German Bundesverfassungsgericht: Alcan, Decision of 17 February 2000; Constitutional review of EC Regulation on bananas, Decision of 7 June 2000

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 791-804

  Hoffmeister, Frank ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

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EID: 85102807582     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: 18758320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1010654916694     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. 1. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 17 Feb. 2000, (2000) EuZW, 445 with annotation by Vo¨gler on 447. Further comments are made by Lindner, (2000) BayVBl., 655; Bausback, ibid. at 658; Gu¨ndisch, (2000) NVwZ, 1125.
2. 2. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 7 June 2000, (2000) EuZW, 702, with annotation by Mayer on 685. The decision is further commented by Lecheler, (2001) JuS, 120; Classen, (2000) JZ, 1157; Berkemann, (2001) JR, 13 at 20; Lindner, (2000) BayVBl., 758; Emmerich-Fritsche, ibid. at 755; Barden, (2000) VwBlBW, 425. For a discussion in context see von Bogdandy, “The European Union as a human rights organization? Human Rights and the Core of the European Union”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1307 at 1322 et seq.
3. 3. BVerfGE 89, 155. A translation can be found in CMLR [1994] 57 et seq. For discussion of the decision in English see Herdegen, “Maastricht and the Constitutional Court: Constitutional restraints for an Ever Closer Union”, 31 CML Rev. (1994), 235; Kokott, “German constitutional jurisprudence and European integration II”, 2 EPL (1996), 413 at 428 et seq.; Hailbronner, “The European Union from the perspective of the German Constitutional Court”, 37 GYIL (1994), 93; Hobe, “The German State in Europe after the Maastricht Decision of the German Constitutional Court”, 37 GYIL (1994), 113; Everling, “The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its significance for the development of the European Union”, 14 YEL (1994), 1; Wieland, “Germany in the European Union – The Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht”, 5 EJIL (1994), 259.
4. 4. Case 94/87, Alcan I, [1989] ECR 175.
5. 5. Case C 24/95, Alcan II, [1997] ECR I-1591.
6. 6. BVerwGE 106, 328.
7. 7. BVerfGE 31, 145 at 173; BVerfGE 75, 223 at 224.
8. 8. Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93, O.J. 1993, L 47, 1.
9. 9. Case 280/93, Germany v. Council, [1994] ECR I-4973 at 5064, para 76 et seq.
10. 10. Case 466/93, Atlanta, [1995] ECR I-3799 at 3808, para 11. For a critical view on the ECJ cases see Everling, “Will Europe slip on bananas? The Banana judgment of the Court of Justice and national courts”, 33 CML Rev. (1996), 401.
11. 11. Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt, 24 Oct. 1996, (1997) EuZW, 182.
12. 12. BVerfGE 73, 339.
13. 13. See supra note 3.
14. 14. These three sentences are at the same time the Headnotes of the Court. In the original they are formulated as follows: “1. Verfassungsbeschwerden und Vorlagen von Gerichten, die eine Verletzung von Grundrechten des Grundgesetzes durch sekunda¨res Gemeinschaftsrecht geltend machen, sind von vornherein unzula¨ssig, wenn ihre Begru¨ndung nicht darlegt, dass die europa¨ische Rechtsentwicklung einschließlich der Rechtsprechung des Europa¨ischen Gerichtshofs nach Ergehen der Solange II-Entscheidung (BVerfGE 73, 339 [378–381]) unter den erforderlichen Grundrechtsschutz abgesunken ist. 2. Deshalb muss die Begru¨ndung der Vorlage oder einer Verfassungsbeschwerde im Einzelnen darlegen, dass der jeweils als unabdingbar gebotene Grundrechtsschutz generell nicht mehr gewa¨hrleistet ist. Dies erfordert eine Gegenu¨berstellung des Grundrechtsschutzes auf nationaler und auf Gemeinschaftsebene in der Art und Weise, wie das BVerfG sie in BVerfGE 73, 339 (378 bis 381) geleistet hat."
15. 15. Case C-68/95, T. Port, [1996] ECR I-6065.
16. 16. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 25 Jan. 1995, (1995) EuZW, 126.
