Between deregulation and social pacts: The responses of European economies to globalization

Politics and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 5-33

  Regini, Marino ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034387322     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329200028001002     Document Type: Review

References (94)

1. See, for example, Ralf Dahrendorf, "Economic Opportunity, Civil Society and Political Liberty" (paper presented at UNRISD conference on "Rethinking Social Development," Copenhagen, 11-12 March 1995); Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity (London: Sage, 1997).
2. See, for example, Ralf Dahrendorf, "Economic Opportunity, Civil Society and Political Liberty" (paper presented at UNRISD conference on "Rethinking Social Development," Copenhagen, 11-12 March 1995); Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity (London: Sage, 1997).
3. From this point of view, the rhetoric of globalization is just as powerful as economic reality, in that it conveys the idea of a decisive challenge that the less competitive economies will be unable to meet and will therefore succumb.
4. Ranging from the standardizing consequences of industrialization through the instrumentalism of an affluent working class, predictions of the institutionalization of class conflict or indeed its "withering away," to the "end of ideology."
5. Wolfgang Streeck, "The Internationalization of Industrial Relations in Europe: Prospects and Problems," Politics & Society 26, no. 4 (1998).
6. Giuseppe Fajertag and Philippe Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe (Bruxelles: ETUI, 1997); Philippe Pochet, "Les pactes sociaux en Europe dans les années 1990," Sociologie du Travail, no. 2 (1998).
7. Giuseppe Fajertag and Philippe Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe (Bruxelles: ETUI, 1997); Philippe Pochet, "Les pactes sociaux en Europe dans les années 1990," Sociologie du Travail, no. 2 (1998).
8. Philippe Schmitter and Jürgen Grote, "The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present and Future," European University Institute Working Papers, no. 97/4 (1997).
9. This is not to underrate the importance of institutionalist approaches in economics (suffice it to mention the work of Douglas North and Oliver Williamson) and in sociology (especially the work of Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio). Nevertheless, it is mainly in political science that neoinstitutionalism has made a major contribution to the analysis of welfare systems, industrial relations, and the labor market - that is, the themes examined by this article.
10. For excellent reviews, see Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies, no. 44 (1996); Guy Peters, "The New Institutionalism and Administrative Reform: Examining Alternative Models," Instituto Juan March Working Papers, no. 113 (1998).
11. For excellent reviews, see Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies, no. 44 (1996); Guy Peters, "The New Institutionalism and Administrative Reform: Examining Alternative Models," Instituto Juan March Working Papers, no. 113 (1998).
12. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
13. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
14. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
15. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
16. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
17. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
18. Among the best known, mention should first be made of the models of interest intermediation that Philippe Schmitter has called respectively neocorporatist and pluralist and of the types of welfare systems classified by Richard Titmuss into institutional-redistributive, residual, and meritocratic-particularistic but then repeatedly redefined to give rise to the currently most widely accepted typology comprising the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and continental European models. See Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, the organization of production - which labor economists and sociologists often only study as a consequence of technological change and managerial strategies - is viewed in this perspective as a choice closely conditioned by the institutional context. See Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, Politique d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemande (Paris: PUF, 1982). This has given rise to the concept of "production regimes," which were simply distinguished between Fordist and post-Fordist in early studies, while the subsequent literature has developed more articulated typologies. See especially the work of David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies," in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds., Markets, Institutions and Corporations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1990) and "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Finally, the distinction between different "models of capitalism" - the Anglo-American and the Rhenish, to which the Japanese one is often added - covers to some extent all the aspects and institutional variables included in previous typologies. See Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), for an early and rather crude formulation. More sophisticated analyses can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
19. The empirical analysis deals with ten countries (see appendix). The data and information used have been taken from a variety of sources. First, I have drawn on the results of a comparative study on eight European countries coordinated by myself for the European Commission, DGXII. These results are presented in Gösta Esping-Andersen and Marino Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Comparative collections on recent trends in some of the areas considered, which have provided valuable information, are the volume edited by Fajertag and Pochet, Social Pacts in Europe, and especially the collection of country studies edited by Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998). Further useful sources of comparative data are a research study recently commissioned by the FIAT industrial relations office on flexibility practices in various countries, the journal European Industrial Relations Review, and, for the past three years, the EIRO (European Industrial Relations Observatory) database coordinated by the European Foundation in Dublin. Of course, I have also drawn from the literature on individual countries, particularly those emblematic of ongoing trends or that have seen the most striking changes (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Italy).
