The British conservative party and Europe: The choosing of John Major

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 473-499

  Cowley, Philip ^b   Garry, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HULL   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039938839     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123498000350     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. A complaint previously made by, inter alia, Malcom Punnett, Anthony King and James MacGregor Burns; see Leonard P. Stark, Choosing A Leader (London: Macmillan, 1996), esp. chap. 1.
2. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
3. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
4. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
5. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
6. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
7. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
8. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
9. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
10. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
11. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
12. The 1990 contest, for example, produced, inter alia, Philip Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', in A. King et al., Britain at the Polls (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Robert Shepherd, The Power Brokers (London: Hutchinson, 1991), chap. 3; Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1992), chap. 8; and Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), chap. 7. There are also good accounts in the many biographies of John Major: see Ed Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), chap. 11; Bruce Anderson, John Major (London: Headline, 1992), chap. 6; Penny Junor, The Major Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1993). chap. 11; Nesta Wyn Ellis, John Major (London: Futura, 1991). chap. 1 ; and John Jenkin, ed. John Major: Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 149-67. Also of interest is Neal G. Jesse, 'Thatcher's Rise and Fall: An Institutional Analysis of the Tory Leadership Selection Process', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 183-202; and Stark, Choosing a Leader.
13. Vernon Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader', in A. Seldon and S. Ball, eds., Conservative Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 69. For examples, see Philip Cowley, 'The Mystery of the Third Hurdle: Re-electing the Conservative Leader', Politics, 16 (1996), 79-86; and Philip Cowley, '111 Not Out: The Press and the 1995 Conservative Leadership Contest', Talking Politics, 8 (1996), 187-90.
14. Vernon Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader', in A. Seldon and S. Ball, eds., Conservative Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 69. For examples, see Philip Cowley, 'The Mystery of the Third Hurdle: Re-electing the Conservative Leader', Politics, 16 (1996), 79-86; and Philip Cowley, '111 Not Out: The Press and the 1995 Conservative Leadership Contest', Talking Politics, 8 (1996), 187-90.
15. Vernon Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader', in A. Seldon and S. Ball, eds., Conservative Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 69. For examples, see Philip Cowley, 'The Mystery of the Third Hurdle: Re-electing the Conservative Leader', Politics, 16 (1996), 79-86; and Philip Cowley, '111 Not Out: The Press and the 1995 Conservative Leadership Contest', Talking Politics, 8 (1996), 187-90.
16. For the rules of Conservative leadership contests, see R. K. Alderman, 'Electing the Leader of the Conservative Party', Public Law (Spring 1992), 30-9; and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Practice, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
17. For the rules of Conservative leadership contests, see R. K. Alderman, 'Electing the Leader of the Conservative Party', Public Law (Spring 1992), 30-9; and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Practice, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
18. These are similar to motivational models utilized in explanations of 'ordinary' voting. The first and third of our models, for example, are similar to the first two stages of the six-stage model utilized by Miller and Shanks, stages entitled 'stable social and economic characteristics' and 'policy related predispositions', respectively. See Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (London: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 192.
19. Junor, The Major Enigma, p. 202.
20. Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', p. 59.
21. In what was supposed to be an unrecorded post-interview discussion with ITN's political correspondent in April 1993, Major, in relation to rebellious backbenchers, asked, 'Where do you think most of this poison is coming from? From the dispossessed and the never possessed. You can think of ex-ministers who are going around causing all sorts of trouble. We don't want another three more of the bastards out there.'
22. See Anderson, John Major, where he talks of Mrs Thatcher lobbying on behalf of Major: 'Gently but firmly, she reminded them of their obligations to her, and asked them to perform one final service on her behalf' (pp. 335-6).
23. Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency, p. 187.
24. Ellis, John Major, p. 3.
25. Alan Clark, Diaries (London: Phoenix, 1994), p. 369.
26. The electoral appeal of both Major and Heseltine could have been either an individualistic or a collective phenomenon. If it was the former - based on the effect that a candidate could make on an individual MP's seat - then we might expect those in the more marginal seats to have been more likely to support either Heseltine or Major (who had very similar election-winning potential by the end of the campaign), at the expense of Hurd (who had much less election-winning potential). However, if the electoral appeal was more collective - not so much a fear of losing one's own seat but of the party ceasing to be in government - then marginality should not have had any effect. Existing works on the contest rarely distinguish between the two phenomena, yet they are very different. Here we can only test for the presence of any individualistic phenomena.
27. Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency, p. 186.