17. 17. The Bundesverfassungsgericht did not expressly state that European measures contravening human rights of the Basic Law were not applicable in Germany, but focused merely on the conditions under which its judicial review was admissible. Nevertheless, it can be deduced from the spirit of the judgment that the sanction of non-applicability would concern ultra vires acts and acts violating the indispensable German human rights standard (Frowein, “Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenze der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit”, 54 Zao¨RV (1994), 1 at 9; Weber, “Zur Kontrolle grundrechtsbzw. kompetenzwidriger Rechtsakte der EG durch nationale Verfassungsgerichte”, in Festschrift Everling, Vol. 2 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995), 1625 at 1633).
18. th ed. (Mu¨ller, 1999), para 217; Ju¨rgensen, “Der Streit um die EG-Bananenmarktordnung” – Book review, (2000) NJW, 2805.
19. 19. For this view see Zuleeg, “Bananen und Grundrechte – Anlaß zum Konflikt zwischen europa¨ischer und deutscher Gerichtsbarkeit”, (1997) NJW, 1201; Huber, “Das Kooperationsverha¨ltnis zwischen BVerfG und EuGH in Grundrechtsfragen”, (1997) EuZW, 517 at 520.
20. 20. According to Vo¨gler, op. cit supra note 1, at 447, the Constitutional Court has favoured a “continuing case-to case control” since it did not review the ECJ human rights jurisprudence in general. To my mind, the Alcan decision can be understood in the opposite way. Saying that there was no reason to believe that the level of indispensable human rights protection required by the German constitution was generally questioned by the ECJ’s preliminary ruling, the Bundesverfassungsgericht hinted at the fact that one “wrong” judgment would not be enough to claim a general setback. As noted above, the review on the merits was then introduced by a disclaimer ("even if a review was admissible"/"im u¨brigen bestu¨nden selbst bei einer U¨ berpru¨fung anhand der Maßsta¨be des Grundgesetzes keine verfassungsrechtlichen Bedenken").
21. 21. In BVerfGE 73, 339, at 379 to 382, the Constitutional Court has first pointed to the right to property, the right to free profession, the right to associate, the principle of equal rights, the freedom of religion, the protection of the family. Second, it has enumerated jurisprudence concerning the principle of proportionality as a limit to possible restrictions of these rights. Third, it has cited examples of those general principles of law which protect the individual like e.g. the principle of legal certainty, of non-rectroactivity, of non bis in idem. Fourth, it has named the right to a fair trial and to effective judicial protection as a part of the European human rights standards. It came to the conclusion that the jurisprudence of the ECJ has developed and “stabilized” the European human rights standards.
22. 22. In that sense Lecheler, op. cit supra note 2, at 123 who interprets the wording “respective” ("jeweils") to mean a comparison in the area of life concerned ("den betreffenden Lebensbereich"). Similarly v. Bogdandy, op. cit supra note 2, at 1323 who understands the Court to require a “comprehensive review of how the European institutions protect the human right in question” (italics added).
23. 23. This view is upheld by Classen, op. cit supra note 2, at 1158 who attaches to the citation of Solange II, pp. 387 to 381, the meaning that the complete picture of human rights’ jurisprudence ("Gesamtbild") should be decisive.
24. 24. Limbach, “Die Kooperation der Gerichte in der zuku¨nftigen europa¨ischen Grundrechtsarchitektur”, (2000) EuGRZ, 417 at 420. The speech is also available in the internet (www.whiberlin.de/limbach.htm). The quote can be found at para 25.
25. 25. On 28 March 2000, the CFI dismissed the claim of the undertaking T. Port against the Commission decision of 9 July 1997 not to grant further licences. According to the CFI, the Commission rightly assessed that the claimant could neither prove that the amount of received licences was too low compared with its previously contracted import obligations nor that the amount of licences led actually to serious threats of insolvency (Case T-251/97, nyr).
26. 26. A longsighted comment has called the ECJ’s decision of Nov. 1996 to be the turn ("die Wende") in the Banana litigation (Pernice, “Grundrechtsschutz im Bananenstreit: die Wende?”, (1997) EuZW, 545). Koenig and Zeiss, (1997) JZ, 461 at 462, however, reproached to the ECJ that it unduly restricted the power of national courts to grant interim relief.
27. 27. The ultra vires doctrine was expressed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the following way: “if European institutions or organs were to implement or develop the Treaty of the European Union in a manner not covered by this Treaty and the German implementation legislation based on it, the resulting legal acts could not be binding within Germany’s sovereign sphere. The German institutions would for constitutional reasons be hindered from applying these measures in Germany. Accordingly, the German Federal Constitutional Court will examine whether legal acts of the European institutions and organs are within the limits of the competences conceded to them or whether they exceed those limits” (BVerfGE 89, 155 at 188).
28. 28. For a detailed analysis of the ultra vires doctrine in the EU Member States see Mayer, Kompetenzu¨berschreitung und Letztentscheidung (Beck, 2000), pp. 140–257. The author comes to the conclusion that in Denmark and in Austria, EC acts may be declared ultra vires but only after a preliminary ruling of the ECJ on the question. In Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland and Greece the constitutional framework can be used to restrict the principle of supremacy (see ibid. at p. 270).
29. 29. Cf. Everling, op. cit supra note 3, at 11; Frowein, op. cit supra note 17, at 8 et seq.; Tomuschat, “Die Europa¨ische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, (1993) EuGRZ, 489 at 494; Schro¨der, “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Hu¨ter des Staates im Prozeß der europa¨ischen Integration”, (1994) DVBl., 316 at 323 et seq.; Meesen, “Maastricht nach Karlsruhe”, (1994) NJW, 549 at 552 et seq.. Others feel that the ultra vires construction can be understood in the light of extensive ECJ rulings in the past (Hailbronner, op. cit supra note 3, at 100) or express their tacit consent (Herdegen, op. cit supra note 3, at 248).
30. 30. Cases C-6/90 and 9/90, [1991] ECR-I 5357, 5403.
31. 31. Ossenbu¨hl, “Der gemeinschaftsrechtliche Staatshaftungsanspruch”, (1992) DVBl., 993; Da¨nzer-Vanotti, “Unzula¨ssige Rechtsfortbildung des Europa¨ischen Gerichtshofs”, (1992) RiW, 773. As Tomuschat, “Das Francovich-Urteil des EuGH – Ein Lehrstu¨ck zum Europarecht”, in Festschrift Everling, Vol. 2 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995), 1585 at 1586 observed only German lawyers felt that the decision was ultra vires, whereas in other Member States the reaction was predominantly positive.
32. 32. Cornils, Der gemeinschaftsrechtliche Staatshaftungsanspruch, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995), 256 and 318.
33. 33. Bundesgerichtshof, (1997) NJW, 123. In a recent Case the Landgericht Bonn confirmed that the Francovich principle was now widely accepted in Germany so that there was no need for a further preliminary ruling by the ECJ. Landgericht Bonn, (2000) NJW, 814.
34. 34. Case C-46/93 and 48/93, [1996] ECR-I, 1029.
35. 35. Scholz, “Zum Verha¨ltnis von europa¨ischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsrecht”, (1998) DO¨ V, 261 at 264.
36. 36. Ibid. at 265.
37. 37. Frowein, “Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht”, (1998) DO¨ V, 806 at 808.
38. 38. Ibid. at 806.
39. 39. Note that the Bundesverfassungsgericht has not expressly dealt with this argument. But even commentators who would have liked the Court do to so (Gu¨ndisch, op. cit supra note 1, at 1125) finally agree with the result that the ECJ can rule on the scope of Article 88 EC without being barred by the Council’s inactivity to adopt procedural rules under Art. 89 EC (ibid. at 1126). Meanwhile the Council adopted Regulation 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 (O.J. 1999, L 83/1) on the basis of Art. 94 EC (now Art. 89 EC) “on special provisions for the application of Art. 93 EC” (now Art. 88 EC). Art. 14(1) of this Regulation obliges the Member States to take all necessary measures to order the repayment of an illegally granted aid unless this would contradict a general principle of Community law. It seems obvious that there is no qualitative change to Art. 88(1) EC and the jurisprudence of the Court, which again demonstrates the weakness of Scholz’s argument.
40. 40. This is correctly stressed by Voegler, op. cit supra note 1, at 448, but his conclusion that the decision would therefore create an (illegal) general effect is misleading.
41. 41. Case 11/70; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR, 1125, 1135, para 3; Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium, [1980], ECR 3881, 3903, para 19; Case 473/93, Commision v. Luxembourg, [1996] ECR I-3207, 3258, paras. 37–38.
42. 42. This observation is shared by nearly all commentators (op. cit supra note 2). Depending on their attitude towards European law the fact is welcomed (Mayer, at 688; Classen, at 1158; Barden, at 427) or criticized (Berkemann, at 20; Emmerich-Fritsche, at 758; Lindner at 759).
43. 43. Cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 9 Jan. 2001, 1 BVR 1036/99, para 15 (www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de) in which the Court repeated the headnotes of the Banana litigation decision to declare inadmissible a constitutional complaint that attacked Directives 86/457/EEC and 93/16/EEC on the grounds of Art. 3(3) and 12(1) of the Grundgesetz. However the constitutional complaint was successful insofar as the Federal Administrative Court did not request a preliminary ruling by the ECJ for the interpretation of these directives, thus violating the right under Art. 101(1) of the Basic Law that the respective competent judge decides the case (ibid., paras. 17 et seq.).
44. 44. Art. 52(1) of the Charter reads: “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations my be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. In the past, several German authors maintained that the ECJ has applied the test of proportionality with insufficient scrutiny: see Nettesheim, “Grundrechtliche Pru¨fdichte durch den EuGH”, (1995) EuZW, 106; Schilling, “Eigentum und Marktordnung nach Gemeinschaftsund nach deutschem Recht”, (1998) EuGRZ, 177 at 183; Pauly, “Strukturfragen des unionsrechtlichen Grundrechtsschutzes”, (1998) EuR, 242; Emmerich-Fritsche, Der Grundsatz der Verha¨ltnisma¨ßigkeit als Direktive und Schranke der EG-Rechtsordnung (2000), pp. 195 et seq. However, Kischel, “Die Kontrolle der Verha¨ltnisma¨ßigkeit durch den EuGH”, (2000) EuR, 380 et seq. and von Bogdandy, op. cit supra note 2, at 1322, on the other hand, maintain that the proportionality test in Karlsruhe and Luxembourg is applied in an essentially comparable way. Mayer, op. cit. supra note 2, at 687 feels that different concepts in the Member States about the necessary intensity of judicial review of majority decisions in the economic field will “presumably” lead to future conflicts between national constitutional courts and the ECJ.
45. 45. Lindner, op. cit supra note 1, at 657. Commenting on the Maastricht case, Weber, op. cit supra note 17, at 1637 already observed that this sort of review would be restricted to “rare exceptional cases” in which the Community evidently grasped competences that have not been conferred on it.
46. 46. Compare the Opinion 2/94, Accession of the EC to the European Convention on Human Rights, [1996] ECR I-1759, with annotation by Kokott and Hoffmeister, 90 AJIL (1996), 664.
47. 47. Compare Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, Judgment of 5 Oct. 2000, nyr with Editorial Comment in 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1301.
48. 48. Although Scholz (again), (2000) RIW, 222, disputed the ECJ’s decision in Case C-285/98, Kreil, Judgment of Kreil of 19 Jan. 2000 nyr – see note by Langer in 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1433 –, the Parliament changed the Grundgesetz in the aftermath of the judgment in order to allow women voluntarily to enter the German armed forces.
49. 49. See Weiler, “The State ‘u¨ber alles’ – Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision”, in Festschrift Everling, Vol. 2 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995), p. 1651 arguing that the underlying “constitutional Weltanschauung” of the Constitutional Court is related to an ethno-cultural homogenous concept of “Volk” leading the Court to call for a “preexisting European demos defined in ethno-cultural terms as precondition for constitutional unification” in order “to ensure that this will never happen” (ibid. at 1673). As von Bogdandy, “Das Leitbild der dualistischen Legitimation fu¨r die europa¨ische Verfassungsentwicklung” – Ga¨ngige Missversta¨ndnisse des Maastricht-Urteils und deren Gru¨nde (BVerfGE 89, 155 ff)”, (2000) KritV, 284 at 289 points out, another interpretation could be that “Volk” describes just the entity of those enjoying the active vote.
50. 50. For a similar view see de Witte,” Sovereignty and European integration: The weight of legal tradition”, 2 MJ (1995), 145 at 166 and 168.
51. 51. According to Ress, case note on the Maastricht Judgment, 88 AJIL (1994) 539, at 547, the Court followed a “19th century approach”.
52. 52. For the concept of divided sovereignty in the Union stemming directly from the people see Pernice, “Multilevel constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European constitution-making revisited, 36 CML Rev. (1999), 703 at 715 et seq.