20. The empirical analysis deals with ten countries (see appendix). The data and information used have been taken from a variety of sources. First, I have drawn on the results of a comparative study on eight European countries coordinated by myself for the European Commission, DGXII. These results are presented in Gösta Esping-Andersen and Marino Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Comparative collections on recent trends in some of the areas considered, which have provided valuable information, are the volume edited by Fajertag and Pochet, Social Pacts in Europe, and especially the collection of country studies edited by Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998). Further useful sources of comparative data are a research study recently commissioned by the FIAT industrial relations office on flexibility practices in various countries, the journal European Industrial Relations Review, and, for the past three years, the EIRO (European Industrial Relations Observatory) database coordinated by the European Foundation in Dublin. Of course, I have also drawn from the literature on individual countries, particularly those emblematic of ongoing trends or that have seen the most striking changes (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Italy).
21. The empirical analysis deals with ten countries (see appendix). The data and information used have been taken from a variety of sources. First, I have drawn on the results of a comparative study on eight European countries coordinated by myself for the European Commission, DGXII. These results are presented in Gösta Esping-Andersen and Marino Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Comparative collections on recent trends in some of the areas considered, which have provided valuable information, are the volume edited by Fajertag and Pochet, Social Pacts in Europe, and especially the collection of country studies edited by Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998). Further useful sources of comparative data are a research study recently commissioned by the FIAT industrial relations office on flexibility practices in various countries, the journal European Industrial Relations Review, and, for the past three years, the EIRO (European Industrial Relations Observatory) database coordinated by the European Foundation in Dublin. Of course, I have also drawn from the literature on individual countries, particularly those emblematic of ongoing trends or that have seen the most striking changes (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Italy).
22. Some of these alternatives are relevant to areas other than the ones with which they are associated here: for instance, one can also discern tendencies toward rigidity or flexibility in the bargaining structure or toward centralization or decentralization in social security systems and so on. However, considering only the principal alternatives helps simplify what would otherwise be a too complex classificatory scheme.
23. As in the Netherlands, see Cees Gorter, "The Dutch miracle?" in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
24. As in Germany, see Kathleen Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Abandon the German Model," in T. Iversen, J. Pontusson, and D. Soskice, eds., Unions, Employers and Central Banks: Wage Bargaining and Macro-Economic Policy in an Integrating Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
25. These difficulties in the construction of qualitative indicators are well known (an emblematic case being the "index of labor market rigidity" constructed by the OECD in 1994 and then radically revised). In order to handle them at least in part, I have used a large amount of information and assessment provided by national experts (see note 10) in allocating a country to one or the other alternative. The countries in parentheses in the tables are cases in which the pros and cons make their placement most problematic (Sweden) or in which major efforts at change have been made but with little success (Germany). However, the aim of this article is to show that the directions of change in each of the three areas may differ and that few countries have opted unequivocally for deregulation or concertation. This seems generally confirmed by the tables, despite the uncertainty and subjectivity that inevitably arise when classifying a particular country.
26. See Gorter, "The Dutch Miracle?"; Anders Björklund, "Going Different Ways: Labor Market Policy in Denmark and Sweden," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; FIAT, "Flessibilità del lavoro: Confronto internazionale e spunti per la realtà italiana" (mimeo, 1998); Simon Deakin and Hannah Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation and Employment in Britain," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; George Taylor, "Labour Market Rigidities, Institutional Impediments and Managerial Constraints: Some Reflections on the Recent Experience of Macro-Political Bargaining in Ireland" (paper presented at SASE 8th International Conference, Geneva, July 1996).
27. See Gorter, "The Dutch Miracle?"; Anders Björklund, "Going Different Ways: Labor Market Policy in Denmark and Sweden," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; FIAT, "Flessibilità del lavoro: Confronto internazionale e spunti per la realtà italiana" (mimeo, 1998); Simon Deakin and Hannah Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation and Employment in Britain," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; George Taylor, "Labour Market Rigidities, Institutional Impediments and Managerial Constraints: Some Reflections on the Recent Experience of Macro-Political Bargaining in Ireland" (paper presented at SASE 8th International Conference, Geneva, July 1996).
28. See Gorter, "The Dutch Miracle?"; Anders Björklund, "Going Different Ways: Labor Market Policy in Denmark and Sweden," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; FIAT, "Flessibilità del lavoro: Confronto internazionale e spunti per la realtà italiana" (mimeo, 1998); Simon Deakin and Hannah Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation and Employment in Britain," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; George Taylor, "Labour Market Rigidities, Institutional Impediments and Managerial Constraints: Some Reflections on the Recent Experience of Macro-Political Bargaining in Ireland" (paper presented at SASE 8th International Conference, Geneva, July 1996).
