In search of leadership challenges

Political Science

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 3-20

  Gomibuchi, Seishi ^a  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Challenger; Leadership change; New Zealand Labour Party; Selection criteria

Indexed keywords

EID: 85047699074     PISSN: 00323187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/003231870105300201     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. See David W. Rohde, 'Risk-Bearing Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23 (1979), pp. 1-26.
2. See also Simon Upton, 'Blair's real change begins', The Dominion, 10 February 1997, p.6.
3. See R. M. Punnet, Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 3
4. Leonard P Stark, Choosing a Leader: Party Leadership Contests in Britain from Macmillan to Blair, London: Mcmillan, p.2.
5. The situation is particularly serious in New Zealand. Only two analytical scholarly studies have been published on the subject of leadership selection/duration in general: Keith Jackson, 'Political Leadership and Succession in the National Party', in Stephen Levine (ed.), Politics in New Zealand, (Auckland: George Allen & Unwin, 1978)
6. Patrick Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems, (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), Chapter 3.
7. Included in this group are, for example: Keith Alderman, 'Revision of Leadership Election Procedures in the Conservative Party', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 52 (1999), pp. 260-74;
8. R. K. Alderman, 'Electing the Leader of the Labour party: Revision of the Rules', Public Law, Spring (1992), pp/17-26
9. Robert L. Peabody, 'Leadership in Legislatures: Evolution, Selection, Functions', Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.4 (1984): 441-73;
10. R. M. Punnet, Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992);
11. Patrick Weller, 'Party Rules and the Dismissal of Prime Ministers: Comparative Perspectives from Britain, Canada and Australia', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.47 (1994): 133-43.
12. See, for example, Hugh Heclo, 'Presidential and Prime Ministerial Selection', in Donald R. Matthews (ed.), Perspectives on Presidential Selection, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973);
13. Michael Marsh (ed.), European Journal of Political Research (Special Issue: Selected Party Leaders), Vol.24 (1993);
14. James W. Davis, Leadership Selection in Six Western Democracies (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998).
15. See also Weller, First Among Equals, Chapter 3;
16. 'Party Rules and the Dismissal of Prime Ministers'.
17. Examples of the studies belonging to this group are Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, Vol.15 (1996), pp.183-202
18. Philip Norton, 'Choosing a Leader: Margaret Thatcher and the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1989-1990', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 43(1990), pp.249-59.
19. Although not formal analyses of the responsible factors for leadership changes/crises per se, a number of descriptive accounts of past leadership contests/crises are available in New Zealand. Recent examples include Barry Gustafson, His Way: a Biography of Robert Muldoon, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2000), Chapters 10, 17, and 23;
20. Simon Sheppard, Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government (Wellington: PSL Press, 1999), Chapters 6, 7, and 8.
21. For example, Heclo, 'Presidential and Prime Ministerial Selection';
22. Philip Norton, 'The Lady's not for Turning: But What about the Rest?': Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party 1979-1989' Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.43 (1990).
23. For instance, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in Anthony King (ed.), Britain at the Polls 1992 (Chatham: Chatham House, 1993).
24. Philip Cowley and John Garry, 'The British Conservative Party and Europe: The Choosing of John Major', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.28 (1998), pp. 473-99;
25. Philip Cowley and Matthew Bailey, 'Peasants' Uprising or Religious War?: Re-examining the 1975 Conservative Leadership Contest', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.30 (2000), pp. 599-629.
26. R. K. Alderman, 'The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1995', Parliamentary Affairs Vol.48 (1996), pp.316-32;
27. R. K. Alderman and Neil Carter, 'A Very Tory Coup: The Ousting of Mrs Thatcher', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.44 (1991), pp. 125-39;
28. Keith Alderman and Neil Carter, 'The Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1994', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 48 (1995), pp.438-55.