28. Interview.
29. We are grateful to Mark Stuart for this information.
30. One systematic method of examining Major's career is to look at service on standing committees The Conservative MP who served on committees with the most divisions between 1979 and 1992 was a certain John Roy Major, serving on sixteen bills which saw a total of 634 divisions. Only two other Conservative MPs served on committees with a total of over 600 divisions, and only seven were within 100 divisions of Major's total. Major was well ahead of his rival for the leadership. Hurd served on just six committees, with a total of 298 divisions, while Heseltine did not serve on a single standing committee between 1979 and 1992. Not only was Major's committee service widespread, but he also served on committees which were larger than the norm, enhancing his contacts with fellow Conservative MPs. During his time in committtee, he served with 146 Conservative MPs. Of these, 123 (a full third of his electorate) were still present in the House at the time of the 1990 leadership election. Such contact with Major did not produce any noticeable changes in MPs' votes (see Philip Cowley, 'How Did He Do That? A Systematic Analysis of the 1990 Conservative Leadership Election', unpublished paper presented at the Political Studies Association EPOP Conference, London, September 1995, pp. 17-18), but it remains indicative of his career.
31. For example, see William Keegan, Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment (London: Allen Lane, 1984); Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), esp. p. 12; and Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1991). More specifically, see Philip Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning." But What About the Rest?' Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 41-58; and Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, 'Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 361-84. Both articles use economic divisions as a key element in their analysis of the ideological divisions within the party.
32. For example, see William Keegan, Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment (London: Allen Lane, 1984); Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), esp. p. 12; and Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1991). More specifically, see Philip Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning." But What About the Rest?' Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 41-58; and Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, 'Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 361-84. Both articles use economic divisions as a key element in their analysis of the ideological divisions within the party.
33. For example, see William Keegan, Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment (London: Allen Lane, 1984); Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), esp. p. 12; and Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1991). More specifically, see Philip Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning." But What About the Rest?' Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 41-58; and Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, 'Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 361-84. Both articles use economic divisions as a key element in their analysis of the ideological divisions within the party.
34. For example, see William Keegan, Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment (London: Allen Lane, 1984); Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), esp. p. 12; and Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1991). More specifically, see Philip Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning." But What About the Rest?' Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 41-58; and Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, 'Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 361-84. Both articles use economic divisions as a key element in their analysis of the ideological divisions within the party.
35. For example, see William Keegan, Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment (London: Allen Lane, 1984); Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), esp. p. 12; and Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1991). More specifically, see Philip Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning." But What About the Rest?' Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 41-58; and Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, 'Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 361-84. Both articles use economic divisions as a key element in their analysis of the ideological divisions within the party.
36. Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', p. 59.
37. This social/moral dimension is the second key element in the analysis of Riddell, Norton, and Crewe and Searing of the party's internal divisions.
38. See John Carry, 'The British Conservative Party: Divisions Over European Policy', West European Politics, 18 (1995), 170-89; and Steve Ludlam, 'The Spectre Haunting Conservatism', in S. Ludlam and M. J. Smith, eds., Contemporary British Conservatism (London: Macmillan, 1996).
39. See John Carry, 'The British Conservative Party: Divisions Over European Policy', West European Politics, 18 (1995), 170-89; and Steve Ludlam, 'The Spectre Haunting Conservatism', in S. Ludlam and M. J. Smith, eds., Contemporary British Conservatism (London: Macmillan, 1996).
40. See Garry, 'The British Conservative Party'. The paper related Conservative MPs' positions on various policy dimensions to their closeness, in policy terms, to a selected range of Conservative figures. Europe emerged as the key underlying ideological variable driving attitudes in the party. See also John Garry, 'The Internal Politics of the British Conservative Party and Margaret Thatcher's Position as Leader' (unpublished MA dissertation, University College, Galway, 1993).
41. See Garry, 'The British Conservative Party'. The paper related Conservative MPs' positions on various policy dimensions to their closeness, in policy terms, to a selected range of Conservative figures. Europe emerged as the key underlying ideological variable driving attitudes in the party. See also John Garry, 'The Internal Politics of the British Conservative Party and Margaret Thatcher's Position as Leader' (unpublished MA dissertation, University College, Galway, 1993).
42. Robin Oakley and Philip Webster, The Times, 19 November 1990.
43. At one point the total number of pledges made to campaign managers in the second round stood at 400 - 28 more than the total number of MPs (Anderson, John Major, pp. 316-17).
44. See also Garry, 'The British Conservative Party', esp. fn. 10 where the survey is further discussed. As explained there, the ideological representativeness of the survey respondents was examined by relating respondents to the Norton typology of the party. Survey respondents were found to be largely representative of the party as a whole (although see fn. 44 below).
45. Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning" '.
46. Patrick Dunleavy, 'The Political Parties', in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Peale, eds., Developments in British Politics 4 (London: Macmillan, 1993).
47. Norton, ' "The Lady's Not For Turning" ', p. 52.
48. David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'Mapping Conservative Fault Lines: Problems or Typology', in P. Dunleavy and J. Stanyer, eds., Contemporary Political Studies, Vol. 1 (Belfast: PSA, 1994), p. 285. But see P. Cowley, 'Philip Norton's Conservative Party', British Politics Group Newsletter, 86 (1996), 16-18.
49. David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'Mapping Conservative Fault Lines: Problems or Typology', in P. Dunleavy and J. Stanyer, eds., Contemporary Political Studies, Vol. 1 (Belfast: PSA, 1994), p. 285. But see P. Cowley, 'Philip Norton's Conservative Party', British Politics Group Newsletter, 86 (1996), 16-18.
50. Well discussed in Matthew Sowemimo, 'The Conservative Party and European Integration 1988-95', Party Politics, 2 (1996), 77-97; and Ludlam, 'The Spectre Haunting Conservatism'.
51. Well discussed in Matthew Sowemimo, 'The Conservative Party and European Integration 1988-95', Party Politics, 2 (1996), 77-97; and Ludlam, 'The Spectre Haunting Conservatism'.
52. See, for example, Garry, 'The British Conservative Party', pp. 170-1; and Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', esp. pp. 41-3.
53. See, for example, Garry, 'The British Conservative Party', pp. 170-1; and Norton, 'The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Major', esp. pp. 41-3.
54. Garry, 'The British Conservative Party', p. 175.
55. Since Norton's typology and the 1991 survey our knowledge of the beliefs of the members of the Conservative parliamentary party has increased as a result of the work of the 'Sheffield' team. See, for example, David Baker, Imogen Fountain, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'Backbench Conservative Attitudes to European Integration', Political Quarterly, 66 (1995), 221-33; and David Baker, Imogen Fountain, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'The Blue Map of Europe: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton, eds., British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1995 (London: Frank Cass, 1996). However, this work is of little use in understanding the 1990 contest for three reasons. First, because the surveys began after the 1992 general election. Secondly, because the respondents to the surveys are non-identifiable. Thus, it is not possible to utilize the Sheffield data to see if there is a link between beliefs and leadership votes (the same problem ruled out utilizing the British Candidate Survey). And thirdly, they mainly investigated MPs' beliefs on Europe and so the results would not allow us to assess the relative impact on voting of a broad range of ideological factors.
56. Since Norton's typology and the 1991 survey our knowledge of the beliefs of the members of the Conservative parliamentary party has increased as a result of the work of the 'Sheffield' team. See, for example, David Baker, Imogen Fountain, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'Backbench Conservative Attitudes to European Integration', Political Quarterly, 66 (1995), 221-33; and David Baker, Imogen Fountain, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'The Blue Map of Europe: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton, eds., British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1995 (London: Frank Cass, 1996). However, this work is of little use in understanding the 1990 contest for three reasons. First, because the surveys began after the 1992 general election. Secondly, because the respondents to the surveys are non-identifiable. Thus, it is not possible to utilize the Sheffield data to see if there is a link between beliefs and leadership votes (the same problem ruled out utilizing the British Candidate Survey). And thirdly, they mainly investigated MPs' beliefs on Europe and so the results would not allow us to assess the relative impact on voting of a broad range of ideological factors.
57. MPs could disagree very strongly, disagree strongly, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, agree strongly, or agree very strongly.
58. Positive responses to Garry's survey were received from 168 MPs, but four erased the identification symbols on their questionnaires. Such data are usable for examining the beliefs of Conservative MPs in toto (as in Garry, 'The British Conservative Party') but not for examining particular groupings. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis we drop the four unidentified cases, leaving us with 164 cases.
59. Detailed bivariate relationships between voting behaviour and non-ideological variables have been reported for all three levels of voting certainty in Philip Cowley, 'How Did He Do That? The Second Round of the 1990 Conservative Leadership Election', in D. M. Farrell, D. Broughton, D. Denver and J. Fisher, eds., British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1996 (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
60. Rerunning the analysis using just the confirmed data produces the same significant variables. There are some slight differences: 'privately educated' was no longer significant for Hurd (although 'previously in government' became significant), and 'higher education' was no longer significant for Major.
