The promise and perils of statistics in international relations

Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 129-151

  Braumoeller, Bear F ^a   Sartori, Anne E ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85168457911     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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