Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Graham, George ^a   Horgan, Terence ^b   Tienson, John ^c  

^a WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c University of Memphis   (United States)

Author keywords

Conscious lives; Intentionality; Mental state; Phenomenal consciousness; Phenomenology; Unity of the mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066661138     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0031     Document Type: Chapter

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