Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 531-561

  Stahn, Carsten ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

Author keywords

Kosovo; Security Council; United Nations Administration; UNMIK

Indexed keywords

EID: 85014628313     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156501000279     Document Type: Article

References (141)

1. See, generally, on the issue of UNMIK J.A. Frowein, Notstandsverwaltung von Gebieten durch die Vereinten Nationen, in H.-W. Arndt, F.-L. Knemeyer, D. Kugelmann, W. Meng & M. Schweitzer, Völkerrecht und Deutsches Recht, Festschrift für W. Rudolf 43 (2001); C. Tomuschat, Yugoslavia's Damaged Sovereignty over the Province of Kosovo, in Liber Amicorum Kooijmans (forthcoming), copy on file with the author; J. Ringelheim, The Legal Status of Kosovo, in Kosovo, 1999-2000, The Intractable Peace, Working Group, European University Institute, available under http://www.iue.; C. Stahn, International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges Ahead, 61 ZaöRV 105 (2001); M. Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the International Community, 50 ICLQ 555-573 (2001); M. Bothe & T. Marauhn, UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council Mandated Trusteeship Administration, in Kosovo and the International Community (forthcoming), copy on file with the author; H. Stromeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and in East Timor, 95 AJIL 46 (2001); M.J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, id., at 76; E. Lagrange, La mission intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo, nouvel essai d'administration directe d'un territoire, 45 AFDI 335 (1999); T. García, La mission d'administration intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo, 104 RGDP 61 (2000).
2. See Reg. 1999/1 (25 July 1999), Sec. 1(1). For a critical account of the scope of powers and the practice of the United Nations, see Stahn, Notstandsverwaltung von Gebieten durch die Vereinten Nationen note 1, at 150 et seq.
3. See UNMIK Reg. 2001/9, available under http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo.
4. For a discussion of Kosovo's legal status under the different SFRY constitutions, see J. Marko, Die staatsrechtliche Entwicklung des Kosovo/a von 1913-1995, in J. Marko (Ed.), Gordischer Knoten Kosovo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren? 15 (1999); E. Pichl, Kosovo in den jugoslawischen Verfassungssytemen: 1974 bis 1998, in Marko, id., at 75.
5. See the 1974 Constitution, Art. 271.
6. Cf. id., Arts. 291, 292, 369, 370, and 375-381.
7. Cf. on the removal of Kosovo's autonomy rights under the Milo Bević era, N. Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo 343 (1998).
8. The “Memorandum SANU” proclaimed that the Serbs were the victims of ‘neo-fascist aggression in Kosovo.’ See A.J. Bellamy, Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99, The International Journal of Human Rights, Special Issue: The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions 105, at 111 (2000); see also Marko, Cf. on the removal of Kosovo's autonomy rights under the Milo Bević era note 4, at 19-20.
9. See also J. Marko, Die rechtliche Stellung der Minderheiten in Serbien, in J.A. Frowein, R. Hofmann & S. Oeter (Eds.), Das Minderheitenrecht europäischer Staaten, Vol. 2, 307, at 318 (1994).
10. Pichl notes that a Kosovo statute was never adopted. See Pichl, Die rechtliche Stellung der Minderheiten in Serbien note 4, at 83.
11. See the 1990 Constitution of Serbia, Art. 109.
12. See International Crisis Group, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolving the Kosovo Crisis, Report of 9 November 1998, available under http://www.icg.org, under ‘Historical background.’
13. See Marko, See International Crisis Group note 4, at 21.
14. Bellamy notes “On 23 March, the Kosovo Assembly, born in the Constitution of 1974, voted itself out of existence by accepting the new constitution proclaimed in Serbia.” See Bellamy, Id. note 8, at 113.
15. See Malcolm, Bellamy notes “On 23 March note 7, at 343-345.
16. Cf. on the “serbianisation” of Kosovo in the 1990s, Bellamy, Bellamy notes “On 23 March note 7 note 8, at 114 et seq.
17. This declaration by 114 Albanian representatives of the Kosovo Assembly was a reaction to the adoption of the “Law on the Measures of Republican Bodies under Special Circumstances” (Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, No. 30/90) by the Serbian parliament.