61. As above, rerunning the analysis using just confirmed data produces very similar results: the only difference is that 'state ownership' was not significant for Heseltine; and 'abortion' was not significant for Major.
62. The second (limited) model for each candidate was reached as follows: one by one the most insignificant variables in the full model were deleted leaving us ultimately with only significant variables (that is, the limited model).
63. We re-ran the regressions using just the confirmed data. The only difference related to education: 'Oxbridge' emerged as significant in the full model for Major and for Hurd and 'higher education' was not at all significant for Heseltine. 41 If we run the (full) model with 'Oxbridge' as the only educational variable included, it emerges as significant (at the 0.05 level).
64. Each regression in Table 5 includes all the variables: socio-economic, political and ideological. We also ran regressions using a different approach: examining the impact of 'blocks' of variables, estimating the increase in explanatory power gained by adding a new block. Following the approach of Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, we first enter socio-economic variables (on the basis that these variables come first in the time sequence of factors influencing MPs' behaviour). Running the 'Major versus others' regression with just the socio-economic variables had an overall prediction score of 65 per cent (56 per cent for y = 0; 72 per cent for y = 1 and generates a lambda p score of 0.23. With political variables added, the prediction score was 73 per cent (64 per cent for y = 0; 80 per cent for y = 1) with a lambda p of 0.40. Adding ideological variables, as reported in Table 5, raises the prediction score to 77 per cent and the lambda p to 0.50. We thus see that the addition of each block increases the explanatory power of the model.
65. Once 'Oxbridge' is dropped in the generation of the limited model, 'higher education' emerges as significant. No great importance is attached to this, however, as 'higher education' had not been significant at bivariate level. As explained, using data on 372 MPs higher education was not significant for Heseltine. However, it did prove significant (at 0.05 level) at bivariate level using the 164 MPs for whom we have both ideological and non-ideological data and as Table 5 reports also appears significant (at 0.05 level) at multivariate level.
66. As with Major we ran additional regressions, entering the blocks of variables separately. Running the 'Heseltine versus others' regression with only socio-economic variables gave a prediction score of 69 per cent (95 per cent for y = 0; 15 per cent for y = 1) and a lambda p score of 0.05. Adding political variables raised the prediction score to 74 per cent (89 per cent for y = 0; 43 per cent for y = 1) and the lambda p to 0.18. Adding ideological variables gave the results shown in Table 5, with a prediction score of 79 per cent and a lambda p of 0.35. Thus for both of our main candidates the model shows greater explanatory power as our blocks of variables are added.
67. Thus the 'Oxbridge' variable behaves in the same way as it did for Major: emerging as significant once other education variables have been dropped.
68. The Hurd model 'fitted' very badly: regardless of which blocks of variables are entered, it did not predict correctly the voting of any of the twenty-one Hurd voters in the analysis! We are content to say that we have models that fit very well and that explain voting for both of the main candidates.
69. As explained in the text the Norton typology of the parliamentary party is not used as the dataset for this paper because (a) the policy-based groups cover only 42 per cent of the party, (b) Norton's groups are composite groups and therefore do not lend themselves easily to dimension by dimension analysis, and (c) Norton primarily used positions on social and economic policy when generating his typology and did not concentrate to the same extent on Europe, the issue which is our key concern here. However, despite these caveats we attempted to replicate our key finding - the importance of Europe in driving voting behaviour - using the Norton data, which was generated completely independently of our survey data. We divided the six groups into two: pro-EU groups and anti-EU groups. We ran a logit regression including non-ideological variables and membership of Norton's pro- or anti-EU groups. For the 'Major versus others' regression, parliamentary experience is negatively related to voting Major (significant at 0.05 level) and pro-Europeanism is also negatively associated to voting Major (at 0.001 level). This yields a highly significant model χ2 result, an overall prediction score of 85 per cent and a lambda p score generated from the classification table of 0.67. For Heseltine parliamentary experience is positively related to voting Heseltine (at 0.05 level), as is higher education (also at the 0.05 level) and pro-Europeanism (at the 0.001 level). The model χ2 result was highly significant, the overall prediction score was 82 per cent and the lambda p score was 0.56. No significant variables emerged for Hurd.) These results for Major and Heseltine serve to confirm and replicate - using Norton's independently generated data - our conclusion that Europe was the key voting determinant.
70. See, for example, Shephard, The Power Brokers, pp. 55-6; Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major, pp. 97-101, 105, 109-10; Anderson, John Major, p. 72; and Hugo Young, One of Us, final edn (London: Pan Books, 1993), esp. pp. 564-5; see also note 14 where the possibility of a collective electoral effect is considered.
