The intellectual commons: A rationale for regulation

Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 275-289

  Dawson, Andrew C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Externalities; Government regulation; Intellectual commons; Internet

Indexed keywords

ECONOMY THEORY; GOVERNMENT ROLE; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS; REGULATORY APPROACH;

EID: 85169778839     PISSN: 08109028     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08109029808629282     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. T. A. Stewart, Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organisations, Doubleday, New York, 1997, p. 6.
2. For example, Article 33 of the TRIPS agreement increases the patent term to 20 years.
3. Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 6, 4th edn., Butterworths, London, 1974, para 505.
4. See Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996.
5. Ibid. at p. 54.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. at p. 55.
8. Ibid. at p. 56.
9. See generally E. Samuels, 'The idea expression dichotomy in copyright law', Tennessee Law Review, 56, 321, 1989.
10. Other explanations may include Demsetz's thesis of the development of property rights: H. Demsetz, 'Towards a theory of property rights', American Economic Review, 51, 347, 1967 at p. 350; or Barzel's assertion that property rights may be deliberately relinquished: Y. Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, pp. 66-68.
11. Other explanations may include Demsetz's thesis of the development of property rights: H. Demsetz, 'Towards a theory of property rights', American Economic Review, 51, 347, 1967 at p. 350; or Barzel's assertion that property rights may be deliberately relinquished: Y. Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, pp. 66-68.
12. For example, copyright will not be granted if there is a lack of originality, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc. (1991) 111 S Ct 1282. Nor will patents be granted for scientific discoveries, See Harwood v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1865) 11 HLC 654; Lindley LJ. in Lane Fox v. Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co. [1892] 3 Ch 424, 428. For a shift away from this position see Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 447 US 303.
13. L. C. Becker, Property Rights, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, p. 18. For discussion of ownership and political theory see A. Reeve, Property, Macmillan, London, 1986, pp. 9-37. Ownership in this context is probably not Honore's concept of 'Full ownership': A. M. Honore, 'Ownership' in A. G. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, pp. 107-147.
14. L. C. Becker, Property Rights, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, p. 18. For discussion of ownership and political theory see A. Reeve, Property, Macmillan, London, 1986, pp. 9-37. Ownership in this context is probably not Honore's concept of 'Full ownership': A. M. Honore, 'Ownership' in A. G. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, pp. 107-147.
15. L. C. Becker, Property Rights, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, p. 18. For discussion of ownership and political theory see A. Reeve, Property, Macmillan, London, 1986, pp. 9-37. Ownership in this context is probably not Honore's concept of 'Full ownership': A. M. Honore, 'Ownership' in A. G. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, pp. 107-147.
16. Reeve, ibid. at p. 34.
17. The theory that the State has claim over property of individuals is perhaps a secular parallel to Locke's idea that God has claim over all property: see Reeve, ibid. at p. 31.
18. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at pp. 64-68.
19. For an account of the widespread view of the 17th century that public power was fiduciary in nature see E.S. Morgan, Inventing the People, Norton & Co, New York, 1989, Ch. 5.
20. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Special Edn, Legal Classics Library, New York, 1994, para. 135, p. 269.
21. Ibid.
22. Whether the government does in fact act as a fiduciary in a democracy is a question that cannot be adequately addressed in this article. It should be noted, however, that public choice theory challenges the idea that government will always act in the public interest. A good concise discussion of public choice theory is found in S. Bottomley & S. Parker, Law in Context, 2nd edn, Federation Press, 1997.
23. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at p. 62.
24. Ibid.
25. See for example Toohey J.'s finding of a fiduciary duty owed by the government to the Meriam people in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) [1992] 175 CLR 1 at 334 and 356-357. A similar duty was imposed on the Canadian government by the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. R [1984] 2 SCR 335. The same approach has been adopted in New Zealand, see Te Runanga o Wharekauri v. Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301.
26. See K. Arrow, 'Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention', in The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962, p. 609.
27. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at p. 67.
