What RoboMary Knows

Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages

  Dennett, Daniel ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Deduction; Epistemic gap; Intuition; Mary; Phenomenal concepts; Phenomenal knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920373655     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0001     Document Type: Chapter

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5. Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster.
6. Dennett, D. (1996). Cow-Sharks, Magnets, and Swampman. Mind and Language 11: 76-77.
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11. Lycan, W. (2003). Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument. In Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays,ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic: 384-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. McConnell, J. (1994). In Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Topics 22: 157-87.
13. McGeer, V. (2003). The Trouble with Mary. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84: 384-93.
14. Robinson, H. (1993). Dennett on the Knowledge Argument. Analysis 53: 174-77.
15. Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.