Stochastic prediction and estimation of nonlinear political durations: An application to the lifetime of bureaus

Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 209-238

  Carpenter, Daniel P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85059254515     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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