28. Ibid. at pp. 173-181, 179-180.
29. For discussion of access to information as a right see P. C. Schuman, 'Information Justice', in D. Lamberton, (ed.), The Economics of Communication and Information, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1996, p. 401.
30. G. Hardin, 'The tragedy of the commons,', Science, 162, 1243, 1968.
31. See for example: J. E. Meade, The Theory of Economic Externalities: The Control of Environmental Pollution and Similar Costs, Sijhoff, Geneva, 1973; W. J. Baumol & W. E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1975; J. M. Buchanan & W. C. Stubblebine, 'Externality', Economics, 29, 371, 1962.
32. See for example: J. E. Meade, The Theory of Economic Externalities: The Control of Environmental Pollution and Similar Costs, Sijhoff, Geneva, 1973; W. J. Baumol & W. E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1975; J. M. Buchanan & W. C. Stubblebine, 'Externality', Economics, 29, 371, 1962.
33. See for example: J. E. Meade, The Theory of Economic Externalities: The Control of Environmental Pollution and Similar Costs, Sijhoff, Geneva, 1973; W. J. Baumol & W. E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1975; J. M. Buchanan & W. C. Stubblebine, 'Externality', Economics, 29, 371, 1962.
34. This is essentially the same as the definition adopted by A. E. Friedman, 'The economics of the common pool: property rights in exhaustible resources', UCLALR, 18, 855, 1971, p. 866.
35. See for example R. Coase, 'The problem of social cost', The Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 289, 1960; A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th cd, Macmillan, London, 1962, p. 184.
36. See for example R. Coase, 'The problem of social cost', The Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 289, 1960; A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th cd, Macmillan, London, 1962, p. 184.
37. R. Perman et al., Natural Resource and Environmental Economics, Longman, New York, 1996 at p. 96.
38. Environmental economics is one such branch of economics. See Perman Ibid. at Ch. 10 for a discussion of innovative environmental valuation techniques.
39. US v. Zenith Radio Corporation 12 F2d 614 (ND Ill 1926).
40. One such chaotic incident was the clogging of the airwaves upon the sinking of the Titanic. See T. W. Hazlett, 'The rationality of US regulation of the broadcast spectrum', Journal of Law and Economics, 33, 133, 1990; H. J. Levin, The Invisible Resource: Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum, John's Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1971.
41. One such chaotic incident was the clogging of the airwaves upon the sinking of the Titanic. See T. W. Hazlett, 'The rationality of US regulation of the broadcast spectrum', Journal of Law and Economics, 33, 133, 1990; H. J. Levin, The Invisible Resource: Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum, John's Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1971.
42. Arrow, op. cit., Ref. 23; See also Pigou, op. cit., Ref. 30 at p. 185.
43. Arrow, op. cit., Ref. 23; See also Pigou, op. cit., Ref. 30 at p. 185.
44. For a criticism of the need for intellectual property rights see F. Machlup & E. Penrose, 'The patent controversy in the nineteenth century', Journal of Economic History, 10, 1, 1950.
45. For a discussion of positive externalities and the free rider problem see J. McMillan, 'The free rider problem: a survey', Economic Record, 55, 95, 1979; see also A. De Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989.
46. For a discussion of positive externalities and the free rider problem see J. McMillan, 'The free rider problem: a survey', Economic Record, 55, 95, 1979; see also A. De Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989.
47. For a discussion of the incentive effects of intellectual property rights see J. Hirshleifer, 'The private and social value of information and the reward for inventive activity', American Economic Review, 61, 561, 1971; Y. Barzel, 'The optimal timing of innovations', Review of Economics and Statistics, 50, 348, 1968.
48. For a discussion of the incentive effects of intellectual property rights see J. Hirshleifer, 'The private and social value of information and the reward for inventive activity', American Economic Review, 61, 561, 1971; Y. Barzel, 'The optimal timing of innovations', Review of Economics and Statistics, 50, 348, 1968.
49. K. E. Boulding, 'The economics of knowledge and the knowledge of economics', American Economic Review, 56(2), 1, 1966, p. 25.
50. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at p. 62.
51. On the value of information to a decision maker see K. Arrow, 'The value of and demand for information', in C. B. Mcguire & R. Radner (eds), Decision and Organisation, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971, p. 131. On the supply value of information see T. Murota, 'Demand and supply values of information', Information Economics and Policy, 3, 25, 1988.
52. On the value of information to a decision maker see K. Arrow, 'The value of and demand for information', in C. B. Mcguire & R. Radner (eds), Decision and Organisation, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971, p. 131. On the supply value of information see T. Murota, 'Demand and supply values of information', Information Economics and Policy, 3, 25, 1988.
53. It is important to note that the global and local characteristics of the intellectual commons do not prevent economic analysis of these potential external effects because the economic analysis of common property resources applies equally to local and global problems. For a discussion of a microscopic commons see J. Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988. For a macroscopic commons see K. N. Cameron, Atmospheric Destruction and Human Survival, Centre for Political Ecology, Santa Cruz, 1992.
54. It is important to note that the global and local characteristics of the intellectual commons do not prevent economic analysis of these potential external effects because the economic analysis of common property resources applies equally to local and global problems. For a discussion of a microscopic commons see J. Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988. For a macroscopic commons see K. N. Cameron, Atmospheric Destruction and Human Survival, Centre for Political Ecology, Santa Cruz, 1992.
55. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at pp. 54, 55.
56. Harper Collins, 1991.
57. Clancy points out in his afterword that all the information needed for construction of a nuclear device is freely available in technical journals. In fact, with the information in the public domain 'a sufficiently wealthy individual could ... produce a multi-stage thermonuclear device': ibid., p. 801.
58. See for example M. A. Vivar, 'The new anti-female violent pornography', Law and Psychology Review, 7, 352, 1984; R. Dworkin & K. MacKinnon, Pornography and Sexual Violence: Evidence of the Links, Everywoman, London, 1988.
59. See for example M. A. Vivar, 'The new anti-female violent pornography', Law and Psychology Review, 7, 352, 1984; R. Dworkin & K. MacKinnon, Pornography and Sexual Violence: Evidence of the Links, Everywoman, London, 1988.
60. An excellent summary of the issues relating to pornography and sexual aggression is given by A. Fukui & B. Westmore, 'To see or not to see: the debate over pornography and its relationship to sexual aggression', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Pychiatry, 28(4), 600, 1994.
61. Feist Publications Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) 111 S Ct 2182.
62. Note that objects will only be 'public goods within a certain technological context': see D. E. Van Zandt, 'The lessons of the lighthouse', Journal of Legal 'Studies, 23, 47, 1993, p. 53.
63. This is the rationale behind the WIPO Draft Database Treaty: see the Preamble of the Treaty at www.loc.gov/copyright/wipo6.html
64. Demsetz, op. cit., Ref. 10.
65. Ibid. at p. 350.
66. See Buchanan & Stubblebine, op. cit., Ref. 28 at p. 381; see generally A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1948.
67. See Buchanan & Stubblebine, op. cit., Ref. 28 at p. 381; see generally A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1948.
68. Coase, op. cit., Ref. 30 at p. 34.
69. Ibid. p. 26.
70. This discussion of marginal social benefits, marginal social costs is based on Perman et al. op. cit., Ref. 31, Chs 8 and 9, in particular pp. 200-203.
71. See generally Arrow, op. cit., Ref. 23; Boulding, op. cit., Ref. 39.
72. See generally Arrow, op. cit., Ref. 23; Boulding, op. cit., Ref. 39.
73. J. Gans, 'Knowledge of growth and the growth of knowledge', Information Economics and Policy, 4, 201, 1991. This reflects Boulding's argument that economic development is essentially a knowledge process that depends on 'copying' old knowledge and the creation of new knowledge: Boulding, op. cit., Ref. 39 at p. 25.
