Mixminion: Design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol

Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 2-15

  Danezis, George ^a   Dingledine, Roger ^b   Mathewson, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BLOCK CODES; CLIENT SERVER COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ELECTRONIC MAIL; INTERNET; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY; REAL TIME SYSTEMS; REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING; SECURITY OF DATA; STATISTICAL METHODS; USER INTERFACES;

ANONYMOUS REMAILER PROTOCOL; REAL WORLD INTERNET; SINGLE USE REPLY BLOCKS; SOFTWARE PACKAGE MIXMINION;

SOFTWARE ENGINEERING;

EID: 0037810717     PISSN: 10637109     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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