18. See Decision of the Enforcement of Special Measures in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 33/90.
19. The measures taken by the Serbian parliament violated the still valid 1974 Federal Constitution. See Marko, Decision of the Enforcement of Special Measures in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo note 10, at 264.
20. Marko speaks of “a 87 per cent participation rate” and an approval by 99 per cent of the voters. See Marko, The measures taken by the Serbian parliament violated the still valid 1974 Federal Constitution note 10, at 265.
21. S. Oeter speaks of a “shadow government,” see S. Oeter, Yugoslavia, Dissolution, in R. Bernhardt (Ed.), 4 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1591 (2000). See on the parallel structure also R. Caplan, International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo, 74(2) International Affairs 451 (1998).
22. But see the recognition of Albania, Keesing's Record of World Events 38513 (1991).
23. See UN General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/RES/51/111 (12 December 1996), para. 2(c).
24. See UN Security Council Resolution, UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998), paras. 4 and 5.
25. UN Doc. S/1999/648 (1999) (7 June 1999). Cf. on the agreement M. Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 International Affairs 211 (1999).
26. See Rambouillet Agreement, Chapter 1, Art. II(5).
27. Cf. id., at Chapter 1, Arts. II(6)-(8) and VII.
28. However, in the latter case, the decisions would have been subject to an appeal to the federal courts. See id., at Chapter 1, Art. V(2).
29. See id., at Chapter 1, Art. 6 lit. c, and the 1992 Constitution of the FRY, Art. 7.
30. See on the negotiation of this clause at the Rambouillet Conference, M. Weller, Enforced Negotiations: The Threat and Use of Force to Obtain an International Settlement for Kosovo, 5 International Peacekeeping 4, at 20 (1999).
31. Cf. Rambouillet Agreement, Chapter 5, Art. IV(4).
32. See on this issue N. Maziau, Cinq ans après, Le traité de Dayton-Paris à la croisée des chemins: Succès incertains et constats d'échec, 45 AFDI 181, at 196 et seq. (1999); L. Pech, La garantie internationale de la Constitution de Bosnie-Herzégovine, 42 Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel 421, at 431 et seq. (2000); Stahn, Cf. Rambouillet Agreement note 1, at 110-111. On the particularities of the Bosnian constitutional system, see also C. Stahn, Die verfassungsrechtliche Pflicht zur Gleichstellung der drei ethnischen Volksgruppen in den bosnischen Teilrepubliken-Neue Hoffnung für das Friedensmodell von Dayton?, 60 ZaöRV 663 (2000).
33. The idea of a ‘modern protectorate’ is sometimes brought up with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. See T.D. Grant, Toward a New Protectorate? Bosnia and Cyprus as Predicates for a New Nontraditional Actor in the Society of States, 8 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 1 (1998); and T.D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 10, at 50 et seq. (1999).
34. See, generally, on this form of international territorial administration, M. Ydit, Internationalised Territories (1961); H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination 17 (1996).
35. See Rambouillet Agreement, Chapter 2, Art. VI and Chapter 7, Art. IX.
36. See also Tomuschat, Rambouillet Agreement note 1, sub. 3.
37. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/1999/779 (12 July 1999), para. 35.
38. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/1999/1159 (23 December 1999), para. 35.
39. See also Bothe & Marauhn, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo note 1, sub. I. UNMIK is not entitled to dispose of the territory, which is arguably the ultimate attribute of sovereignty. It is therefore difficult to assume that “sovereignty over Kosovo” is temporarily vested with the UN. For a different view, see Ringelheim, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo note 1.
40. See also Ruffert, also Bothe & Marauhn note 1, sub. III(2.c).
41. For a different view, see H. Quane, A Right to Self-Determination for Kosovo Albanians?, 13 LJIL 219, at 227 (2000).
42. See on the internal right of self-determination, K. Doehring, Self-determination, in B. Simma (Ed.), Charter of the United Nations 64 (1994); P. Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in C. Tomuschat (Ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination 101 (1993); O. Kimminich, A ‘Federal’ Right of Self-Determination?, in Tomuschat, id., at 83. For a survey of the constitutional options for the realization of internal self-determination, see M. Suksi, Constitutional Options for Self-Determination: What Works?, Paper prepared for the UNA-USA/IAI Conference on ‘Kosovo's final status’, Rome, 12-14 December 1999, available under http://www.unausa. org/issues/kosovo.
43. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2001/565 (7 June 2001), para. 20 et seq.
44. The Secretary-General notes that the most important gaps were to be overcome with respect to the title of the document, the request for a directly elected President, a Constitutional Court, a referendum, and a “sunset clause” spelling out the time period of provisional selfgovernment. See id., at para. 22.
45. The Democratic League of Kosovo and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo demanded the holding of a referendum on the status of Kosovo. Furthermore, they wanted the document to be called an “Interim Constitution.” See id., at para. 3.
46. See Constitutional Framework, Chapters 5 and 9.
47. See Report of the Secretary-General, Constitutional Framework note 49, at para. 5, mentioning “the branding” of the Constitutional Framework as “unacceptable by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”
48. See id., at para. 20.
49. For a comparative analysis of the notion of the constitution, see B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, at 532 et seq. (1998).
50. See for a parallel discussion within the context of the enactment of the Basic Law and the statehood of Germany under the Occupation Statute, C.J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution, XLIII The American Political Science Review 461, at 471 et seq. (June 1949). It was contended that without a treaty-like arrangement with the Allied Powers, the German people were not possessed of sufficient sovereignty to establish a constitution. For a denial of the continued existence of the German State, see, in particular, H. Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39 AJIL 518 (1945).
51. Text in League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 7 (July 1922).
52. See Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947, Ann. VII.
53. Statute for the City of Jerusalem (Draft Prepared by the Trusteeship Council), UN TCOR, 2nd Sess., Third Part, Annex, at 4, UN Doc. T/118 Rev. 2 (21 April 1948).
54. See, in particular, in the European context, I. Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 CMLR 703, at 709 (1999); M. Morlok, Grundfragen einer Verfassung auf europäischer Ebene, in P. Häberle (Ed.), Staat und Verfassung in Europa 73, at 74-75 (2000); G. Hirsch, EG: Kein Staat, aber eine Verfassung?, 1 NJW 46 (2000); W. Hertel, Supranationalität als Verfassungsprinzip 28 et seq. (1999). For a different view, see D. Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution, in P. Gowan & P. Anderson (Eds.), The Question of Europe 239, at 245-246 (1997); and A. Randelzhofer, Souveränität und Rechtsstaat: Anforderungen an eine Europäische Verfassung, in H. Noske (Ed.), Der Rechtsstaat am Ende? 123, at 124 et seq. (1995).
55. This is the approach taken by Verdross and Simma with respect to the Charter of the United Nations. See A. Verdross & B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht vii-viii (1984). See also J.A. Frowein, Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts, in K. Dicke (Ed.), Völkerrecht und Internationales Privatrecht in einem sich globalisierenden internationalen System-Auswirkungen der Entstaatlichung transnationaler Rechtsbeziehungen 427 (2000). For a survey of the different approaches, see Hertel, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited? note 60, at 61 et seq.
56. Generally, constitutions serve to legitimize, to organize, and to limit the exercise of public authority. See on the functions of a constitution, inter alia, C. Walter, Die Folgen der Konstitutionalisierung für die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion, 115 DVBl. 1, at 5 (2000). For a discussion of the features of an “ideal type” of a constitution, see Fassbender This is the approach taken by Verdross and Simma with respect to the Charter of the United Nations. note 55, at 569 et seq.; B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right to Veto-A Constitutional Perspective 95-95 (1998).
57. See Fassbender, Generally, constitutions serve to legitimize, to organize, and to limit the exercise of public authority. note 55, at 568 et seq.; P.-M. Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 (1997).
58. See Pernice, Fassbender note 60, at 707; I. Pernice, On Article 23, in H. Dreier (Ed.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 2, 344 (1998), Art. 23.
59. Cf. J.A. Frowein, Die Herausbildung europäischer Verfassungsprinzipien, in A. Kaufmann (Ed.), Festschrift für A. Maihofer 149, at 152 (1988); F. Hoffmeister, Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention als Grundrechtsverfassung der Bürger, Der Staat (forthcoming). See on this issue also C. Walter, Die EMRK als Konstitutionalisierungsprozess, 59 ZaöRV 961 (1999).