71. See, for example, Shephard, The Power Brokers, pp. 55-6; Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major, pp. 97-101, 105, 109-10; Anderson, John Major, p. 72; and Hugo Young, One of Us, final edn (London: Pan Books, 1993), esp. pp. 564-5; see also note 14 where the possibility of a collective electoral effect is considered.
72. See, for example, Shephard, The Power Brokers, pp. 55-6; Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major, pp. 97-101, 105, 109-10; Anderson, John Major, p. 72; and Hugo Young, One of Us, final edn (London: Pan Books, 1993), esp. pp. 564-5; see also note 14 where the possibility of a collective electoral effect is considered.
73. See, for example, Shephard, The Power Brokers, pp. 55-6; Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major, pp. 97-101, 105, 109-10; Anderson, John Major, p. 72; and Hugo Young, One of Us, final edn (London: Pan Books, 1993), esp. pp. 564-5; see also note 14 where the possibility of a collective electoral effect is considered.
74. Anderson, John Major, chap.6.
75. Such factors form the fifth stage of Miller and Shanks' six stages of voting and are described as 'impressions of the candidates' personal qualities' (see Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, p. 192).
76. Two examples should suffice: personal friendship; and what could be called 'delayed ambition', either for oneself, or for another. The former is self-explanatory. The latter is an adaptation of the maxim that 'young bishops vote for old popes'. A voter may vote for X despite prefering Y, because the voter judges that Y cannot win this time, but may well win any future contest, as long as that contest is not held too far into the future. Both theories were suggested to one of the authors to explain the behaviour of a few of the individuals supporting Douglas Hurd.
77. See, for example, David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification'. Parliamentary Affairs, 47 (1994), 37-60; and Philip Cowley and Philip Norton, Are Conservative MPs Revolting? Dissension in the British House of Commons 1979-1996, Research Papers in Legislative Studies 2/96 (Hull: University of Hull Centre for Legislative Studies, 1996).
78. See, for example, David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, 'The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification'. Parliamentary Affairs, 47 (1994), 37-60; and Philip Cowley and Philip Norton, Are Conservative MPs Revolting? Dissension in the British House of Commons 1979-1996, Research Papers in Legislative Studies 2/96 (Hull: University of Hull Centre for Legislative Studies, 1996).
79. Keith Alderman, 'The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1995', Parliamentary Affairs, 49 (1996), 316-32.
80. See John R. Hibbing and David Marsh, 'Accounting for the Voting Patterns of British MPs on Free Votes', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 7 (1987), 275-97.
81. Public (or private) schools are those in the 1995 Headmasters' Conference (HMC) or, in some rare cases, the Girls' Schools Association (GSA). In some cases MPs have been educated overseas, almost certainly privately, but only those educated at HMC or GSA schools are here treated as educated privately. To be classed as university educated requires either attendance at a university (!) or to have been to a college of law, a medical college, the Royal Military College (Sandhurst), the Royal Military Academy (Woolwich), or to a polytechnic akin to a university (i.e., post-expansion).
82. See, for example, David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts 1900-1994, 7th edn (London: Macmillan, 1994); and Michael Rush, 'The Members of Parliament', in M. Ryle and Peter G. Richards, eds., The Commons Under Scrutiny (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 24-5. That Butler and Butler and Rush disagree on both education and occupation is itself evidence of the problems inherent in such an exercise.
83. See, for example, David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts 1900-1994, 7th edn (London: Macmillan, 1994); and Michael Rush, 'The Members of Parliament', in M. Ryle and Peter G. Richards, eds., The Commons Under Scrutiny (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 24-5. That Butler and Butler and Rush disagree on both education and occupation is itself evidence of the problems inherent in such an exercise.
84. Watkins, A Conservative Coup, pp. 214-15.
85. Of the three, the data on Heseltine's supporters were the most difficult to gather, perhaps indicating that there was an incentive for Heseltine's supporters to be quiet about supporting the man who had 'wielded the dagger'. However, it was still possible to confirm 53 per cent of his support, and only to be doubtful about 13 per cent.
86. Hence our focus on the second round of the contest. Reliable identification of those who vote against the leader in such circumstances is extremely difficult so near to the event. For an attempt, see Philip Cowley, 'Fanatics Are Seldom Winners', Parliamentary Brief, 4 (1995), 36-8.
87. Compare 'How Did He Do That? A Systematic Analysis' (September 1995) with 'How Did He Do That? The Second Round' (published September 1996).