From contention to social bargaining: Labour unions and democratic consolidation in Spain

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 60-84

  Royo, Sebastián ^a,b  

^a SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratic consolidation; Labour unions; Party union relationship; Social bargaining; Spain

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL CHANGE; TRADE UNION;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; SOUTHERN EUROPE; SPAIN; WORLD;

EID: 85047689709     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/135103404200317761     Document Type: Article

References (148)

1. Ruth Berins Collier, Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
2. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986)
3. Peter Lange, The Institutionalization of Concertation, Working Paper. No.26, mimeo (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1987).
4. Nancy Bermeo, 'Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions. Lessons from Spain', The Journal of Politics, Vol.56, No.3 (1994), pp.601-27
5. Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies. A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
6. David Cameron, Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.143-78
7. Philippe Schmitter, 'Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Western Europe and North America', in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.287-327.
8. Robert Fishman, 'Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy', World Politics, Vol.42, No.3 (1990), pp.422-40.
9. Rafael Durán Munoz, Contencion y Transgression: Las Movilizaciones Sociales y el Estado en las Transiciones Española y Portuguesa (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, 2000).
10. Omar Encarnacion, 'Social Concertation in Democratic and Market Transitions. Comparative Lessons from Spain', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.4 (1997), pp.387-419.
11. For a detailed analysis of the process of social concertation in Spain from which this article draws see Sebastián Royo, From Social Democracy to Neoliberalism. The Consequences of Party Hegemony in Spain 1983-1996 (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000).
12. David Cameron (note 4), pp.143-5;
13. Peter Lange (note 2), pp.1-10.
14. Omar Encarnación 'Social Concertation' (note 7), pp.387-419;
15. Philippe Schmitter, 'Neo-corporatism and the State', in Wyn Grant (ed.), The Political Economy of Neo-corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1985 ).
16. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 'Government Partisanship and Economic Performance When and How does "Who Governs" Matter?', Journal of Politics, Vol. 51 (1989), pp.676-93.
17. Such as: the specific organizational culture and ideology of each union, the competitive industrial relations institutional framework based on a model of representativeness rather than affiliation, or the differing syndical and collective action models.
18. I would like to acknowledge the valuable comments from Graeme Beacon Robertson related to this point. His paper Leading Labour: Unions, Politics and Protest in New Democracies (NY: Columbia University, Mimeo, 2002) is a valuable contribution to this debate.
19. Ruth Berins Collier (note 1), pp.4-14.
20. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
21. Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', in Lisa Anderson (ed.), Transitions to Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999 (1970)), pp.14-41
22. Philippe Schmitter, 'An Introduction to Southern European Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey', in O'Donnell and Schmitter (note 2), pp.3-10.
23. See also Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990);
24. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Overview', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.323-48.
25. Ruth Berins Collier (note 1), pp.6-8.
26. J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Labour Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis', Comparative Politics, Vol.21, No.4 (1989). Valenzuela focuses on three main sources of variation (p.452): the 'strength or weakness of the labour movement and the economic context of the transition, the centralization or decentralization of the labour movement and its unity or division, and the modalities of the transition and the relationship between the labour movement and the elites guiding the transition'.
27. Joe Foweraker, 'Corporatist Strategies and the Transition to Democracy in Spain', Comparative Politics, Vol.20, No.1 (1987), pp.57-72;
28. Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, 'Adding Collective Actors to outcomes: Labour and Recent Democratizations in South America and Southern Europe', in Anderson (note 16), pp.97-119;
29. Nancy Bermeo, 'Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions', in Anderson (note 16), pp.120-40.
30. Ruth Berins Collier (note 1), pp.1-32, challenges in a sophisticated analysis accepted views about the role of elites and working class movements in the origins of democracy and the common emphasis on the centrality of elite bargaining between incumbents and moderate opposition leaders. Her central argument is that our conventional understanding of democratization has to be supplemented by a consideration of the important role played by labour movements - a factor traditionally ignored in comparative and theoretical analyses. In doing so, she looks at the processes of democratization in terms of the role of the working class, not middle and upper classes. According to her analysis, through escalating protests labour destabilized the authoritarian elite in two ways: it challenged its ability to maintain social peace or order and it undermined its cohesion. At the same time, she examines the role of labour during the transition process and its contribution in provoking the transition.
31. See, among others, Nancy Bermeo 'Myths of Moderation' (note 20), pp. 120-40;
32. Ruth Berins Collier (note 1), pp. 110-65;
33. Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney (note 20), pp.97-119;
34. Alvaro Soto Carmona, 'Conflictividad Social y Transición Sindical', in Javier Tusell and Alvaro Soto Carmona, Historia de la Transición 1975-1986 (Madrid: Alianza Universidad 1996);
35. Víctor Pérez-Díaz, Clase Obrera, Partidos y Sindicatos (Madrid: Fundación del Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1979);
36. Víctor Pérez-Diaz, 'Políticas Económicas y Pautas Sociales en la España de la Transición. La Doble Cara del Neocorporatismo', in Juan Linz (ed.), España. Un Presente Para el Futuro (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1984), pp.23-55;
37. José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent (London: Tavistock, 1978);
38. Juan Linz et al., Informe Sociológico sobre el Cambio Político en España 1975-1981 (Informe FOESSA) (Madrid: Euramerica, 1981);
39. Philippe Schmitter, 'Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe', in R. Gunther, N. Diamandouros and H. Puhle, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.284-314;
40. Katrina Burgess, 'Loyalty Dilemmas and Market Reform: Party Union Alliances Under Stress in Mexico, Spain and Venezuela', World Politics, Vol.52 (October 1999), pp.105-34;
41. Sidney Tarrow, 'Mass Mobilization and Regime Change: Pacts, Reform and Popular Power in Italy (1918-1922) and Spain (1975-1978)', in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhleu (note 21), pp.204-30;
42. Alvaro Espina, 'Política de Rentas en España', in F. Miguelez and C. Prieto (eds), Las Relaciones Labourales en España (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1995);
43. Ludolfo Paramio, 'Los Sindicatos y la Política en España, 1982-1992', in various authors, La Decada del Cambio (Madrid: Fundación Sistema, 1993).
44. Durán Munoz (note 6), pp.255-99 develops one of the most comprehensive and interesting analysis of the differences between labour mobilizations in Spain and Portugal during the democratic transition.
45. Robert Fishman, Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) emphasizes the crucial role of labour leaders at plant-level in national political processes.
46. See Alan Stoleroff, 'Labour and Democratization in Portugal. Problems of the Union-Party Relationship', paper prepared for the Conference on Labour Movements and the Transition to Democracy, Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, April 1988.
47. See also María Victoria Murillo, Labour Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
48. Murillo identifies union competition and political partisanship as key factors in Latin America.
49. See Philippe Schmitter, 'Interest Intermediation' (note 4);
50. David Cameron (note 4), pp. 143-78;
51. and Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, The Economics of Worldwide Stagflation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
52. See Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange (note II), pp.676-93;
53. Miriam Golden, 'The Dynamics of Trade Unionism and National Economic Performance', American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No.2 (1993), pp.439-56;
54. Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Bargaining Structure, Corporatism, and Economic Performance', Economic Policy, 3 (1988), pp. 13-61.
55. See Adam Prezeworski, 'The Game of Transition', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: South America in Comparative Perspective (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 126;
56. Philippe Schmitter, 'An Introduction to Southern European' (note 16), pp.3-10;
57. and Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
58. Marino Regini, Between Deregulation and Social Pacts. The Responses of European Economies to Globalization', Politics & Society. Vol.28, No.1 (2000), pp.5-33;
59. and Omar Encarnación; 'A Casualty of Unemploymeat: The Breakdown of Social Concertation in Spain', South European Society & Politics, Vol.4, No.3 (1999), pp.32-59.
60. Marino Regini (note 26), p.5.
61. Soto Carmona (note 21), pp.378-9.
62. See also Durán Munoz (note 6), pp.77-110.
63. Ludolfo Paramio, (note 21), p.524.
64. Alan Stoleroff (note 22), p.12.
65. As we will see, these links broke down in the second half of the 1980s when unions re-established their political autonomy from political parties and henceforth-partisan control of the unions has waned.
66. See Sebastián Royo, From Social Democracy (note 8), pp.67-111;
67. and Javier Ruiz Astudillo, Los Recursos del Socialismo. Las Cambiantes Relaciones Entre el PSOE y la UGT (1982-1993) (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Ciencias Sociales, 1998).
68. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad, Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp.203-204.
69. I b i d.
70. The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), another clandestine union that emerged in 1960, decided to abandon the Comisiones Obreras at that time, due to the evident control exercised by the PCE.
71. One of the most visible events of this repression was the so-called 'Proceso 1.001', which sentenced union leaders to very long terms in jail for their syndical activities. Marcelino Camacho, the leader of CCOO, was sentenced in 1972 to 20 years in jail.
72. Ilse Marie Führer, Los Sindicatos en España. (Madrid: CES, 1996), p.78
73. and Eusebio Mujal-León, 'The PCE in Spanish Politics', Problems of Communism, No.27 (July-August 1978), p.27.
74. J.L. Guinea, Los Movimientos Obreros y Sindicales en España de 1833 a 1978 (Madrid: Ibérico European de Ediciones, 1978), p.167.
75. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad (note 32), pp.205-206.
76. Ibid., p203.
77. They dispute the claims of 'complete independence' on the part of UGT and note that 'in one province, for instance, it was necessary to pass through the office of the UGT in order to reach the PSOE office',
78. Tom Burns Maranon, Conversaciones Sobre El Socialismo (Madrid: Plaza & Janes, 1996), pp.202-203.
79. See also Santos Juliá, Los Socialistas en la Política Española 1879-1982 (Madrid: Taurus, 1997), pp.419-29.
80. Interview with Nicolás Redondo in Dec. 1996.
81. This is not to say that the preferences of workers for unions and political parties were identical. Polls conducted by Pé rez-Díaz (1979) among CCOO and UGT affiliates indicated that only 39 per cent of CCOO's affiliates voted for the PCE (while 44.7 per cent voted for the PSOE and 10 per cent to conservative parties), while 71.9 per cent of UGT's affiliates voted for the PSOE (2 per cent voted for the PCE, and 21 per cent to conservative parties).
82. See Ilse Marie Führer (note 36), p.93.
83. Ibid., pp.83-5.
84. Ibid., pp.94-5.
85. While stressing that the PSOE was not always successful in gaining compliance with their demands to the union Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad (note 32), p.209,
86. state that one PSOE deputy 'referred to the link between the party and its unions as a 'command' relationship.' Nicolás Redondo, former Secretary General of UGT denied this when I interviewed him in Madrid in December 1996.
87. For instance, this handicap led part of the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO, and independent Socialist union that emerged during the transition) leadership and a high number of affiliates to abandon this union in 1977 and join UGT. The importance of this factor in this decision was confirmed during an interview that José María Zufiaur, one of the leaders of USO who left the union and became part of UGT's leadership, gave to Führer (note 36), pp.94-5.
88. A peculiarity of these pacts was that despite the fact that unions and business were not signatories, they would be the ones that would have to enforce one of the pacts' major components, that is an incomes policy. Obviously, at the heart of the agreements was an attempt to control a rather loose political and economic context, with the government trying to impose its economic targets upon the economic actors. The reaction from unions was ambivalent. Both Nicolás Redondo and Marcelino Camacho, the secretaries general of the two major union confederations, UGT and CCOO, were representatives in Parliament and voted in favour of the pacts.
