The united states and the east asia summit: Finding the proper home

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 293-312

  Cook, Malcolm ^a  

^a Lowy Institute for International Policy   (Australia)

Author keywords

ASEAN; Asia Pacific; East Asia; East Asia Summit; India; Regionalism; United States

Indexed keywords

EID: 85044795190     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/cs30-2f     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. A. Acharya and S.S Tan, “Betwixt Balance and Community: America, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6, no. 1 (2006): 37–60.
2. For a copy of the speech see .
3. G. Earl, “Easing Tensions Brings Benefits to All”, Australian Financial Review, 23 June 2008.
4. See A. Gyngell, Design Faults: The Asia Pacific’s Regional Architecture (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2007); and H. Tanaka, Japan and Asia in Transition (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2007).
5. The clearest and most powerful expression of the Asia Pacific as a true region beyond a simple instrumental grouping of countries can be found in Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda’s recent speech on the future of Asia where he argues that the Pacific Ocean is an “inland sea”. H.E. Y. Fukuda, “When the Pacific Ocean becomes an ‘Inland Sea’: Five Pledges to a Future Asia that Acts Together”, presented at the 14th International Conference on the Future of Asia, Tokyo, 22 May 2008. For academic work on the importance of the United States to the idea of the Asia Pacific, see A. Gyngell and M. Cook, How to Save APEC (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, October 2005) and the discussion in 2000 between Ellis Kraus and Stuart Harris in Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 473–523.
6. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit, 12 December 2005.
7. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, 14 December 2005.
8. See D.B. Dewitt, Perspectives on Asian Peace and Security in the 21st Century, CANCAPS Papier no. 28, Toronto, York University, March 2002; A. Gyngell, Design Faults, op. cit.; the recent Asia Pacific Community speech by Prime Minister Rudd; and A. Acharya and E. Goh, eds., Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (London: MIT Press, 2007).
9. B. Dewitt, Perspectives on Asian Peace and Security, op. cit.
10. See D. Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 305–21, for a good discussion of how the American security presence in Asia comforts Southeast Asian states in their growing relations with China.
11. E. Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Strategies”, International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/08): 113–57.
12. For more information on the final point, see D.C Blair and J.T. Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements”, Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2001): 7–17; and E. Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States’ East Asian Strategy”, Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 47–69.
13. Y. Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington: IIE, 1995).
14. J. Ravenhill, “Mission Creep or Mission Impossible?”, in A. Acharya and E. Goh, eds., Reassessing Security, op. cit., pp. 135–54.
15. Russia’s entry into APEC was closely tied to the end of the Cold War in Europe as it was an American initiative in part to assuage Russia’s concerns about NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe.
16. J. Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 112–14.
17. Chu Shulong calls the APT process the only truly East Asian regional body. See S.L. Chu, “The ASEAN Plus Three Process and East Asian Security Cooperation”, in A. Acharya and E. Goh, eds., Reassessing Security Cooperation, op. cit., pp. 155–76.
18. This can clearly be seen by Japan’s push in the 1960s for a Pacific Asia Free Trade Agreement that acted as the precursor to PECC and APEC and the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand as “Asian members” of the Asian Development Bank. Japan is the largest funder of the ADB (and APEC) and the bank has always been headed by a Japanese national.
19. A. Milner, “Asia-Pacific Perceptions of the Financial Crisis: Lessons and Affirmations”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 284–305.
20. T.J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy towards East Asia”, International Security 31 no. 1 (2006): 81–125.
21. S. Harris, “Asian Multilateral Institutions and Their Response to the Asian Economic Crisis: The Regional and Global Implications”, Pacific Review 13, no. 2 (2000): 495–516.
22. Sheldon Simon, “Whither Security Regionalism? ASEAN and ARF in the Face of New Security Challenges,” in A. Acharya and E. Goh, eds., Reassessing Security Cooperation, op. cit., pp. 113–34.
23. E. Krauss, “Japan, the US, and the emergence of multilateralism in Asia”, Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 473–94.
24. S. Harris, “Asian Multilateral Institutions”, op. cit.
25. Y. Soeya, “Functional Cooperation in East Asia”, Look Japan, 1 August 2002.
26. The EU cannot sign the treaty as it is only open to states.
27. T. Chistensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?”, op. cit.
28. Cdr. G.S. Khurana, “Safeguarding the Malacca Straits”, Sahara Times, New Delhi, 1 January 2005.
29. S. Harris, “Asian Multilateral Institutions”, op. cit.
30. “Body for East Asian Version of the OECD launched in Jakarta”, Jiji Press, 3 June 2008.
31. L. Srivastava and R. Mathur, “Global Energy Security”, Dialogue of Globalization Briefing Paper (New Dehli: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2007).
32. A. Gyngell and M. Cook, How to Save APEC, op. cit.
33. J. Ravenhill, “Mission Creep”, op. cit.
34. T. Koh, “ASEAN at Forty: Perception and Reality”, Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2008–2009 (Singapore, ISEAS, 2008), pp. 7–11.
35. R. Cossa, “Rice’s Unfortunate Choice”, Asia Times Online, 28 July 2005.
36. Many “Asia hands” in the United States are encouraging the next administration to accede to the TAC. For one example see, E.L Frost, et al., China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy, Strategic Forum no. 231, Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, April 2008.
37. Australia and New Zealand fall under the North American and Oceanian Affairs while the People’s Bank of China’s regional office for the South Pacific is in Sydney.
38. EAS members have signed the TAC with reservations recorded including South Korea and Australia. M. Bliss, “Amity, Cooperation and Understanding(s): Negotiating Australia’s Entry into the East Asia Summit”, The Australian Year Book of International Law 26 (2006): 63–86.
39. R. Pereira, “The Fifth ASEM Summit: A Critical Assessment”, Santiago do Cacem, Portugal: CIARI, 17 November 2004 .
40. T. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?”, op. cit.
41. B. Desker, “ASEAN: Time to Suspend Myanmar”, RSIS Commentaries, Singapore, 4 October 2007. Sheldon Simon notes that Prime Minister Mahathir himself said in 2003 that Myanmar could be expelled. See Simon, “Whither Security Regionalism?”, op. cit.
42. A. Gyngell, Design Faults, op. cit.