The political economy of inflation targets: New Zealand and the UK

Canadian Policy Debates and Case Studies in Honour of David Laidler

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 171-208

  Goodhart, C A E ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

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EID: 85015255571     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230274303     Document Type: Chapter

References (47)

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