29. See Gorter, "The Dutch Miracle?"; Anders Björklund, "Going Different Ways: Labor Market Policy in Denmark and Sweden," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; FIAT, "Flessibilità del lavoro: Confronto internazionale e spunti per la realtà italiana" (mimeo, 1998); Simon Deakin and Hannah Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation and Employment in Britain," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; George Taylor, "Labour Market Rigidities, Institutional Impediments and Managerial Constraints: Some Reflections on the Recent Experience of Macro-Political Bargaining in Ireland" (paper presented at SASE 8th International Conference, Geneva, July 1996).
30. See Gorter, "The Dutch Miracle?"; Anders Björklund, "Going Different Ways: Labor Market Policy in Denmark and Sweden," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; FIAT, "Flessibilità del lavoro: Confronto internazionale e spunti per la realtà italiana" (mimeo, 1998); Simon Deakin and Hannah Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation and Employment in Britain," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; George Taylor, "Labour Market Rigidities, Institutional Impediments and Managerial Constraints: Some Reflections on the Recent Experience of Macro-Political Bargaining in Ireland" (paper presented at SASE 8th International Conference, Geneva, July 1996).
31. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
32. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
33. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
34. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
35. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
36. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
37. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
38. See Paula Adam and Patrizia Canziani, "Partial De-regulation: Fixed-Term Contracts in Italy and Spain," Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers No. 386 (1998)-Giuseppe Bertola and Andrea Ichino, "Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective of Italian Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy, no. 21 (1995); Jerôme Gautié Miguel Malo, and Luis Toharia, "France: The Deregulation That Never Existed," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Luis Toharia and Miguel Malo "The Spanish Experiment: Pros and Cons of the Flexibility at the Margin," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgier Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Ferner and Hyman eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; FIAT, Flessibilità del lavoro; Susanne Fuchs and Ronald Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?; Manuela Samek, "Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
39. See Marino Regini, "The Dilemmas of Labor Market Regulation," in Esping-Andersen and Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets?
40. See Harry Katz, "The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, no. 47 (1993).
41. On developments in these countries, see the respective chapters in Ferner and Hyman eds Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. For a critique of the prevailing view of general decentralization, however, see Peter Lange, Michael Wallerstein, and Miriam Golden, "The End of Corporatism?" in S. Jacoby, ed., The Workers of Nations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
42. On developments in these countries, see the respective chapters in Ferner and Hyman eds Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. For a critique of the prevailing view of general decentralization, however, see Peter Lange, Michael Wallerstein, and Miriam Golden, "The End of Corporatism?" in S. Jacoby, ed., The Workers of Nations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
43. See Pochet, "Les pactes sociaux en Europe."
44. Marino Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism? Recent Italian Experience in Comparative Perspective," European Journal of Industrial Relations 3, no. 3 (1997); Mimmo Carrieri Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? Il futuro della concertazione in Italia (Roma: Ediesse, 1997); Serafino Negrelli, "Social Pacts and Flexibility: Towards a New Balance between Macro and Micro Industrial Relations: The Italian Experience," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
45. Marino Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism? Recent Italian Experience in Comparative Perspective," European Journal of Industrial Relations 3, no. 3 (1997); Mimmo Carrieri Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? Il futuro della concertazione in Italia (Roma: Ediesse, 1997); Serafino Negrelli, "Social Pacts and Flexibility: Towards a New Balance between Macro and Micro Industrial Relations: The Italian Experience," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
46. Marino Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism? Recent Italian Experience in Comparative Perspective," European Journal of Industrial Relations 3, no. 3 (1997); Mimmo Carrieri Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? Il futuro della concertazione in Italia (Roma: Ediesse, 1997); Serafino Negrelli, "Social Pacts and Flexibility: Towards a New Balance between Macro and Micro Industrial Relations: The Italian Experience," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
47. Torben Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bar" gaining: The Cases of Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics, no. 4 (1996).
48. Franz Traxler "Farewell to Labour Market Associations? Organized versus Disorganized Decentralization as a Map for Industrial Relations," in C. Crouch and F. Traxler, eds., Organized Industrial Relations in Europe: What Future? (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1995).
49. Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes."