89. See Jordi Roca, 'Los Pactos Sociales en El Estado Español', Crónica de Información Laboural, No.32 (1985), p.4.
90. This support generated tensions within the union, with some leaders, like Gerardo Iglesias, expressing a more critical view of the agreements and many affiliates demonstrating against the pacts.
91. See A. Rubén Vega García, CC.OO de Asturias en la Transición y la Democracia (Oviedo: Unión Regional de CCOO de Asturias, 1995), p. 118.
92. See Ludolfo Paramio (note 21), p.523;
93. and Manuel Tunon de Lara, 'El Movimiento Obrero de 1981 a 1991', in various authors, La Decada del Cambio (Madrid: Fundación Sistema, 1993). There were sectors within the union, however, that opposed these pacts and criticized the government economic policies. Subsequently these sectors gained the debate and forced a strategic shift in the union that led to a more confrontational stance and the refusal to sign ensuing agreements.
94. Interview with Nicolás Redondo in December 1996.
95. See also Burns Maranón (note 40), p.206; and
96. Justo Domínguez, 'Diez Años de Relaciones Industriales en España', in Angel Zaragoza (eds), Pactos Sociales Sindicatos y Patronal en España (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1990), p.78.
97. Interview with Nicolás Redondo in December 1996.
98. See also Leopoldo Moscoso, 'Social Democracy and Industrial Conflict: The Breakdown of Concertation in Spain, 1982-1994', paper presented at the Harvard-Tufts Iberian Study Group, Harvard University, September 1995.
99. Interviews with Carlos Solchaga and Joaquín Almunia in December 1996.
100. Ludolfo, Paramio (note 21), p.524.
101. Leopoldo Moscoso (note 51), p.65.
102. Interview with Antonio Gutiérrez in December 1996. While the CCOO did not explicitly endorse the PCE in the 1977 elections, the party tried to maximize the prestige of CCOO in the 1979 election, nominating CCOO's members as PCE candidates as well as helping the union develop a socioeconomic program very similar to the PCE's. In 1979 the union asked voters to support parties that included CCOO's candidates and supported the union program. A more explicit strategy however, risked weakening the CCOO because in 1977 only 39 per cent of the CCOO's affiliates had voted for the PCE and, hence, non-communist voters could abandon CCOO if they perceived the union as being to closely aligned with the PCE.
103. See Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad (note 32), pp.206-208.
104. In the case of this last agreement CCOO pursued actively an anti-AMI campaign in the enterprises to demonstrate that incomes policies could not be enforced without CCOO's support. This strategy failed (the wage policies established in the agreement were effectively enforced) and backfired in the next syndical elections.
105. See Sebastián Royo From Social Democracy (note 8), pp.77-9.
106. Leopoldo Moscoso (note 51), p.66.
107. Interview with Nicolás Redondo and Sergio Santillán in December 1996.
108. In the course of interviews that I conducted with representatives of the UGT and CCOO in Dec. 1996,
109. Antonio Gutiérrez, Secretary General of CCOO, and Nicolás Redondo and Sergio Santillán from UGT, emphasized the strong impact the failed coup had on their strategies.
110. The major significance of this agreement was that for the first time in the new democratic regime, the government recognized the social actors as equal partners, signed an agreement with them, and was fully engaged in the pact's negotiation and implementation.
111. See Justo Dominguez (note 50), p.85;
112. and Joaquín Estefanía and Rodolfo Serrano, 'Díez Años de Relaciones Industriales en España', in Zaragoza (note 50), p.35
113. Interview with Antonio Gutiérrez in December 1996.
114. Ludolfo Paramio (note 21), p.525.
115. See also José María Zufiaur, 'El Sindicalismo Español en la. Transición y la Crisis', Papeleside Economía Española, No.22 (1985), p.210.
116. On 28 January 1983, unions and the business organization announced the rupture in the negotiation process. Alfonso Guerra, then vice president of the government, took the initiative and convinced José María Cuevas, the president of the business organization, to conclude an agreement.
