A practical congestion attack on Tor using long paths

Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 33-50

  Evans, Nathan S ^a   Dingledine, Roger ^b   Grothoff, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DENVER   (United States)

^b Tor Project

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANDWIDTH;

ANONYMITY NETWORKS; FALSE POSITIVE; LONG-PATH; TOR NETWORKS;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 85076290610     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (36)

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