 2003). See also “Australiens Regierungschef für Anti-Terror-Schläge im Ausland”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1 December 2002, available at http://www.nzz.ch/2002/12/01/al/pagenewzzD96V9VAV-12.html (25 September 2003).
81. “Israel Threatens Militants Abroad”, New York Times, 9 September 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Israel-Militant-Leaders.html (25 September 2003). See for Russia The Washington Times, 9 September 2004.
82. “Pre-emption not prerogative of one country”, The Tribune, Online Edition, 1 October 2002, quoting Indian Secretary of finances Jaswant Singh: “Pre-emption is not the sole prerogative of any one country.” Available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20021001/world.htm#2 (25 September 2003).
83. See “Sinha flies a kite”, The Hindu, 20 April 2003, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mag/2003/04/20/stories/2003042000420200.htm (25 September 2003).
84. Discours de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, Président de la République française à l’ouverture de la 58ième séssion de l’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, 23 September 2003, available at http://www.elysee.fr/magazine/deplacement_etranger/sommaire.php?doc=/documents/discours/2003/NY030922E.html (8 October 2003).
85. “Pakistan rejects Sinha’s ‘talk of pre-emption’”, The Hindu, 4 April 2003, available at http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/04/04/stories/2003040404991100.htm (25 September 2003), quoting the Indian Foreign Minister Yaswant Sinha: “India has a much better case to go for pre-emptive action” against Pakistan than the United States in Iraq.
86. “First strike an ‘act of war’”, CNN.com, 3 December 2002, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/12/02/australia.terror.us/index.html (25 September 2003).
87. Declaration of J. A. Staehelin, Permanent Representative of Switzerland at the United Nations before the Security Council on the subject: “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait”, of 11 March 2003: “Dans les circonstances actuelles, c’est-à-dire aussi longtemps que, selon les experts, les inspections continuent à donner des résultats, la Suisse considère qu’il faut donner la priorité au désarmement pacifique de l’Irak. (...) Si toutes les tentatives tendant au désarmement pacifique de l’Irak venaient malgré tout à échouer, la Suisse invite les membres du Conseil de sécurité à veiller à ce que toute décision, prise sur la base du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, inclue l’exigence inconditionnelle pour toutes les parties à un éventuel conflit de respecter et de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire”, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/g/home/recent/focus/irakcr.Par.0012.UpFile.pdfsp_030311_UNiraqkuwt_fe.pdf (25 September 2003).
88. It is merely speculated whether the country will make use of the pre-emption doctrine against Taiwan. See “Iraq effect on US role in Asia”, The Christian Science Monitor, 8 May 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0508/p11s02-coop.html (25 September 2003).
89. UN Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly, 23 September 2003, supra note 48.
90. See in favor of the doctrine of pre-emption, L. R. Beres, “Israel and Pre-emption: Striking First Under International Law”, Tzemach News Service, 30 January 2001, available at http://www.tzemach.org/fyi/docs/beres/preempt.htm (25 September 2003).
91. E. O’Connor, “Addendum to Armed Forces in Iraq: Issues of Legality”, ASIL-Insights, April 2003, available at http://www.asil.org/insights.htm (7 October 2003). P. W. Schroeder,“What would Kant say? Iraq: The Case Against Pre-emptive War”, The American Conservative, 21 October 2002, available at http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html (7 October 2003); R. N. Gardner, “Neither Bush nor the ‘Jurisprudes’”, 97 AJIL 585, at 588 (2003); Sapiro, supra note 68, at 599-607.
92. See, e.g., I. H. Daalder, “The Use of Force in a Changing World—US and European Perspectives”, 16 LJIL 171 (2003); C. Tomuschat, “Völkerrecht ist kein Zweiklassenrecht”, 2 Vereinte Nationen 41, at 42-43 (2003); R. Kolb, “Ein Recht auf präventive Verteidigung?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 June 2003, available at http://www.nzz.ch/dossiers/2003/ terrorismus/2003.06.23-al-article8VKPS.html (6 No-vember 2003); D. Murswiek, “Die amerikanische Präventivkriegsstrategie und das Völkerrecht”, 56 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1014, at 1017 (2003).
93. See Daalder, supra note 82, at 172 and 180.
94. See M. Reisman, “Editorial Comment: Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War”, 97 AJIL 82, at 86-87 (2003).