117. See Joaquín Estefanía and Rodolfo Serrano (note 60), p.38.
118. The government was not a signatory of the agreement but participated actively in the negotiations. The business organization, CEOE, wanted to involve the government in the agreement in order to force the socialists to negotiate its economic policies (since it opposed the electoral programme of the PSOE).
119. Nicolás Redondo argued during an interview with the author in December 1996 that his union rejected the participation of the government because they considered that such participation would tie the latter's hands and force modifications to the socialist electoral programme.
120. Ludolfo Paramio (note 21), p. 526.
121. Leopoldo Moscoso (note 51), p.67.
122. Interview with Antonio Gutiérrez in December 1996.
123. Ilse Marie Führer (note 36), p.367;
124. Justo Domínguez (note 50), p.91.
125. Rodrigo Iglesias, 'La Concertación Social desde la Perspectiva de las Organizaciones Empresariales', in Zaragoza (note 50), pp. 161-3;
126. Justo Domínguez (note 50), p.93.
127. During the author's interview with Antonio Gutiérrez in December 1996 he emphasized the fact that Article 17 of the AES opened the door for free dismissals in Spain.
128. See also Joaquin Estefanía and Rodolfo Serrano (note 60), p.44.
129. During interviews with Nicolás Redondo, former secretary general of the UGT, and with Fernando Moreno and Fabián Marquez from the CEOE in December 1996, they all emphasized that this clause was the most important point of dispute between the UGT and the CEOE. They also stated that the interpretation of the article was one of the major reasons behind the CEOE's decision to repudiate the agreement later on, and the employers' association's decision to reject the possibility of reaching new agreements with UGT in 1987.
130. Joe Foweraker (note 20), p.61.
131. Sebastián Royo From Social Democracy (note 8), pp.88-96.
132. This dispute provoked an institutional and organic rupture between the union and the party, marked by the establishment of incompatibility rules preventing PSOE members to have positions of responsibility within UGT.
133. See Ludolfo Paramio (note 21), p.533;
134. Sebastián Royo From Social Democracy (note 8), pp.179-85; and
135. Richard Gillespie, 'The Break-up of the 'Socialist Family': Party-Union Relations in Spain 1982-1989', West European Politics, Vol.16, No.1 (1990), pp.78-96.
136. Alan Stoleroff (note 22), p.17.
137. On this subject see: Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).
138. Omar Encarnación, 'Social Concertation' (note 7), p.415.
139. Victor Pérez-Díaz (note 21), pp.44-6.
140. The article emphises the mechanisms that facilitated control over the unions, which have hindered the institutionalization of these processes: division within the labour movement, low union density, unions' financial and orgizational difficulties as well as weak organization structures, the transition to democracy, and the economic crisis all facilitated such influence. At the same time, Iberian unions started with a major disadvantage: the political system was not consolidated and the unions' institutional position was not defined, either vis-à-vis the government/party or their own constituencies. Elsewhere in for instance Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Norway centralized agreements were characterized by the political/economic exchange between actors whose positions in the system were fully institutionalized and defined.
141. See Sebastián Royo From Social Democracy (note 8), pp. 182-5;
142. Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994);
143. and Thomas Koelble, 'Recasting Social Democracy in Europe', 'Nested Games' and Rational Choices in Strategic Adjustment Process, Working Paper Series No.12 (Cambridge: CES-Harvard University, 1991).
144. Sebastián Royo, From Social Democracy (note 8), pp.173-201.
145. José María Maravall has argued that economic conditions as well as the minority nature of the government were more important factors than ideology in explaining concertation. He argues that minority governments such as UCDs were more vulnerable and tried to strengthen their position through agreements, and agreements were easier at the depth of the crisis.
146. See José María Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reform in Southern Europe', in Bresser Pereira, Maravall and Przeworski (note 3), pp. 118-19.
147. Sebastián Royo, From Social Democracy (note 8), p.212.
148. See Sebastián Royo, 'A New Century of Corporatism?' Corporatism in Southern Europe. Spain and Portugal in Comparative Perspective (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).