The Appointments Process and the Administrative Presidency

Presidential Studies Quarterly

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 38-59

  Aberbach, Joel D ^a   Rockman, Bert A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85050422756     PISSN: 03604918     EISSN: 17415705     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2008.03657.x     Document Type: Article

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