60. See the criteria of the ‘ideal type’ of a constitution, established by Fassbender, Die Herausbildung europäischer Verfassungsprinzipien note 55, at 569-570, and Die Herausbildung europäischer Verfassungsprinzipien note 62, at 94-95.
61. See also the principles outlined by Grimm, the criteria of the ‘ideal type’ of a constitution note 60, at 244 et seq.
62. Cf. on the different positions, Joint Working Group on the Legal Framework, Press Briefing of 13 April 2001, available under http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/press.
63. See Reg. 1999/24 (12 December 1999) on the Law Applicable in Kosovo, Sec. 1.
64. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 2(a): “The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and their officials shall exercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the terms set forth in this Constitutional Framework” (emphasis added).
65. See Reg. 1991/1 (25 July 1999).
66. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 6.
67. See id., at Chapter 8.1(m) and (o).
68. See id., at Chapter 6.1(l) and (w).
69. See id., at Chapter 6.1(g) and Chapter 9.4.8.
70. See also id., Chapter 12.
71. See, explicitly, id., at Chapter 2.
72. The Ombudsperson may adopt decisions in the form of recommendations, see Reg. 2000/38 (30 June 2000), Sec. 4.
73. See id., Secs. 6.2 and 8.
74. See Constitutional Framework, Preamble, para. 2. UNMIK therefore refused to call the Legal Framework a constitution.
75. See id., at Chapter 1.2.
76. The example of the Basic Law should be kept in mind which, at the time of its adoption, was deliberately conceived as a provisional constitution. For further details, see Friedrich, id. note 56, at 477.
77. See Treaty of Versailles (1919), Art. 16. Cf. on the administration of the Saar Territory, F. Münch, Saar Territory, 4 EPIL 271 (2000); S.R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping 91 et seq. (1995).
78. See Treaty of Versailles, Art. 103. See on the role of the League of Nations with respect to Danzig, Ydit, Treaty of Versailles note 37, at 194 et seq.
79. See on the role of the United Nations in this case, R. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, Vol. 2, 91 et seq. (1970). Higgins notes (p. 95) that the United Nations would administer West Irian “as a sort of trusteeship (though the term ‘trusteeship’ was not explicitly used), until the people of the territory could be prepared for a plebiscite.”
80. See General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, GAOR, 5th Special Session, Suppl. No. 1, UN Doc. A/6657. The Council was not only charged with administrative functions, but also vested with the authority to “promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established.” See, generally, on the United Nations Council for Namibia, A. Junius, Der United Nations Council for Namibia (1989); L. Herman, The Legal Status of Namibia and of the United Nations Council for Namibia, XIII Canadian Yearbook of International Law 306 (1975); H.G. Schermers, The Namibia Decree in National Courts, 26 ICLQ 81 (1977); E. Klein, Namibia, 3 EPIL 488 (2000).
81. For an analysis, see S.R. Ratner, The Cambodia Peace Settlement Agreements, 87 AJIL 1 (1993).
82. See Security Council Res. 1037, UN Doc. S/RES/1037 (15 January 1996). See also the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1025 (1995), UN Doc. S/1995/1028 (13 December 1995), para. 5.
83. The Draft Constitution of Danzig was, e.g., submitted to the Council of the League for final approval. See Ydit, Security Council Res. 1037 note 37, at 190. Moreover, the Paris Accords were endorsed by the Security Council in its Res. 718 (31 October 1991), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1991, Official Records: 46th year, UN Doc. S/INF/47, at 40 et seq.
84. See Ydit, id., at 69.
85. In Resolution 385 (30 January 1976) the Security Council declared that “it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity.” See Res. 385 (1976), para. 7, 30 Yearbook of the United Nations 782 (1976). In order to achieve this aim, the five western members of the Security Council at that time (Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States) established a catalogue of ‘Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia’, UN Doc. S/15287 (12 July 1982). See on the framing of the Constitution of Namibia, E. Schmidt-Jortzig, The Constitution of Namibia: An Example of a State Emerging under Close Supervision and World Scrutiny, 34 GYIL 413 (1991); Klein, id. note 88, at 491; R. Dreyer, The United Nations and Namibia: An Overview, V International Geneva Yearbook 26 (1991).
