The effect of the mandatory adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings manipulation, management effectiveness and firm financing: Evidence from Greece

Managerial Finance

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 257-277

  Chalevas, Constantinos ^a   Tzovas, Christos ^a  

^a ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

Corporate finances; Corporate governance; Earnings management; Financial reporting; Greece; Management effectiveness

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015609029     PISSN: 03074358     EISSN: 17587743     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03074351011019573     Document Type: Article

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