29. For example, Gustafson, His Way, Chapter 10;
30. Sheppard, Broken Circle, Chapter 8.
31. Heclo also touched upon the selection criteria for the American presidency and British prime ministership, although in a far less systematic manner. His main interest appeared to be highlighting the differences between the two systems, rather than identifying a set of standard selection criteria as Jackson and Stark did. Nevertheless, he listed the ability to win an election, the capability to preserve internal party unity, 'reliability and trustworthiness as a colleague', and 'combat effectiveness in attacking the opposing party' as important criteria for Britain. He did not rank them in order of priority. (Heclo, 'Presidential and Prime Ministerial Selection', pp. 156-160.)
32. Keith Jackson, 'Political Leadership and Succession in the National Party'.
33. Stark, Choosing a leader.
34. See, for example, Keith Jackson, Dilemma of Parliament, (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 58.
35. Keith Jackson, 'The Duration of Leaders', Manuscript (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1992).
36. See also Elizabeth McLeay, 'Roles, Rules and Leadership' in M. Clark (ed), Three Labour Leaders: Normeyer, Kirk, Rowling (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2001), p.87 (Note 2).
37. See, Patrick Weller, 'Party Rules and the Dismissal of Prime Ministers: Comparative Perspectives from Britain, Canada and Australia', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.47 (1997), pp. 133-143.
38. For a comparison with the British counterpart, see, Bryan Could. 'The Labour pains', The Sunday Star-Times, 16 June 1996, p.C1.
39. The timing of regular leadership review has changed since 1939, though. Since 1980. when the caucus rules were modernised, a periodical review has been scheduled at the first caucus of the year preceding the election year.
40. The author is grateful to David Caygill for the information on this procedural motion.
41. The procedure does not preclude the incumbent leader from entering the new contest although her/his chance of re-gaining the leadership is considered small given that the procedural motion is practically a no-confidence vote.
42. Weller, 'Party Rules and the Dismissal of Prime Ministers', p.138.
43. For a more detailed account and analysis of Moore's selection and demise in 1993, see Seishi Gomibuchi, 'Followers and Leadership Durability: An Analysis of Leadership Support in the New Zealand Labour Party: 1990-1996', (University of Canterbury: Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 2001), Chapters 3-5.
44. One such occasion took place shortly after the Wellington Central by-election. See, for example, Brent Edwards, 'MPs say no coup on Moore likely', The Evening Post, 11 March 1993, p.5.
45. Michael Cullen, personal interview, 25 July 1998.
46. David Lange, 'Leadership Challenge', in D. Lange, Cuttings, (Auckland: Jonathan Hudson & Associates), p.70.
47. David Caygill, personal interview, 23 November1998.
48. Jonathan Hunt, personal interview, 22 June 1998; Ruth Dyson, personal interview, 4 September 1998.
49. Both Cullen (Cullen, personal interview) and Clark (David Caygill, personal interview) fell into this category.
50. Ironically, Cullen was one of the most ardent supporters of Moore in 1993, and his candidacy was considered without his consent (Cullen, personal interview).
51. For instance, Judith Tizard says: 'Helen, who had been Deputy twice…obviously saw herself as the next leader. So she was the natural person to whom those who were dissatisfied with Mike would to come to' (Judith Tizard, personal interview, 12 June1998).
52. Probably the most notable display of his ill judgement was his election night speech in 1993. The former leader himself later referred to it as 'the worst election night speech in history'. See, Mike Moore, 'It's a time for more humour in politics', The New Zealand Herald, 17 November 1995, p.6.
53. For the content of his speech, see, for example, Simon Kilroy, 'Mood swings wildly at Moore's headquarters', The Dominion, 8 November 1993, p.3.
54. Anonymous 1, personal interview, 25 May 1998.
55. Caygill, personal interview.
56. The New Zealand Labour Party, Jobs, Growth, Health: Labour's Manifesto for New Zealand, (Wellington: MMSC, 1993), p.124.
