Causal closure principles and emergentism

Philosophy

Volumn 75, Issue 294, 2000, Pages 571-585

  Lowe, E J ^a  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21444460373     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s003181910000067x     Document Type: Review

References (23)

1. See H. Bondi, Cosmology, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1961), Ch XII
2. See W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge University Press 1988), Ch. 9
3. For further discussion of the (ir)relevance of physical conservation laws to the problem of psychophysical causation, see my Subjects of Experience (Cambridge University Press, 1996)p. 56-63
4. A relatively early version of this form of argument may be found in Oxford: Clarendon Press, though Peacocke's version does not exactly conform to the pattern I specify below Christopher Peacocke, Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979)p. 134-13, though Peacocke's version does not exactly conform to the pattern I specify below
5. I raise an objection to Peacocke's argument in my 'Against an Argument for Token Identity', Mind 90 (1981)p. 120-1
6. Why should systematic causal overdetermination be ruled out where psychophysical causation is concerned? Perhaps it shouldn't be, and this would be a quick way to dispose of causal closure arguments: further Eugene Mills, Interactionism and Overdetermination, American Philosophical Quarterly 33 1996p. 105-17. But I take it that most interactionist dualists would not wish to resort to this strategy if possible, as it looks suspiciously ad hoc psychophysical causation is concerned? Perhaps it shouldn't be, and this would be a quick way to dispose of causal closure arguments: see further Eugene Mills, 'Interactionism and Overdetermination', American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996)p. 105-17. But I take it that most interactionist dualists would not wish to resort to this strategy if possible, as it looks suspiciously ad hoc
7. For more on the distinction between event-causation and fact-causation Oxford: Clarendon Press see Jonathan Bennett, Events and their Names (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)p. 21ff
8. David Papineau, 'Mind the Gap', in James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, 12: Language, Mind and Ontology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998)p. 373-88: see p. 375
9. David Papineauhilosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 22
10. Papineau, 'Mind the Gap'. 386, n. 4
11. Scott Sturgeon, 'Physicalism and Overdetermination', Mind 107 (1998)p 411-32: p. 413. 411-32: see p. 413
12. Paul Noordhof, 'The Overdetermination Argument versus the Cause-and-Essence Principle - No Contest', Mind 108 (1999)p. 367-75: p. 367. Cause-and-Essence Principle - No Contest', Mind 108 (1999)p. 367-75: see p. 367
13. Sturgeon, 'Physicalism and Overdetermination'. 413. 13 See, e.g., John Eccles, The Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self (London: Routledge, 1989)p. 187-92. C. Eccles, The Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self (London: Routledge, 1989)p. 187-92
14. (1G) is very near to a version of the causal closure principle advanced Jaegwon Kim, namely, 'Any physical event which has a cause at time t has a physical cause at t': his Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1993). 280 and, for a slightly different wording. 360. Jaegwon Kim, namely, 'Any physical event which has a cause at time t has a physical cause at t': see his Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1993). 280 and, for a slightly different wording. 360
15. 12 to P in addition to a physical one. But then one wonders why Peacocke bothered to discuss this sort of situation and object to it on the grounds that it involves overdetermination
16. I explore this proposal in more detail and with a slightly different focus in my 'Self, 6 1999p focus in my 'Self, Agency, and Mental Causation', Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1999)p. 225-39
17. For a description of the more familiar 'binding' problem, see Valerie Gray Hardcastle, 'Psychology's Binding Problem and Possible Neurobiological Solutions', Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1994)p. 66-90
18. Something like (IH) is suggested by the following recent remark of Jaegwon Kim's: 'One way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this: If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical'. Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). 40. Of course, another reading of this remark might equate it with the excessively strong principle (1E). Jaegwon Kim's: 'One way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this: If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical'. See Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). 40. Of course, another reading of this remark might equate it with the excessively strong principle (1E)
19. For an earlier development of this conception of mental causation, see my Subjects of Experiencep. 64-71 and 82ff. Subjects of Experiencep. 64-71 and 82ff
20. There are some resemblances between my proposal and one made by Fred Dretske: his 'Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior', in J. Heil and A. R. Mele (eds), Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Dretske: see his 'Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior', in J. Heil and A. R. Mele (eds), Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)
21. See further G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Causality and Determination', in her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers, II (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981) Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume II (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981)
22. and Nancy Cartwright, Nature's Capacities and their Measurement (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989)
23. I am grateful for comments received when an earlier version of this paper was delivered at the School of Advanced Study in the University of London was delivered at the School of Advanced Study in the University of London