The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Papineau, David ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Causal closure; Causal relation; Causal closure thesis; Naturalism; Naturalistic doctrines; Physics

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066646666     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0003     Document Type: Chapter

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