Risk-sensitive decision making examined within an evolutionary framework

American Behavioral Scientist

Volumn , Issue 6, 2000, Pages 926-939

  Rode, Catrin ^a   Wang, X T ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85046527097     PISSN: 00027642     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/00027640021955676     Document Type: Article

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