Progress in international relations: Beyond paradigms in the study of institutions

Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 135-152

  Lake, David A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85059283942     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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