50. On Ireland, see Rory O'Donnell and Colm O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Ferdinand Von Prondzynski, "Ireland: Corporatism Revived," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. On Norway, see Jon Erik Dølvik and Andrew Martin "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters: The Divergent Fates of Social Pacts in Sweden and Norway," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Dølvik and Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation."
51. On Ireland, see Rory O'Donnell and Colm O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Ferdinand Von Prondzynski, "Ireland: Corporatism Revived," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. On Norway, see Jon Erik Dølvik and Andrew Martin "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters: The Divergent Fates of Social Pacts in Sweden and Norway," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Dølvik and Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation."
52. On Ireland, see Rory O'Donnell and Colm O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Ferdinand Von Prondzynski, "Ireland: Corporatism Revived," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. On Norway, see Jon Erik Dølvik and Andrew Martin "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters: The Divergent Fates of Social Pacts in Sweden and Norway," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Dølvik and Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation."
53. On Ireland, see Rory O'Donnell and Colm O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Ferdinand Von Prondzynski, "Ireland: Corporatism Revived," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. On Norway, see Jon Erik Dølvik and Andrew Martin "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters: The Divergent Fates of Social Pacts in Sweden and Norway," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Dølvik and Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation."
54. On Italy, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism?"; Carrieri, Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? On the Dutch case, see Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, "A Dutch Miracle": Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997); and Jelle Visser, "The Netherlands: The Return of Responsive Corporatism," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
55. On Italy, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism?"; Carrieri, Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? On the Dutch case, see Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, "A Dutch Miracle": Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997); and Jelle Visser, "The Netherlands: The Return of Responsive Corporatism," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
56. On Italy, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism?"; Carrieri, Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? On the Dutch case, see Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, "A Dutch Miracle": Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997); and Jelle Visser, "The Netherlands: The Return of Responsive Corporatism," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
57. On Italy, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism?"; Carrieri, Seconda Repubblica: Senza sindacati? On the Dutch case, see Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, "A Dutch Miracle": Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997); and Jelle Visser, "The Netherlands: The Return of Responsive Corporatism," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
58. On Britain, see Deakin and Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath?"; on France, see Jeanine Goetschy, "France: The Limits of Reform," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; on Spain, see Miguel Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
59. On Britain, see Deakin and Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath?"; on France, see Jeanine Goetschy, "France: The Limits of Reform," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; on Spain, see Miguel Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
60. On Britain, see Deakin and Reed, "River Crossing or Cold Bath?"; on France, see Jeanine Goetschy, "France: The Limits of Reform," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; on Spain, see Miguel Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
61. See Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining"; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996); Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters"; Anders Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?" in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Steen Scheuer, "Denmark: A Less Regulated Model," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Jens Lind, "EMU and Collective Bargaining in Denmark," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
62. See Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining"; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996); Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters"; Anders Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?" in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Steen Scheuer, "Denmark: A Less Regulated Model," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Jens Lind, "EMU and Collective Bargaining in Denmark," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
63. See Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining"; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996); Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters"; Anders Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?" in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Steen Scheuer, "Denmark: A Less Regulated Model," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Jens Lind, "EMU and Collective Bargaining in Denmark," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
64. See Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining"; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996); Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters"; Anders Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?" in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Steen Scheuer, "Denmark: A Less Regulated Model," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Jens Lind, "EMU and Collective Bargaining in Denmark," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
65. See Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining"; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996); Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters"; Anders Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?" in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Steen Scheuer, "Denmark: A Less Regulated Model," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Jens Lind, "EMU and Collective Bargaining in Denmark," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
66. See Iversen, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining"; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996); Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters"; Anders Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?" in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Steen Scheuer, "Denmark: A Less Regulated Model," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe; Jens Lind, "EMU and Collective Bargaining in Denmark," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
67. See Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Abandon the German Model"; Reinhard Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Otto Jacobi, Berndt Keller, and Walther Müller-Jentsch, "Germany: Facing New Challenges," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
68. See Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Abandon the German Model"; Reinhard Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Otto Jacobi, Berndt Keller, and Walther Müller-Jentsch, "Germany: Facing New Challenges," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
69. See Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Abandon the German Model"; Reinhard Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe; Otto Jacobi, Berndt Keller, and Walther Müller-Jentsch, "Germany: Facing New Challenges," in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
70. See Björklund, "Going Different Ways."
71. See the various country studies in Ferner and Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.
72. On the Italian solution, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism? " On the pension reform in France, see Laurent Duclos and Olivier Mériaux, "Private Interest Governments under State Constraint: The Case of French 'paritarism'" (paper presented at SASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); on the protest movement against such reform, see Francois Piotet, "Les événements de décembre 1995, chroniques d'un conflit," Sociologie du Travail, no. 4 (1997).
