Bargaining efficiency in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU: treaty of nice vs. constitutional treaty

Journal of European Integration

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 381-398

  Dür, Andreas ^a   Mateo, Gemma ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

bargaining efficiency; Constitutional Treaty; intergovernmental bargaining theory; Intergovernmental Conferences; supranational bargaining theory; Treaty of Nice

Indexed keywords

EID: 85050412064     PISSN: 07036337     EISSN: 14772280     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07036330600853992     Document Type: Article

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