74. J. Gans, 'Knowledge of growth and the growth of knowledge', Information Economics and Policy, 4, 201, 1991. This reflects Boulding's argument that economic development is essentially a knowledge process that depends on 'copying' old knowledge and the creation of new knowledge: Boulding, op. cit., Ref. 39 at p. 25.
75. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4, pp. 60-64.
76. R. R. Nelson, 'The simple economics of basic scientific research', Journal of Political Economy, 67, 297, 1959, p. 302.
77. I. H. Siegel, 'Scientific discovery and the rate of invention', in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1962 at p. 442.
78. Ibid. at p. 442.
79. Gans, op. cit., Ref. 58.
80. R. Solow, 'A contribution to the theory of economic growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 65, 1956; T. W. Swan, 'Economic growth and capital accumulation', The Economic Record, 32, 334, 1956.
81. R. Solow, 'A contribution to the theory of economic growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 65, 1956; T. W. Swan, 'Economic growth and capital accumulation', The Economic Record, 32, 334, 1956.
82. Siegel, op. cit., Ref. 61 at p. 442.
83. This 'linear theory' of technical change may not always hold. See generally N. Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
84. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at p. 63.
85. Basic scientific research may in some cases depend on technological knowledge in the intellectual commons rather than technological change depending on scientific research: see Rosenberg, op. cit., Ref. 66, Ch. 7.
86. It should be noted here that Gans' requirements for economic growth tend to conflict. Intellectual property rights arguably create an incentive to produce information. These property rights grant the holder a temporary monopoly over knowledge which necessarily hampers its free distribution.
87. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at p. 121; P. Stoneman & P. Dierderen, 'Technology diffusion and public policy', The Economic Journal, 104, 918, 1994.
88. Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at p. 121; P. Stoneman & P. Dierderen, 'Technology diffusion and public policy', The Economic Journal, 104, 918, 1994.
89. For example, the Australian Broadcasting Authority's Investigation into the Content of On-line Services: Report to the Minister for Communications and the Arts, 30 June 1996, Australian Senate, Sydney; Select Committee on Community Standards Relevant to the Supply of Services Utilising Electronic Technologies, Report on Regulation of Computer On-line Services Part 3, June 1997.
90. For example, the Australian Broadcasting Authority's Investigation into the Content of On-line Services: Report to the Minister for Communications and the Arts, 30 June 1996, Australian Senate, Sydney; Select Committee on Community Standards Relevant to the Supply of Services Utilising Electronic Technologies, Report on Regulation of Computer On-line Services Part 3, June 1997.
91. For example, the British parliament has amended provisions of the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the Protection of Children Act 1978, and the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in order to deal with computer-generated child pornography. In a similar vein, the United States passed the Communications Decency Act 1996. This Act was struck down as unconstitutional in Reno, Attorney-General of the Uniled States of America et al. v. American Civil liberties Union et al. No. 96-511, 26 June 1997.
92. G. Calabresi & A. Melamed, 'Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral', Harvard Law Review, 85(6), 1089, 1972, pp. 1111-1112.
93. Ibid.
94. Declan McCullagh's Plague of Freedom net site at http://www.eff.org/"declan/global/
95. G. J. Stigler, 'The economics of information', Journal of Political Economy, 69, 213, 1961; see also Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at pp. 156, 157; Stewart, op. cit., Ref. 1 at p. 6.
96. G. J. Stigler, 'The economics of information', Journal of Political Economy, 69, 213, 1961; see also Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at pp. 156, 157; Stewart, op. cit., Ref. 1 at p. 6.
97. G. J. Stigler, 'The economics of information', Journal of Political Economy, 69, 213, 1961; see also Drahos, op. cit., Ref. 4 at pp. 156, 157; Stewart, op. cit., Ref. 1 at p. 6.
98. Calabresi & Melamed, op. cit., Ref. 73 at p. 1115.
99. The term 'Leviathan' in this context means direct government intervention and stems from Ophuls who argued the tragedy of the commons could only be corrected by recourse to 'the tragic necessity of Leviathan'; W. Ophuls, 'Leviathan or oblivion', in H. E. Daly (ed.), Toward a Steady State Economy, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA, 1973, 215 at p. 229.
