Between Impunity and Show Trials

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 6, Issue , 2002, Pages 1-35

  Koskenniemi, Mariti ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

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EID: 85145074227     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/18757413-00601002     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. The description of the campaign for ending the culture of impunity as an aspect of the legalist-domestic analogy is usefully discussed in G. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance. The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 2000, 8-36.
2. Quoted in N. Frei, "Le retour du droit en Allemagne. La justice et l'histoire contemporaine après l'Holocauste - un bilan provisoire", in: F. Brayard (ed.), Le génocide des Juifs entre procès et histoire 1943-2000, 2000, 57.
3. L. Köhler/ H. Kohler (eds), Hannah Arendt - Karl Jaspers. Correspondence 1926-1969, 1996, 410. Quoted also in L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment. Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust, 2001, 174-175. Here Jaspers was undoubtedly drawing upon his Die Schuldfrage, 1946.
4. L. Köhler/ H. Kohler (eds), Hannah Arendt - Karl Jaspers. Correspondence 1926-1969, 1996, 410. Quoted also in L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment. Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust, 2001, 174-175. Here Jaspers was undoubtedly drawing upon his Die Schuldfrage, 1946.
5. L. Köhler/ H. Kohler (eds), Hannah Arendt - Karl Jaspers. Correspondence 1926-1969, 1996, 410. Quoted also in L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment. Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust, 2001, 174-175. Here Jaspers was undoubtedly drawing upon his Die Schuldfrage, 1946.
6. In her The Nazi War Against the Jews: 1933-1945, 1975, Lucy Davidowicz stresses the extent to which the Holocaust was not an accidental offshoot but a deliberate choice of the Hitler regime.
7. This was certainly the perspective taken by the Prosecutor, Gideon Hausner, whom Arendt saw as simply "obeying his master", David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister; H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. and enlarged edition, 1963, 5. For an excellent recent discussion of this aspect of the trial, cf. Douglas, see note 3, 97 et seq., 150-182.
8. Arendt, see above, 270-271.
9. Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal: "Procedure in case of failure to execute a warrant."
10. P. Hazan, La justice face à la guerre. De Nuremberg à la Haye, 2000, 134.
11. Cf e.g. J. Verhoeven, "Vers un ordre répressif universel?" AFDI 45 (1999), writing about criminal justice in terms of "une fonction qui l'on dirait 'consolatrice', d'ordre thérapeutique et pédagogique⋯la quiétude et la sérénité," 55 et seq., (60). In regard to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, D.D. Ntanda Nserko, "Genocidal Conflict in Rwanda and the ICTR", NILR 48 (2001), 62 et seq.
12. Cf e.g. J. Verhoeven, "Vers un ordre répressif universel?" AFDI 45 (1999), writing about criminal justice in terms of "une fonction qui l'on dirait 'consolatrice', d'ordre thérapeutique et pédagogique⋯la quiétude et la sérénité," 55 et seq., (60). In regard to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, D.D. Ntanda Nserko, "Genocidal Conflict in Rwanda and the ICTR", NILR 48 (2001), 62 et seq.
13. For a summary of such justifications, cf. A. Cassese, "On the Current Trend towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment for Breaches of International Humanitarian Law," EJIL 9 (1998), 2 et seq., (9-10).
14. Frei, see note 2, 62-67.
15. S. Jung, Die Rechtsprobleme der Nürnberger Prozesse, 1992, 89-92, 109-111.
16. F. M. Buscher, The U.S. War Crimes Trials Programme in Germany, 1946-1955, 1989, 69.
17. During 1946-49, twelve US military tribunals sitting in Nuremberg heard cases of 185-199 defendants (numbers vary according to source) while a US Army European Command set up its own process, conducted at Dachau that tried 1672 individuals. The trials were vehemently criticised by various United States and German organisations. Though the processes ended in a large number of convictions, most of the sentences were later reduced and a large number of the convicted amnestied in 1951. The summary of the history of those trials is negative: "⋯ the war crimes programme did little to change German attitudes. Cries of foul play and Victor's justice' accompanied the proceedings⋯ The constant attacks against the Allies, especially the United States as the main instigator of those proceedings in the late 1940's by Germany's church leaders, politicians, veterans' and refugee organizations demonstrated that the war crimes programme had not reeducated and democratized the Germans," Buscher, see note 13, 22. For the domestic US critiques, cf. The U.S. War Crimes Trials Programme in Germany, 1946-1955, 29-47. For the uses of administrative reviews and amnesties, cf. The U.S. War Crimes Trials Programme in Germany, 1946-1955, 49-89.