57. Brent Edwards, 'Top Labour MPs praise Contracts Act', The Evening Post, 20 October 1993, p.1.
58. Mike Moore, personal correspondence to the author, 25 January 2001.
59. Maryan Street, personal interview, 10 June 1998. Moore has no recollection that this conversation took place (Moore, personal correspondence to the author, 24 May 2001).
60. Street, personal interview.
61. Street, personal interview. Street was a former Party President between 1993 and 1995. Prior to the presidency, she was a Senior Vice President, heavily involved in the 1993 candidate selection. For Labour's candidate selection during this period, see, Simon Shepherd 'The Struggle for the Agenda: New Zealand Labour Party Candidate Selections 1987-93', Political Science, Vol. 49 (1998), pp. 198-228.
62. Anonymous I, personal interview, 25 May 1998.
63. Prior to assuming the prime ministership, Moore was third ranked Cabinet Minister. One of the few occasions where he attempted to distance his caucus from the fourth Labour Government was the 1991 Party Conference. He asserted: 'Monetarism is over. Rogernomics has had its day and though its day was important and historically necessary, it's now a new day, a new dawn and New Zealand must move on'. The New Zealand Labour Party, Labour Aims and Values 1991: 75th Anniversary Conference Report. (1991: Wellington), p. 27.
64. Moore, personal interview.
65. See, Shepherd, 'The Struggle for the Agenda', p.202.
66. Gordon Campbell, 'Labour: Moore is Not Enough', Listener, 4 December 1993, p.38.
67. Colin James, 'A Clash of Egos' in Colin James and Alan McRobie, Turning Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond, (Wellington: Bridget Williams, 1993), p.166.
68. Victoria Main, 'Relaxing into the Job', The Dominion, 12 December 1998, p.17.
69. Anonymous 1, personal interview, 25 May 1998.
70. Richard Northey, personal correspondence to the author, 2 February 1998.
71. This was probably due to her late appointment (in 1987) as well as her social policy related responsibilities such as Health and Housing.
72. Caygill, personal interview.
73. Larry Sutherland, personal interview, 11 September 1998.
74. See, for example, David Caygill, 'Labour leadership fights frequent and familiar but MMP changed the game' The Independent, 17 December 1993, p.6.
75. See for example, Gomibuchi, 'Followers and Leadership Durability', pp. 143-4.
76. Jane Clifton, 'Clark promises move to "strong, centre-left party"', The Dominion, 2 December 1993, p.2.
77. Ruth Laugesen, 'Prime Minister in Waiting', The Dominion, 20 March 1993, p.9.
78. James, 'A Clash of Egos', pp. 164-5.
79. Tizard, personal interview.
80. Dyson, personal interview.
81. This culminated in the formation of the Mike Moore Supporters Club, an independent organisation through which he attempted to run part of Labour's campaign.
82. Mike Moore, personal interview, 19 September 1998.
83. See, for example, Gordon Campbell, 'Labour: Moore is Not Enough', Listener, 4 December 1993, pp.38-9. Moore vehemently repudiates this claim. 'Of course, I would have dealt with Jim Anderton. There would have been no choice. The so called left "principles" were about gaining power, not governing.' (Mike Moore, personal correspondence to the author, 13 February 2001). This criticism of Moore also conveniently neglected the fact that Clark's personal relationship with Anderton had been far from conciliatory.
84. Dyson, personal interview.
85. Caygill, 'Labour leadership fights frequent and familiar but MMP changed the game'.
86. Nevertheless, Moore trailed Winston Peters for most of the 1992-1993 period in the Heylen-One Network News opinion polls.
87. See, Clark's reported comment in Bernard Orsman, 'Labour looks for its soul', The New Zealand Herald, 1 December 1993, Sec.1, p.9.
88. Dyson, personal interview.
89. Caygill, personal interview, 1998.
90. Street, personal interview.
91. Maharey, personal interview.
92. For a more detailed account and analysis of the 1996 leadership crisis, see Gomibuchi, 'Followers and Leadership Durability', Chapters 6-8.