100. Ostrom provides an excellent discussion of these policy prescriptions: E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990 at pp. 8-13.
101. See for example Ibid., and the articles contained in T. Anderson & R. Simmons, (eds), The Political Economy of Custom and Culture, Rowan and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, USA, 1993. For a comprehensive bibliography of work in this area see F. Martin, Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography, vols 1 and 2, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989 and 1992.
102. See for example Ibid., and the articles contained in T. Anderson & R. Simmons, (eds), The Political Economy of Custom and Culture, Rowan and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, USA, 1993. For a comprehensive bibliography of work in this area see F. Martin, Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography, vols 1 and 2, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989 and 1992.
103. See for example Ibid., and the articles contained in T. Anderson & R. Simmons, (eds), The Political Economy of Custom and Culture, Rowan and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, USA, 1993. For a comprehensive bibliography of work in this area see F. Martin, Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography, vols 1 and 2, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989 and 1992.
104. Ostrom, op. cit., Ref. 79 at pp. 90-102.
105. M. Goldman, 'Customs in culture', Theory and Society, 26(1), 1, 1997 at p. 6.
106. This is consistent with Olson's view that the larger the group the further it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good: M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965, p. 48.
107. See R. Sethi & E. Somanathan, 'The evolution of social norms in common property resource use', American Economic Review, 86(4), 766, 1996.
108. This conclusion is consistent with Ayres and Braithwaite's proposition that self-regulation is unlikely to be achieved if strong punitive sanctions are removed. See I. Ayres & J. Braithwiate, Responsive Regulation, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992 at p. 39.
109. Sethi & Somanathan, op. cit., Ref. 84 at pp. 769, 776.
110. Ibid. at p. 776.
111. Ibid. p. 781.
112. See Pigou, op. cit., Ref. 30 at p. 192.
113. See Demsetz, op. cit., Ref. 10 at p. 356. For an examination of enclosure of the commons see K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1944.
114. See Demsetz, op. cit., Ref. 10 at p. 356. For an examination of enclosure of the commons see K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1944.
115. Demsetz, op. cit., Ref. 10 at p. 356. Ostrom discusses similar views: see Ref. 79 at p. 12.
116. There is currently an action before the Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand for the assignment of intellectual property-type rights over Maori culture. This could be taken to be a depletion of the commons. Alternatively, it may represent a formal recognition of Maori ownership of their cultural commons: 'Maoris claim birds and bees', The Australian, 16 September 1997.
117. See Coase, op. cit., Ref. 30.
118. A 'tit for tat' strategy refers to the use of persuasion with movement to punitive strategies for recalcitrants: Ayres & Braithwaite, op. cit., Ref. 85 at p. 24.
119. Ibid. Ch. 2.
120. Ibid. Ch. 4.
121. Ibid. p. 135.
122. Investigation into the Content of On-line Services, op. cit., Ref. 71 at pp. 105-117.
123. Report on Regulation of Computer On-line Services: Part 3, op. cit., Ref. 71.
124. The European Community has also recommended enforced self-regulation of ISPs: Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet at www.europa.eu.int/en/record/legal/index.htm
125. H. Wright, 'The net: the beginning or the end of free speech?', Computers and Law, 29, 3, 1996.
126. Ibid. and J. T. Delacourt, 'The international impact of Internet regulation', Harvard International Law Journal, 38, 207, 1997. See also John Perry Barlow's Declaration of Independence of the Internet on 9 February 1996 at www.eff.org.au
127. Ibid. and J. T. Delacourt, 'The international impact of Internet regulation', Harvard International Law Journal, 38, 207, 1997. See also John Perry Barlow's Declaration of Independence of the Internet on 9 February 1996 at www.eff.org.au
128. Ibid. and J. T. Delacourt, 'The international impact of Internet regulation', Harvard International Law Journal, 38, 207, 1997. See also John Perry Barlow's Declaration of Independence of the Internet on 9 February 1996 at www.eff.org.au