95. Reisman, supra note 84, at 89; Daalder, supra note 82, at 177; O’Connor, supra note 49, at 159; Tomuschat, supra note 82, at 45. Most succinctly, historian Paul W. Schroeder emphasizes “how novel, dangerous, and subversive of international order and peace this new, unprecedented American doctrine is. [...] A more dangerous, illegitimate norm and example can hardly be imagined. ... [I]t completely subverts previous standards for judging the legitimacy of resorts to war, justifying any number of wars hitherto considered unjust and aggressive. [...] It would in fact justify almost any attack by any state on any other for almost any reason. [...] The American example and standard for pre-emptive war, if carried out, would invite imitation and emulation, and get it.” (Schroeder, supra note 81). As the UN Secretary General aptly observed, the doctrine of pre-emption “could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without credible justification”. Address to the General Assembly, 23 September 2003, supra note 48.
96. Mursiwek, supra note 82, at 1019.
97. Daalder, supra note 82, at 180.
98. Tomuschat, supra note 82, at 44.
99. Reisman, supra note 84, at 90.
100. O’Connor, supra note 49, at 148 and 157-18. In that sense also Schroeder, supra note 81.
101. See Triepel, supra note 5, at 205; Ginther, supra note 5, at 688.
102. See on the history of the idea E. D. Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law (1920); J.Goebel, The Equality of States: A Study in the History of Law (1923); W. Schaumann, Die Gleichheit der Staaten: Ein Beitrag zu den Grundprinzipien des Völkerrechts (1957), emphasizing the antagonism between the principle of equality and Great Power politics at 150-151; P. H. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States: An Inquiry into the Foundations of International Law (1964); R. A. Klein, Sovereign Equality among States: The History of an Idea (1974), on equality in a world of superpowers (at 143).
103. W. Grewe, Epochs of International Law (2000).
104. See, e.g., T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, Chapter IV, 245-270 (1937); H. Mosler, Die Grossmachtstellung im Völkerrecht 33-47 (1949) on collective hegemony performing “an organising function in terms of the idea of law in the twilight between politics and law” (transl. by the author).
105. H. Steinberger, “Sovereignty”, 4 EPIL 500, at 515 (2000); G. Dahm/J. Delbrück/R. Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, Vol. I/1 239 (1988).
106. E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains, Préliminaires, para. 18 (1758, repr. 1916).
107. A. Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law”, 40 HarvJIL 1, at 22 (1999).
108. Speaking of “equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.
109. UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XVV), speaking of “equal rights and duties” of all States. See also UN Doc. A/RES/34/103 (1979): “Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism”.
110. S. Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae Gentium Libri Octo (1688, repr. 1934), Book VIII, Chapter 12, para. 4; J. J. Moser, Versuch des neuesten Europäischen Völkerrechts in Friedens- und Kriegszeiten, Vol. I, Chapter III (1777) (portions reprinted as Grundsätze des Völkerrechts 14 (1959)). In contemporary scholarship notably Dahm/Delbrück/Wolfrum, supra note 95, at 236.
111. Moreover, the principle of State equality is generally conceived of a purely legal (“formal”) position. It does not generally encompass a right to factual equality (substantially equal positions or outcomes). See for the quest for substantial equality or for “compensatory inequality” in favor of developing countries the 1970’s debate on the New International Economic Order.
112. During the drafting process, a proposal by a group of developing States to define “force” so as to include economic or political pressure was rejected. However, this does not preclude a dynamic interpretation of the existing text. See R. G. Wetzel/D. Rauschnig, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Travaux Préparatoires 361-371 (1978); P. Reuter, Introduction au droit des traités 270-274 (1995).
113. See as a prototype of positivist reasoning L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, § 116, at 170-171 (1912).
114. See in this sense Krisch, supra note 8, at 153.
115. M. J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed”, Foreign Affairs 16, at 32-33 (May/June 2003).
116. This was Hans Morgenthau’s characterization of the structure of the UN (H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 322 (1948)).
117. See in this sense L. Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World (1994), arguing that American hegemony is in some circumstances morally acceptable and creates the opportunity for political morality.
118. See M. Chemillier-Gendreau, “L’ordre juridique international, une chimère?” Le Monde diplomatique 46 (July 1999), No. 544, at 8-9 (emphasizing the lacking generality of international law).
119. W. G. Grewe, “Die Gleichheit der Staaten in der Rüstungskontrolle”, in Festschrift für Hermann Jahrreiss zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag 57, at 84 (1964); P. H. Kooijmans, supra note 92, at 107, 240, 246; see also Dickinson, supra note 92, at 336.
120. P. Malanczuk, “The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the Consequences of Leaving the United States Behind?” 11 EJIL 77-90 (2000) with further references.
121. This has been forcefully argued by Krisch, supra note 8, at 150-152.
122. The fact that the global environmental law conventions build on common, but differentiated responsibilities of the State parties does not disprove this diagnosis. Differentiated burdens here as in the GATT are supposed to satisfy the quest for material equality. The said regimes’ aspiration is genuinely egalitarian.
123. G. Orwell, Animal Farm 114 (1976, orig. 1945).
124. According to an analysis of the US Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq, presented by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) of 3 September 2003, the Army lacks sufficient active-duty forces to maintain its current level of nearly 150,000 troops in Iraq beyond the spring of 2004, available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4515&sequence=0 (31 October 2003). See on the study T. E. Ricks/J. Weismann, “Army Lacks Forces for Iraq Mission, CBO Warns”, Washington Post, 2 September 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A16689-2003Sep2¬Found=true (3 November 2003).
125. I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden 205-206 (1983, orig. 1795). See with regard to US imperialism Brzezinski, supra note 4, at 210; D. Vagts, “Hegemonic International Law”, 95 AJIL 843, at 845 (2001); Franck, supra note 49, at 617 (pointing to lacking sociopolitical solidarity at home).
126. See references to US newspapers in Stromseth, supra note 68, at 633.
127. See already J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (1762), Book I, Chapter 3 (“Of the Right of the Strongest”), first sentence: “The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.” (transl. by G. D. H. Cole, rendered into HTML and text by J. Roland, available at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (3 November 2003).
128. J. S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, Chapter 5: “Redefining the National Interest” 137 et seq. (2002); Brzezinski, supra note 4, at 214.
129. J. Delbrück, “Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets—Implications for Domestic Law: A European Perspective”, 1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 9-36 (1993); D. Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (1999); J. A. Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (2000); M. R. Ferrarese, Le istituzioni della globalizzazione (2000); Nye, supra note 118, at 677 et seq.
130. But see Glennon, supra note 107, at 34.
131. M. Hardt/A. Negri, Empire (2000); E. Todd, Après L’Empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système américain (2002).
132. Nye, supra note 118, at 40, quoting J. Joffe, “America the Inescapable”, New York Times [Sunday]Magazine, 8 June 1997, at 38.
133. Nye, supra note 118, subtitle of the book.
134. William Howard Taft IV, Address of 20 March 2003. US Department of State, International Information Programs, Washington File of 21 March 2003, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/rightsd/law/03032202.htm (2 September 2003).
135. Krisch, supra note 8, at 155.
136. See the special issue in 54 IO 385 et seq. (2000); notably M. Kahler, “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization”, 54 IO 661-703 (2000).
137. Schroeder, supra note 81. See on States’ reasons to observe law L. Henkin, How Nations Behave 49-68 (1979), concluding that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” (Id., at 47). But see J. R. Bolton, “Is There Really ‘Law’ in International Affairs?”, 10 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1-48 (2000).
138. See notably C. Tomuschat, “Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will”, 241 Recueil des Cours 209-240 (1993);
139. B. Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interests”, 250 RdC 217-384 (1994);
140. B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (1998);
141. B. Fassbender, “The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community,” 36 Columbia JTL 529-619 (1998);
142. J. A. Frowein, “Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts”, 29 Berichte DGV 427-447 (2000);
143. C. Walter, “Constitutionalizing (inter)national Governance—Possibilities for and Limits to
144. the Development of an International Constitutional Law”, 44 GYIL 170-201 (2001);
145. R. Uerpmann, “Internationales Verfassungsrecht”, 56 Juristen-Zeitung 565-573 (2001);
146. E.- U. Petersmann, “Constitutionalism, International Law and ‘We the Peoples of the UN’”, in H. J. Cremer et al. (eds.), Tradition und Weltoffenheit des Rechts: Festschrift für Helmut Steinberger 291-313 (2002);
147. B.- O. Bryde, “Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts”, 42 Der Staat 61-75 (2003); T. Cottier/M. Hertig, “The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism”, 7 Max Planck YB of UN Law 261-328 (2003).
148. J. Delbrück (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking—International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest (1997).
149. Walter, supra note 128, at 193; G. Teubner, “Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie”, 63 ZaöRV 1, at 27 (2003).