18. During 1946-49, twelve US military tribunals sitting in Nuremberg heard cases of 185-199 defendants (numbers vary according to source) while a US Army European Command set up its own process, conducted at Dachau that tried 1672 individuals. The trials were vehemently criticised by various United States and German organisations. Though the processes ended in a large number of convictions, most of the sentences were later reduced and a large number of the convicted amnestied in 1951. The summary of the history of those trials is negative: "⋯ the war crimes programme did little to change German attitudes. Cries of foul play and Victor's justice' accompanied the proceedings⋯ The constant attacks against the Allies, especially the United States as the main instigator of those proceedings in the late 1940's by Germany's church leaders, politicians, veterans' and refugee organizations demonstrated that the war crimes programme had not reeducated and democratized the Germans," Buscher, see note 13, 22. For the domestic US critiques, cf. The U.S. War Crimes Trials Programme in Germany, 1946-1955, 29-47. For the uses of administrative reviews and amnesties, cf. The U.S. War Crimes Trials Programme in Germany, 1946-1955, 49-89.
19. Buscher, see note 13, 91.
20. Jung, see note 12, 5.
21. For a detailed review, cf. e.g. A. Grosser, Le crime et la mémoire, 1989, 87-132.
22. Cf. A. Rückerl, NS-Verbrechen vor Gericht. Versuch einer Vergangenheitsbewältigung 1984, 330; Grosser, see note 17, 112-113, 121.
23. E. Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints. Reflections on Restorative Justice", in: R.J. Rotberg/ D. Thompson, Truth v. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions, 2000, 88 and Rotberg, "Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation", Truth v. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions, 19.
24. E. Kiss, "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints. Reflections on Restorative Justice", in: R.J. Rotberg/ D. Thompson, Truth v. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions, 2000, 88 and Rotberg, "Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation", Truth v. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions, 19.
25. L. Douglas, "Régenter le passé: Le négationnisme et la loi", in: Brayard, see note 2,218-223.
26. Douglas, see note 20, 227-238.
27. Arendt, see note 5, 251.
28. Arendt, see note 5, 4-5.
29. Thus one advocate: "⋯punishment of war criminals should be motivated primarily by its deterrent effect, by the impetus it gives to improved standards of international conduct," C.M. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Law, 1992, 14. A particularly thoughtful argument is in P. Akhavan, "Beyond Impunity. Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?", AJIL 95 (2001), 7 et seq.
30. Thus one advocate: "⋯punishment of war criminals should be motivated primarily by its deterrent effect, by the impetus it gives to improved standards of international conduct," C.M. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Law, 1992, 14. A particularly thoughtful argument is in P. Akhavan, "Beyond Impunity. Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?", AJIL 95 (2001), 7 et seq.
31. Cf. especially T. Todorov, Tentation du bien, mémoire du mal, 2000.
32. A. Besançon, Le malheur du siècle. Sur le communisme, Ze nazisme et Vunidté de la Shoah, 1998, 45.
33. Cf. J. Klabbers, "Just Revenge? The deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law", forthcoming in Finnish YBIL 11 (2000).
34. For a recent analysis, cf. I. Tallgren, "The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal law", forthcoming in EJIL 13 (2002).
35. Cf. D. Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory, 2001, 38-56.
36. Buscher, see note note 13, 110.
37. Hazan, see note 8, 245-247.
38. J. Borneman, Settling Accounts. Violence, Justice and Accountability in Postsodalist Europe, 1997, 23.
39. Cf. R. G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, 2000, especially 51-59.
40. For this controversy after German unification, especially in relation to the GDR border guard trials and the trials of Honecker and the former Politbüro members, cf. J. McAdams, Judging the Past in Unified Germany, 2001, 23-54.
41. Teitel, see note 33, 46-49, 66.
42. Cf. K.C. Moghadli, "No Peace without Justice. The Role of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law in Conflict Settlement and Reconciliation," paper given at a conference "From Impunity to a Culture of Accountability," Utrecht 26-28 November 2001.
43. Cf. e.g. P. Bouretz, "Prescription: table ronde du 22 janvier 1999", Droits 31 (2000), 53.
44. For this criticism in regard to the ICTY, cf. Hazan, see note 8, 239-263.
45. Cf. M. Wildt, "Des vérités qui diffèrent. Historiens et procureurs face aux crimes de Nazis", in: Brayard, see note 2, 251-257. Cf. also D. Lochak, "Prescription, remarques dans une table ronde du 22 janvier 1999", Droits 31 (2000), 49-54.