73. On the Italian solution, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism? " On the pension reform in France, see Laurent Duclos and Olivier Mériaux, "Private Interest Governments under State Constraint: The Case of French 'paritarism'" (paper presented at SASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); on the protest movement against such reform, see Francois Piotet, "Les événements de décembre 1995, chroniques d'un conflit," Sociologie du Travail, no. 4 (1997).
74. On the Italian solution, see Regini, "Still Engaging in Corporatism? " On the pension reform in France, see Laurent Duclos and Olivier Mériaux, "Private Interest Governments under State Constraint: The Case of French 'paritarism'" (paper presented at SASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); on the protest movement against such reform, see Francois Piotet, "Les événements de décembre 1995, chroniques d'un conflit," Sociologie du Travail, no. 4 (1997).
75. See Fuchs and Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility"; Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs"; Anton Hemerijck, "Renegotiating the Dutch Welfare State" (paper presented at S ASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); Jan Peter van den Toren, "A 'Tripartite Consensus Economy' : The Dutch Variant of a Social Pact," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
76. See Fuchs and Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility"; Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs"; Anton Hemerijck, "Renegotiating the Dutch Welfare State" (paper presented at S ASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); Jan Peter van den Toren, "A 'Tripartite Consensus Economy' : The Dutch Variant
77. See Fuchs and Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility"; Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs"; Anton Hemerijck, "Renegotiating the Dutch Welfare State" (paper presented at S ASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); Jan Peter van den Toren, "A 'Tripartite Consensus Economy' : The Dutch Variant of a Social Pact," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
78. See Fuchs and Schettkat, "Germany: A Regulated Flexibility"; Bispinck, "Germany: The Chequered History of the Alliance for Jobs"; Anton Hemerijck, "Renegotiating the Dutch Welfare State" (paper presented at S ASE 10th International Conference, Vienna, 13-16 July 1998); Jan Peter van den Toren, "A 'Tripartite Consensus Economy' : The Dutch Variant of a Social Pact," in Fajertag and Pochet, eds., Social Pacts in Europe.
79. See Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation"; O'Donnell and O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96"; Björklund, "Going Different Ways"; Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters."
80. See Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation"; O'Donnell and O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96"; Björklund, "Going Different Ways"; Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters."
81. See Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation"; O'Donnell and O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96"; Björklund, "Going Different Ways"; Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters."
82. See Martinez Lucio, "Spain: Regulating Employment and Social Fragmentation"; O'Donnell and O'Reardon, "Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership, 1987-96"; Björklund, "Going Different Ways"; Dølvik and Martin, "A Spanner in the Works and Oil on Troubled Waters."
83. See Pochet, "Les pactes sociaux en Europe dans les années 1990.
84. Michele Salvati, "The Crisis of Government in Italy," New Left Review, no. 2/3 (1995).
85. Pontusson and Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions."
86. Marino Regini, "Social Institutions and Production Structure: The Italian Variety of Capitalism in the 1980s," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism.
87. Of course, there are other variables of a more organizational character that can explain Confindustria's position, which differs from that of other employers' associations such as Confcommercio. The fragmentation of employer representation and its consequent loss of influence, in particular, may have induced Confindustria to step up its presence at the "concertation table" to regain legitimation among employers. However, its strongly positive stance has not changed even on the occasion of the social pact signed in December 1998, when it lost its oligopolistic position as a result of the new government's decision to involve the maximum possible number of actors in the negotiations.
88. Martin Rhodes, "Globalisation, Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of Competitive Corporatism?" in M. Rhodes and Y. Meny, eds., The Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract? (London: Macmillan, 1997).
89. See Thelen, "Why German Employers"; Jacobi, Keller, and Müller-Jentsch, "Germany: Facing New Challenges."
90. See Thelen, "Why German Employers"; Jacobi, Keller, and Müller-Jentsch, "Germany: Facing New Challenges."
91. Kjellberg, "Sweden: Restoring the Model?"
92. Fritz Scharpf, ed., Games in Hierarchies and Networks (Frankfurt: Campus, 1993).
93. See Pontusson and Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions"; Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves."
94. See Pontusson and Swenson, "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions"; Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves."