Civitas: Toward a secure voting system

Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 354-368

  Clarkson, Michael R ^a   Chong, Stephen ^a   Myers, Andrew C ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS; INFORMATION FLOWS; QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION; SECURITY ANALYSIS; SECURITY AND PRIVACY; SECURITY PROOFS;

VOTING MACHINES;

EID: 50249102797     PISSN: 10816011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/SP.2008.32     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (75)

1. R. Araújo, S. Foulle, and J. Traoré. On coercion-resistant schemes with linear work. In Proc. of Frontiers of Electronic Voting: Dagstuhl Seminar 07311, July 2007.
2. J. Bannet, D. W. Price, A. Rudys, J. Singer, and D. S. Wallach. Hack-a-vote: Security issues with electronic voting systems. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(1):32-37, Jan. 2004.
3. E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid. Recommendation for key management. NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1, Mar. 2007.
4. O. Baudron, P.-A. Fouque, D. Pointcheval, G. Poupard, and J. Stern. Practical multi-candidate election system. In Proc. of ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 274-283, Aug. 2001.
5. M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In Proc. of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 62-73. ACM, Nov. 1993.
6. J. D. C. Benaloh. Verifiable Secret-Ballot Elections. PhD thesis, Yale University, Sept. 1987.
7. F. Brandt. Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed El Gamal encryption. In Proc. of International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, pages 32-47, Dec. 2005.
8. Brennan Center for Justice. The machinery of democracy: Voting system security, accessibility, usability, and cost. New York University, Oct. 2006.
9. J. Camenisch and M. Stadler. Efficient group signature schemes for large groups. In Proc. of International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), pages 410-424, Aug. 1997.
10. M. Castro and B. Liskov. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance. In Proc. of Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation, pages 173-186, Feb. 1999.
11. D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84-88, 1981.
12. D. Chaum. SureVote. http://www.surevote.com, 2007. International patent WO 01/55940 A1, 02 August 2001.
13. D. Chaum and T. P. Pedersen. Wallet databases with observers. In Proc. of International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), pages 89-105, Aug. 1992.
14. L. Chen and A. Avizienis. N-version programming: A fault tolerance approach to reliability of software operation. In International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, 1978.
15. S. Chong and A. C. Myers. End-to-end enforcement of erasure. In submission.
16. S. Chong and A. C. Myers. Language-based information erasure. In Proc. of IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 241-254, June 2005.
17. City of New York Board of Elections. General election results. http://www.vote.nyc.ny.us/results.html, 2004.
18. M. R. Clarkson, S. Chong, and A. C. Myers. Civitas: Toward a secure remote voting system. Technical Report 2007-2081, Cornell University, May 2007. Revised Mar. 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/7875.
19. R. Cramer, M. Franklin, B. Schoenmakers, and M. Yung. Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with linear work. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 72-83, May 1996.
20. R. Cramer, R. Gennaro, and B. Schoenmakers. A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 103-118, May 1997.
21. L. F. Cranor and R. K. Cytron. Sensus: A security-conscious electronic polling system for the Internet. In Proc. of IEEE Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science, pages 561-570, Jan. 1997.
22. S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and M. Ryan. Coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in electronic voting. In Proc. of IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 28-42, July 2006.
23. Diebold Election Systems. New York City BOE voting system, Cost response: Cost proposal summary, October 20, 2006. http://www.vote.nyc.ny.us/rfi.html.
24. Diebold Election Systems. New York City BOE voting system, Cost response: Lever replacement solution: Optical scan pollsite system, October 20, 2006. http://www.vote.nyc.ny.us/rfi.html.
25. D. L. Dill, B. Schneier, and B. Simons. Voting and technology: Who gets to count your vote? Communications of the ACM, 46(8):29-31, Aug. 2003.
26. R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. F. Syverson. Tor: The second-generation onion router. In Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium, pages 303-320, Aug. 2004.
27. B. W. DuRette. Multiple administrators for electronic voting. Bachelor's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999.
28. D. Evans and N. Paul. Election security: Perception and reality. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(1):24-31, Jan. 2004.
29. A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In Proc. of International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), pages 186-194, Aug. 1986.
30. S. Forrest, A. Somayaji, and D. Ackley. Building diverse computer systems. In Proc. of IEEE Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems, May 1997.
31. A. Fujioka, T. Okamoto, and K. Ohta. A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 244-251, May 1992.
32. J. Furukawa. Efficient and verifiable shuffling and shuffle-decryption. IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, E88-A(1):172-188, 2005.
33. O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game or a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In Proc. of ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 218-229, 1987.
34. M. Gomułkiewicz, M. Klonowski, and M. Kutyłowski. Rapid mixing and security of Chaum's visual electronic voting. In Proc. of European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pages 132-145, 2003.
35. P. S. Herrnson, R. G. Niemi, M. J. Hanmer, B. B. Bederson, and F. C. Conrad. Voting Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot. Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
36. M. Herschberg. Secure electronic voting over the world wide web. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997.