93. Cullen, personal interview; Phil Goff, personal interview, 12 June 1998; and Annette King, personal interview,12 November 1998.
94. Goff, personal interview.
95. Goff, personal interview; King, personal interview.
96. The same group was confident that if the leadership vote had been taken, a leadership change would have been successful. (Anonymous 2, personal interview, 24 June 1998).
97. For an analysis of why some MPs remained loyal to Clark in this desperate situation, see Gomibuchi, 'Followers and Leadership Durability', Chapter 8.
98. Some of the frontbenchers collected signatures of Labour MPs on paper which expressed desires for a leadership change before their meeting with Clark.
99. King, personal interview.
100. When Moore met Clark on 28 May 1996, he promised her not to personally engage in any campaign against her or for himself because that would be 'inappropriate'. (Moore, personal interview).
101. Cullen, personal interview; King, personal interview; Phil Goff, personal interview.
102. Steve Maharey, personal interview, 24 July 1998.
103. See Keith Jackson, 'Leadership and Change', in E. M. McLeay (ed.), The 1990 General Election: Perspectives on Political Change in New Zealand (Wellington: Department of Politics, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991).
104. King, personal interview.
105. Anonymous 2, personal interview, 24 June 1998.
106. Cullen, personal interview.
107. King, personal interview.
108. Anonymous 2, personal interview, 24 June 1998.
109. Cullen, personal interview.
110. Furthermore, Clark had open contempt for 'charismatic leadership'. In 1993, she said: "I mean there's lot of bullshit about charismatic leaders. Charismatic leaders typically have very little insight about themselves and they have an absolute certainty of their own worth - and in the end it can all melt away' (Roger Mackey, 'The lady in waiting', The Independent, 23 July 1993, p.14.).
111. Also, see, Anna Smith, 'Helen Clark: Crisis Manager', Management, October 1994, p.29.
112. Anonymous 2, personal interview, 24 June 1998.
113. Mark Peck, personal interview, 23 June 1998.
114. Cullen, personal interview.
115. Anonymous 2, personal interview, 24 June 1998.
116. Were the 1996 Clark supporters electorally suicidal? The simple answer is no. Interestingly, they also regarded the elective concern as imperative in deciding to remain loyal to the incumbent. According to their view, the party would fare best under Clark's leadership at the upcoming election despite the grim indications suggested by the opinion polls. See Gomibuchi, 'Followers and Leadership Durability', pp.264-268.
117. Cullen, personal interview.
118. Dyson, personal interview; Street, personal interview.
119. King, personal interview.
120. National MPs should know this. The so-called 'Colonel's Coup' against the incumbent Prime Minister, Muldoon, in 1980 failed largely because of the reluctance of the chosen challenger, Brian Talboys. For an excellent account, see Gustafson, His Way, Chapter 17.
121. An interesting question is whether Moore's perceived election winning ability actually had the desired effect in the 1990 election. See Alan McRobie, 'Leadership and the Public Opinion Polls', in E. M. McLeay (Ed), The 1990 General Election.
122. An interesting question is what the selectors would have sought in a new leader if s/he had been required by factors not related to internal insurgence (e.g., health/age related voluntary resignation or death) and if the incumbent had been regarded as a 'success'. Would they have sought a replacement who resembled the incumbent?
123. This tendency may not be confined to these two case studies. A former National Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, failed to become the party leader in 1985 to replace Robert Muldoon. The position went instead to Jim McLay. In a TV interview, Bolger explained that that was because [he was 'considered loo much like Rob Muldoon' whilst] McLay was 'distinctively different' from the former leader. (TV1, Assignment, 7 May 1998, 7:30pm) However, whether these patterns are observed in leadership challenger selections beyond the cases examined here remains a question for future empirical studies.