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Volumn 52, Issue , 2015, Pages 4-14

The political economy of adjustment and rebalancing

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EID: 85027919388     PISSN: 02615606     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.11.010     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (33)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.