37. M. Hirt and K. Sako. Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 539-556, May 2000.
38. International Foundation for Election Systems. Getting to the CORE - A global survey on the cost of registration and elections, June 2006. http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Elections-Pub-Core.pdf.
39. M. Jakobsson and A. Juels. Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (ASIA-CRYPT), pages 162-177, Dec. 2000.
40. M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, and R. L. Rivest. Making mix nets robust for electronic voting by randomized partial checking. In Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium, pages 339-353, Aug. 2002.
41. D. Jefferson, A. D. Rubin, B. Simons, and D. Wagner. Analyzing Internet voting security. Communications of the ACM, 47(10):59-64, Oct. 2004.
42. D. Jefferson, A. D. Rubin, B. Simons, and D. Wagner. A security analysis of the secure electronic registration and voting experiment (SERVE). http://www.servesecurityreport.org/paper.pdf, Jan. 2004.
43. R. Joaquim and C. Ribeiro. CodeVoting: Protecting against malicious vote manipulation at the voter's PC. In Proc. of Frontiers of Electronic Voting: Dagstuhl Seminar 07311, July 2007.
44. R. Joaquim, A. Zúquete, and P. Ferreira. REVS - A robust electronic voting system. In Proc. of IADIS International Conference on e-Society, June 2003.
45. A. Juels, D. Catalano, and M. Jakobsson. Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In Proc. of Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pages 61-70, Nov. 2005.
46. C. Karlof, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner. Cryptographic voting protocols: A systems perspective. In Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium, 2005.
47. A. Kiayias, M. Korman, and D. Walluck. An Internet voting system supporting user privacy. In Proc. of Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 165-174. IEEE Computer Society, Dec. 2006.
48. T. Kohno, A. Stubblefield, A. D. Rubin, and D. S. Wallach. Analysis of an electronic voting system. In Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 27-42, May 2004.
49. M. Kutyłowski, F. Zagórski, et al. W-Voting system. http://w-vote.im.pwr.wroc.pl, 2007.
50. R. Lebre, R. Joaquim, A. Zúquete, and P. Ferreira. Internet voting: Improving resistance to malicious servers in REVS. In Proc. of IADIS International Conference on Applied Computing, Mar. 2004.
51. G. Lowe. An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol. Information Processing Letters, 56(3):131-136, Nov. 1995.
52. E. Magkos, M. Burmester, and V. Chrissikopoulos. Receipt-freeness in large-scale elections without untappable channels. In Proc. of IFIP Conference on E-Commerce, E-Business, E-Government, pages 683-694, Oct. 2001.
53. R. Mercuri. Statement on electronic voting. http://www.notablesoftware. com/RMstatement.html, 2007.
54. A. C. Myers. JFlow: Practical mostly-static information flow control. In Proc. of Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 228-241, Jan. 1999.
55. A. C. Myers and B. Liskov. Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 9(4):410-442, Oct. 2000.
56. A. C. Myers, L. Zheng, S. Zdancewic, S. Chong, and N. Nystrom. Jif: Java information flow (software release). http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif, July 2001.
57. C. A. Neff. Verifiable mixing (shuffling) of ElGamal pairs. http://www.votehere.org/vhti/documentation/egshuf-2.0.3638.pdf, Apr. 2004.
58. M. Ohkubo, F. Miura, M. Abe, A. Fujioka, and T. Okamoto. An improvement on a practical secret voting scheme. In Proc. of Information Security Workshop, pages 225-234, Nov. 1999.
59. T. Okamoto. Receipt-free electronic voting schemes for large scale elections. In Proc. of Security Protocols Workshop, pages 25-35, Apr. 1997.
60. R. A. Peters. A secure bulletin board. Master's thesis, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, June 2005.
61. S. Popoveniuc and B. Hosp. An introduction to Punchscan. In Proc. of Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, June 2006.
62. Republic of Estonia. Digital signatures act (digitaalallkirja seadus). http://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=694375, 2000.
63. A. D. Rubin. Security considerations for remote electronic voting. Communications of the ACM, 45(12):39-44, Dec. 2002.
64. P. Y. A. Ryan and S. A. Schneider. Prêt à Voter with re-encryption mixes. In Proc. of European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Sept. 2006.
65. K. Sako and J. Kilian. Secure voting using partially compatible homomorphisms. In Proc. of International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), pages 411-424, Aug. 1994.
66. K. Sako and J. Kilian. Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme - A practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 393-403, May 1995.
67. C.-P. Schnorr. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. Journal of Cryptology, 4(3):161-174, 1991.
68. C.-P. Schnorr and M. Jakobsson. Security of signed ElGamal encryption. In Proc. of International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (ASIACRYPT), pages 73-89, Dec. 2000.
69. A. M. Shubina and S.W. Smith. Design and prototype of a coercion-resistant, voter verifiable electronic voting system. In Proc. of Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, pages 29-39, Oct. 2004.
70. W. D. Smith. New cryptographic election protocol with best-known theoretical properties. In Proc. of Workshop on Frontiers in Electronic Elections, Sept. 2005.
71. Sun Microsystems. Sun grid compute utility: Users guide. http://www.sun.com/service/sungrid/SunGridUG.pdf, Mar. 2007.
72. M. Volkamer, A. Alkassar, A.-R. Sadeghi, and S. Schulz. Enabling the application of open systems like PCs for online voting. In Proc. of Workshop on Frontiers in Electronic Elections, 2006.
73. D. Wagner and M. Bishop. Voting systems top-to-bottom review. http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm, 2007.
74. B. White, J. Lepreau, L. Stoller, R. Ricci, S. Guruprasad, M. Newbold, M. Hibler, C. Barb, and A. Joglekar. An integrated experimental environment for distributed systems and networks. In Proc. of Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation, pages 255-270, Dec. 2002.
75. A. Zúquete, C. Costa, and M. Rom̃ao. An intrusion-tolerant e-voting client system. In Proc. of Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion-Tolerant Systems, pages 23-27, Mar. 2007.