Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law

German Law Journal

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 341-369

  Kumm, Mattias ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85175477917     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200004727     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. CARL SCHMITT, Die Wendung zum Totalen Staat, in POSITIONEN UND BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR, GENF, VERSAILLES 1923-1939, at 166-78 (3d ed. 1994).
2. CARL SCHMITT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN (3d ed. 1963).
3. HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHSLEHRE (2d ed. 1960).
4. CARL SCHMITT, Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat (1937), in POSTIONEN UND BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR - GENF-VERSAILLES 1923- 1939, at 268 (3d ed. 1994).
5. E.W. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Grundrechte lals Grundsatznormen, in STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEMOKRATIE 185 (1991).
6. R. Hirschl, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004).
7. BVerfGE 46, 160 (Schleyer). BVerfGE refers to the official collection of the judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court. The first number refers to the volume, the second refers to the page number on which the decision begins. A bracketed third number refers to the exact page on which a particular citation can be found. Particularly well-known cases are conventionally named either after the complainant or the core subject-matter addressed by the decision.
8. BVerfGE 49, 89 and BVerfGE 53, 30.
9. BVerfGE 89, 214.
10. E. FORSTHOFF, DER STAAT DER INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT 144 (2d ed. 1971).
11. E. FORSTHOFF, DER TOTALE STAATE (1933).
12. See Art. 79 Sect. I Basic Law referring to Art. 20 Sect. 1 Basic Law.
13. For a comparative discussion of democratic constitutions that authorize militant actions towards the enemies of the constitution see A. SAJO ed., MILITANT DEMOCRACY (2005).
14. R. ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002).
15. For further references see TCR, 224 n.5.
16. BVerfGE 6, 32 (Elfes).
17. BVerfGE 39, 1, BVerfGE 88, 203.
18. BVerfGE 54, 143 (147).
19. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1362 (3d. ed. vol. 1, 2000).
20. The ECHR refers to this as the "margin of appreciation." 21 Art. 6 Sect. 4 Basic Law.
21. Art. 1 Basic Law.
22. Art. 20 Sect. 1 Basic Law.
23. BVerfGE 7, 198 (Lueth).
24. For Alexy's discussion of horizontal effect see, supra, note 13, 351-65.
25. BVerfGE 39, 1 (41).
26. BVerfGE 86, 1.
27. See Alexy, supra note 13, 300-14.
28. BVerfGE 30, 59 and BVerfGE 49, 89.
29. BVerfGE 46, 160.
30. BVerfGE 39, 1 and BVerfGE 88, 203.
31. Art. 1 para. 3 Basic Law.
32. See sec. 138 para. 1 BGB: "Ein Rechtsgeschäft, dass gegen die guten Sitten verstsst ist nichtig."
33. For a discussion of usury see PALANDT (62d ed. 2003), HEINRICHS para. 242, recital 65-76.
34. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
35. EC Directive 13/93 addressing consumer protection against unfair practices. See also the Swedish "Act on the Prohibition of Unconscionable Contractual Terms" of 1971.
36. Art. 2 I Basic Law states: "Everyone has the right to freely develop their personality." The FCC has interpreted this right expansively to mean that everyone is free to do or to abstain from doing whatever they like. See BVErfGE 6, 32 (Elfes).
37. This has propelled the FCC into the role of assessing, for example, the constitutionality of restrictions on feeding pigeons in public squares (see BVerfGE 54, 263) or riding horses through public woods (BVErfGE 80, 137).
38. in Ireland such constitutional tort actions are recognized. See Walsh, J. in the 1973 case of Meskell v. Coras Iompair Eireann: "If a person has suffered damage by virtue of a breach of a constitutional right ... that person has the right to seek redress against the person or persons who infringed that rights." I.R. 121, 133 (1973).
39. BVErfGE 7, 198 (Lüth).
40. See BVerfGE 30, 173 (Mephisto).
41. For a general theory of deference see MARIUS RAABE, GRUNDRECHTE UND ERKENNTNIS (1998).
42. For an account of the relationship between the FCC and the branches of the judiciary see Christian Starck, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichte, 51 JURISTENZEITUNG 1033 (1996).
43. See Johannes Hager, Grundrechte im Privatrecht, 49 JURISTENZEITUNG 374 (1994).
44. See BVerfGE 89, 214 (holding unconstitutional a civil court decision that failed to interpret the general clauses of the code as invalidating a contract between a bank and income- and asset-less relatives of bank debtors to assume high liability risks in case the debtor defaults on the grounds that it failed to take into account the parties' constitutional liberty interests).
45. See BVerfGE 89, 1 (holding that both the interests of both the landlord and the tenant in a property are deemed property rights under the Constitution that need to be taken into account in the interpretation of landlord-tenant law).
46. BVerfGE 103, 89 (limiting the kind of prenuptials that can be enforced against the structurally weaker party).
47. BVerfGe 7, 198 (Lueth).
48. Basil M. Merkesinis, Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany, 115 L.Q.R. 47, 64 (1999).
49. M. Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 584 (2004).
50. See the dissent by Grimm, J. in BVerfGE 6, 32 (Equestrian Case)
51. B. Schlink, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit, in FESTSCHRIFT 50 JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT VOL. 2, 445 (P. Badura & H. Dreier eds., 2001).
52. See E.W. Böckenförde, supra, note 6.
53. PITZNER/RONELLENFITSCH, DAS ASSESSOREXAMEN IM OFFENTLICHEN RECHT 51 (9th ed. 1996).
54. For such an understanding of rights, see J. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 109 (1996).
55. This is the generally accepted doctrine used by the FCC. See e.g. BVerfGE 43, 130 (137), BVerfGE 61, 1 (7).
56. J. HABERMAS, Popular Sovereignty as Procedure, in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 600 (1996).
57. This understanding of the purpose of rights is very similar to that proposed by J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 180-92 (1986).
58. MITCH LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 25-35 (2004).
59. PHILLIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 230 (1997).
60. C. Schmitt, Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staates in Deutschland, EUROPÄISCHE REVUE 65 (1933)
61. C. SCHMITT, Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staate, in POSITIONEN UND BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF UM WEIMAR 268 (3d ed. 1994).
62. R. DWORKIN, The Constitutional Conception of Democracy, in FREEDOM'S LAWS (1996)
63. J. WALDRON, The Constitutional Conception of Democracy, in LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999), on the other.
64. See e.g. Alexy, supra, note 13, 394-25;
65. D. DYZENHAUS, THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 6-19 (2004)
66. Y. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002).