46. Cf. M. Wildt, "Des vérités qui diffèrent. Historiens et procureurs face aux crimes de Nazis", in: Brayard, see note 2, 251-257. Cf. also D. Lochak, "Prescription, remarques dans une table ronde du 22 janvier 1999", Droits 31 (2000), 49-54.
47. Kiss, see note 19, 69.
48. For discussion of this difficulty in the German situation, cf. Bornemann, see note 32, 80-96, 99-100; McAdams, see note 34,47-54.
49. For the role of such interpretations in the Milosevic trial, cf. K. Cavoski, "Juger l'histoire" in: P. Marie Gallois/ J. Vergés, L'apartheid judiciaire au TPI, arme de guerre, 2002, 77-89.
50. H. Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen, 1929, 62-72 and passim. For the general context and a discussion, cf. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, 2002, 440-445.
51. H. Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen, 1929, 62-72 and passim. For the general context and a discussion, cf. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, 2002, 440-445.
52. Wildt, see note 39, 251.
53. As pointed out in Grosser, see note 17, 76-77.
54. Cf. Bloxham, see note 29, 28-32.
55. For an account of the procedural difficulties in prosecuting former Nazis in Germany under the common criminal law, cf. Rückerl, see note 18, 261-288.
56. Cf. D. O. Pendas, "'Auschwitz, je ne savais pas ce que c'était'. Le procès d'Auschwitz à Francfort et l'opinion public allemande", in: Brayard, see note 2, 85-93. Cf also Douglas, see note 3, 188-190.
57. H. Grami/ K.D. Henke, Nach Hitler. Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte. Beiträge von Martin Broszat, 1987, 47-49.
58. Todorov, see note 25, 36-41; Besançon, see note 26, 59-64.
59. Even the individualisation of guilt is a policy - namely a policy of collective impunity. "We have to individualize the guilt," said Ivan Djordjevic, a former dissident lawyer and an official in Serbia's Ministry of Internal Affairs. "Otherwise we have this feeling of collective guilt, that this whole nation had the goal of eliminating other people and killing. Not all of us supported this," New York Times 11 February 2002.
60. New York Times, 11 February 2002.
61. As Charles Leben has observed, in large political crimes, the ordinary relationship between fact and context breaks down. Judges may no longer confine themselves within the former, historians within the latter: in judging the facts, judges also judge the context, "Remarques dans un débat de table ronde le 22 janvier 2000", Droits 31 (2000), 64.
62. J.F. Lyotard, The Differend. Phrases in Dispute, translated by G. Van Den Abbeele, 1988, 9.
63. For the diplomatic history, cf. Hazan, see note 8, 55-77.
64. Vyshinsky, as reported in T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials. A Personal Memoir, 1992, 211.
65. For the view of the Prosecutor that although "some mistakes" were made, no violations of humanitarian law were involved, cf. the Annual Report of the ICTY, Doc. A/55/273, 30-31, para. 192. The legality of the bombing has, however, been severely contested within humanitarian organisations, among them the ICRC. For the contents of a confidential memorandum by the ICRC, cf. Hazan, see note 8, 219-223.
66. Cf. Comparution de M. Slobodan Milosevic, Les incohérences du Tribunal pénal international, Le Monde Diplomatique (20 juillet 2001) par Catherine Samary, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/kosovo/samary0701.
67. For aspects of that guilt, cf. M. Koskenniemi, ""The Lady Doth Protest too Much" Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law," The Modern Law Review 65 (2002), 159 et seq.
68. Quoted in M. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46. A Documentary History, 1997, 90.
69. Marrus, see above, 88; Bloxham, see note 29, 101-102. But de Menthon's alternate Edgar Faure went to great detail in researching and describing the persecution of the Jews and other crimes against humanity in the West. Cf. A. Wieviorka, "La France et le procès de Nuremberg," in: A. Wieviorka (ed.), Les procès de Nuremberg et de Tokio, 1996, 62-77.
70. Jackson, c6 June 1945' as cited in Marrus, see note 60, 42.
71. Cf. Taylor, see note 56, 75-76.
72. For a critique, cf. Douglas, see note 3, 48-56.
73. Bloxham, see note 29, 108-110.
74. Marrus, see note 60, 127. For a sustained description and criticism of the emphasis in the IMT and the successor trials, cf. Bloxham, see note 29, especially, 57-128.
75. Marrus, see note 60, 134-139.
76. Taylor, see note 56, 555. Cf. also M. Messerschmidt, "La quête de la responsabilité⋯", in: Wieviorka, see note 61, 91-92. Other famous "oversights" include the Allied terror bombing of German cities and of course Hiroshima and (especially) Nagasaki. For the embarrassing treatment of the Katyn massacre, cf. A. Viatteau, "Comment a été traité la question de Katyn à Nuremberg", in: Les procès de Nuremberg et de Tokio, 145-155 and A. Tusa/J. Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, 1983, 410-412.
77. Taylor, see note 56, 555. Cf. also M. Messerschmidt, "La quête de la responsabilité⋯", in: Wieviorka, see note 61, 91-92. Other famous "oversights" include the Allied terror bombing of German cities and of course Hiroshima and (especially) Nagasaki. For the embarrassing treatment of the Katyn massacre, cf. A. Viatteau, "Comment a été traité la question de Katyn à Nuremberg", in: Les procès de Nuremberg et de Tokio, 145-155 and A. Tusa/J. Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, 1983, 410-412.
78. Taylor, see note 56, 555. Cf. also M. Messerschmidt, "La quête de la responsabilité⋯", in: Wieviorka, see note 61, 91-92. Other famous "oversights" include the Allied terror bombing of German cities and of course Hiroshima and (especially) Nagasaki. For the embarrassing treatment of the Katyn massacre, cf. A. Viatteau, "Comment a été traité la question de Katyn à Nuremberg", in: Les procès de Nuremberg et de Tokio, 145-155 and A. Tusa/J. Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, 1983, 410-412.
79. Douglas, see note 3, 57-63.
80. The increasing criticism and decreasing use by historians of Nuremberg documentation is pointed out e.g. in B.F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, 1977, xv-xvi. One aspect of the cold war interpretation lay in the legend about the Wehrmacbt's innocence in the crimes of the SS, necessary so as to prepare military cooperation with the West. Cf. Bloxham, see note 29, 129-133.
81. Law No. 64-1326 of 26 December 1964. For a discussion of the debates surrounding the adoption of this law, cf. A. Laquièze, "Le débat de 1964 sur l'imprescriptibilité des crimes contre l'humanité", Droits 31 (2000), 19-40.
82. Cour de Cassation, Judgment of 20 December 1985. For an extensive analysis of the drafting of this language, cf. L. Sadat Wexler, "The Interpretation of the Nuremberg principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again", Col J. Transnat'l L. 32 (1994), 287 et seq., (338). Cf also G. Binder, "Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity in the Trial of Klaus Barbie", Yale L. J. 14 (1989), 1321 et seq., (1337-1338).
83. Cour de Cassation, Judgment of 20 December 1985. For an extensive analysis of the drafting of this language, cf. L. Sadat Wexler, "The Interpretation of the Nuremberg principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again", Col J. Transnat'l L. 32 (1994), 287 et seq., (338). Cf also G. Binder, "Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity in the Trial of Klaus Barbie", Yale L. J. 14 (1989), 1321 et seq., (1337-1338).
84. Wexler, see above 72, 346.
85. Wieviorka, see note 61, 83.
86. Touvier was finally condemned to life imprisonment by the Versailles appeals court on 19 April 1994. For the relevant part of the act of accusation, cf. S. Chalandon/ P. Nivelle (eds), Crimes contre l'humanité. Barbie, Touvier,; Bousquet, Papon, 1998, 160-163. For a description and critique of the 1992 judgments, cf. Wexler, see note 72, 344-353 and 361-367. Cf. also Annex II of the article which contains the reasoning of the Paris Court ending up in the conclusion that Vichy France was not exercising tca policy of ideological hegemony," Yale L. J. 376-379.
87. Touvier was finally condemned to life imprisonment by the Versailles appeals court on 19 April 1994. For the relevant part of the act of accusation, cf. S. Chalandon/ P. Nivelle (eds), Crimes contre l'humanité. Barbie, Touvier,; Bousquet, Papon, 1998, 160-163. For a description and critique of the 1992 judgments, cf. Wexler, see note 72, 344-353 and 361-367. Cf. also Annex II of the article which contains the reasoning of the Paris Court ending up in the conclusion that Vichy France was not exercising tca policy of ideological hegemony," Yale L. J. 376-379.