86. See Reg. 2001/2 on the Election of a Constituent Assembly to prepare a Constitution for an Independent and Democratic East Timor. The Constitution is elaborated by a Constituent Assembly, which shall “also consider such draft regulations as may be referred to it by the Transitional Administrator.” In this case, an affirmative vote of a simple majority of the Constituent Assembly shall constitute the endorsement of such draft legislation. See UNTAET Reg. 2001/2 (16 March 2001), Sec. 2.5.
87. See on the legal debate over the powers of Security Council to adopt the Statute, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946-1951, at 482.
88. For a full account, see Ydit, on the legal debate over the powers of Security Council to adopt the Statute note 37, at 244 et seq.
89. Id., at 295. For a closer analysis of the Statute, see Ratner, For a full account note 85, at 98-99; Ydit, For a full account note 37, at 285 et seq.
90. The Trusteeship Council had prepared a revised “Draft Statute” (see Report of the Trusteeship Council, in GAOR, 5th Sess. (1950), Supp. 9, UN Doc. A/1286). But it failed to be passed by the General Assembly at its 5th Assembly (1950).
91. Letter of Approval of the Basic Law of 12 May 1949, reprinted in E.H. Litchfield, Governing Postwar Germany 577 (1953), App. J.
92. Occupation Statute of 8/11 April 1949 defining the powers to be retained by the occupation authorities, reprinted in Litchfield, id., App. L, at 616.
93. See Letter of Approval of the Basic Law, para. 2.
94. See Occupation Statute, para. 1.
95. Id., at para. 2.
96. Id., at para. 5.
97. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 14.3.
98. See Occupation Statute, para. 3.
99. See Constitutional Framework, Preamble, para. 9, and Chapter 12.
100. See Coblenz Resolutions of the Ministers-President of 10 July 1948, reprinted in Litchfield, Constitutional Framework note 99, App. D, at 545. According to the Resolution, it should be clear “that what is in question is a provisional establishment only, and also an institution which owes its origin exclusively to the temporary state of the conditions related to the present occupation of Germany.” See also Friedrich, Constitutional Framework note 56, at 470.
101. See Ministers-President Conference Comments on Document I, in Litchfield, id., App. D, at 548.
102. Friedrich refers to the fact that in the United States, for example, the word ‘constitution’ has a broader generic sense, encompassing “any organizational charter, even of non-sovereign bodies, e.g., a university.” See Friedrich, Ministers-President Conference Comments on Document I note 56, at 477.
103. See UN Security Council Resolution 1244, paras. 10 and 11.
104. See Constitutional Framework, Chapters 2 and 3.
105. On the legal obligations of UNMIK, see Stahn, Constitutional Framework note 1, at 137 et seq.
106. See Bosnian Constitution, Art. II(2), and its Ann. I.
107. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 3.3.
108. Id., at Chapter 3.1.
109. Id., at Chapter 3.2.
110. See Reg. 1999/24 (12 December 1999), Chapter 1.3, as amended by Reg. 2000/59 (27 October 2000).
111. See Bosnian Constitution, Art. II(5), and the Dayton Peace Agreement, Ann. 7. On the problems of minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Third Partial Decision in Case 5/98, Judgment of 1 July 2000, available under http://www.ustavnisud.ba.
112. See Constitutional Framework, Sec. 3.4 (“The competent institutions and organs in Kosovo shall take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo […]”).
113. See Bosnian Constitution, Art. IV(3) and Art. V(2). For a critical appraisal, see R.C. Slyle, The Dayton Peace Agreement: Constitutionalism and Ethnicity, 21 Yale Journal of International Law 459, at 462 et seq. (1996).
114. See Rambouillet Agreement, Chapter 1, Art. II(7)-(9) (“vital interest motion”).
115. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 9.1.14.
116. Id., at Chapter 9.1.39.
117. Id., at Chapter 9.1.41.
118. