Votebox: A tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system

Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security Symposium

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 349-364

  Sandler, Daniel ^a   Derr, Kyle ^a   Wallach, Dan S ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK SECURITY; PERSONAL COMPUTERS; VOTING MACHINES;

COMMERCIAL ELECTRONICS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES; DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS; ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS; END-TO-END SECURITY; RESEARCH RESULTS; TAMPER-EVIDENT; VOTING SYSTEMS;

ELECTRONIC VOTING;

EID: 85077688812     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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