88. Cf. especially M. Marrus/ R.O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 1983, 250-252.
89. L. Sadat, "The Legal Legacy of Maurice Papon," in: R.J. Golsan (ed.), The Papon Affair. Memory and Justice on Trial, 2000, 141-142.
90. This theme is treated in most of the essays in Golsan, see above. But cf. especially R.O. Paxton, "Vichy on Trial", 169-170; A. Lévy-Willard/ B. Vallaeys, "Those who Organised the Trains Knew There Would be Deaths," Interview with R.O. Paxton in: Libération 3 October 1997, and N. Weill/ R. Solé, "Today, Everything Converges on the Haunting Memory of Vichy," Interview with P. Nora in: Le Monde 1 October 1997. That to judge Papon was to judge Vichy France was even an aspect of Papon's defence. Cf. his final statement to the Bordeaux Appeals Court on 1 April 1998, cf. P. Nivelle, "Le procès papón", in: Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 510-513, 515.
91. This theme is treated in most of the essays in Golsan, see above. But cf. especially R.O. Paxton, "Vichy on Trial", 169-170; A. Lévy-Willard/ B. Vallaeys, "Those who Organised the Trains Knew There Would be Deaths," Interview with R.O. Paxton in: Libération 3 October 1997, and N. Weill/ R. Solé, "Today, Everything Converges on the Haunting Memory of Vichy," Interview with P. Nora in: Le Monde 1 October 1997. That to judge Papon was to judge Vichy France was even an aspect of Papon's defence. Cf. his final statement to the Bordeaux Appeals Court on 1 April 1998, cf. P. Nivelle, "Le procès papón", in: Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 510-513, 515.
92. This theme is treated in most of the essays in Golsan, see above. But cf. especially R.O. Paxton, "Vichy on Trial", 169-170; A. Lévy-Willard/ B. Vallaeys, "Those who Organised the Trains Knew There Would be Deaths," Interview with R.O. Paxton in: Libération 3 October 1997, and N. Weill/ R. Solé, "Today, Everything Converges on the Haunting Memory of Vichy," Interview with P. Nora in: Le Monde 1 October 1997. That to judge Papon was to judge Vichy France was even an aspect of Papon's defence. Cf. his final statement to the Bordeaux Appeals Court on 1 April 1998, cf. P. Nivelle, "Le procès papón", in: Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 510-513, 515.
93. This theme is treated in most of the essays in Golsan, see above. But cf. especially R.O. Paxton, "Vichy on Trial", 169-170; A. Lévy-Willard/ B. Vallaeys, "Those who Organised the Trains Knew There Would be Deaths," Interview with R.O. Paxton in: Libération 3 October 1997, and N. Weill/ R. Solé, "Today, Everything Converges on the Haunting Memory of Vichy," Interview with P. Nora in: Le Monde 1 October 1997. That to judge Papon was to judge Vichy France was even an aspect of Papon's defence. Cf. his final statement to the Bordeaux Appeals Court on 1 April 1998, cf. P. Nivelle, "Le procès papón", in: Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 510-513, 515.
94. Cf. Jackson's Report to the President, 6 June 1945 quoted by Marrus, see note 60, 41.
95. Quoted in Marrus, see note 60, 118.
96. C. Châtelot, "Le procès Milosevic s'enfonce dans la routine," Le Monde 25 Mai 2002, 15.
97. Cf. J. Vergés, De la stratégie judiciaire, 1968.
98. De la stratégie judiciaire, 86-87.
99. De la stratégie judiciaire, 104-112.
100. A. Frossard, Le crime contre l'humanité, 1997, 40. On the reception of the Barbie trial in France, cf. also the very useful account in H. Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome. History and memory in France since 1944, translated by A. Goldhammer, 1991, 191-216. Interesting is also Binder, see note 72.
101. A. Frossard, Le crime contre l'humanité, 1997, 40. On the reception of the Barbie trial in France, cf. also the very useful account in H. Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome. History and memory in France since 1944, translated by A. Goldhammer, 1991, 191-216. Interesting is also Binder, see note 72.
102. Douglas, see note 3, 187-188.
103. Decision of 4 October 1985. For extracts from the act of accusation of the Lyon Court, cf. Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 17-28.
104. Judgment of 20 December 1985. Cf. also the quote at page 22 and references in note 72.
105. Cf e.g. the account of the statement of the counsel for the Ligue des droits de l'homme, Henri Noguères, experiencing "shock of witnessing a discrimination between the Jews and the non-Jews that had been thrown into the last train from Lyon to Auschwitz on 11 August 1944,"in: S. Chalandon, "Le procès de Klaus Barbie," in: Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 125.
106. Frossard, see note 85, 17.
107. Frossard, see note 85, 70. In her thorough commentary of the case, L. Sadat takes the position that Frossard's definition, which coincided with the Lyon Court's restricted view, was both "illogical" and possibly "insensitive", see note 77, 137. Cassese, too, supports the wider definition - but oddly defends this on the basis that the targeted persons were chosen "only because they belong to the enemy" (instead of being belligerents), A. Cassese, Law and Violence in the Modern Age, 1986, 112. But surely the Jews were not targeted because they were the enemy. And surely that is precisely where the speciality of the Nazi genocide resides, as Frossard argues, and what is lost from the wider definition.
108. Cf. W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, translated by M. Byers, 2000, 626 and my book review in ICLQ 51 (2002), 746 et seq., as well as Kritische Justiz 35 (2002), 277 et seq.
109. Cf. W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, translated by M. Byers, 2000, 626 and my book review in ICLQ 51 (2002), 746 et seq., as well as Kritische Justiz 35 (2002), 277 et seq.
110. Cf. W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, translated by M. Byers, 2000, 626 and my book review in ICLQ 51 (2002), 746 et seq., as well as Kritische Justiz 35 (2002), 277 et seq.
111. For Vergés career and pre-trial statements, cf. Binder, see note 72, 1356 1359 and Cassese, see note 91, 113-115.
112. Rousso, see note 85, 208-209.
113. A. Finkelkraut, La mémoire vaine. Du crime contre l'humanité, 1998, 51-52.
114. Finkelkraut, see above, 61-63.
115. Vergés 1 July 1987, as reported in Chalandon/ Nivelle, see note 75, 138.
116. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, 226 et seq., (239-240, paras 24-25). Cf further M. Koskenniemi, "The Silence of Law/ The Voice of Justice", in: L. Boisson de Chazournes/ R Sands, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 1999, 488 et seq., (490-498).
117. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, 226 et seq., (239-240, paras 24-25). Cf further M. Koskenniemi, "The Silence of Law/ The Voice of Justice", in: L. Boisson de Chazournes/ R Sands, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 1999, 488 et seq., (490-498).
118. Cavoski, see note 42, 77-89.
119. Cf. the account of the trial of Ernst Zundel, over his pamphlet "Did Six Million really Die?", in Toronto, Canada, in 1988, in: Douglas, see note 3, 226-254. Through the aggressive cross-examination by Zundel's advocate, D. Christie, "memory was ridiculed, the survivor transformed into an amnesiac at best, and outright liar at worst," 240. For the enormous risks involved in trying to prove "sacred facts" through the banality of the legal process, cf. also D.D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial History, Justice and David Irving Libel Case, 2001, 307-308.
120. Cf. the account of the trial of Ernst Zundel, over his pamphlet "Did Six Million really Die?", in Toronto, Canada, in 1988, in: Douglas, see note 3, 226-254. Through the aggressive cross-examination by Zundel's advocate, D. Christie, "memory was ridiculed, the survivor transformed into an amnesiac at best, and outright liar at worst," 240. For the enormous risks involved in trying to prove "sacred facts" through the banality of the legal process, cf. also D.D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial History, Justice and David Irving Libel Case, 2001, 307-308.
121. Cross-examination of Ms Drita Emini on 28 and 30 May 2002, Transcript of the Milosevic trial, 5747-5764.
122. P. Vidal-Naquet, Les assassins de la mémoire, 1987, 148.
123. Cf. Finkelkraut, see note 95.
124. It often seems that the memory for which the trial in the Hague is staged is not the memory of Balkan populations but that of an "international community" recounting its past as a progress narrative from "Nuremberg to the Hague," impunity to the Rule of Law. This "community" would construct itself in the image of a "public time" (in analogy with "public space") in which it would contemplate its past and give a moral meaning to disasters such as Rwanda or Srebrenica as implying a promise of radiant future. On the idea of "public time", cf. S. Villavicencio, "Sans même un procès. L'impunité et les identités collectives," in: J. Poulain, Qu'est-ce que la justice? Devant l'autel de l'histoire, 1996, 216-217.
125. Cf. Hazan, see note 8, 243-247.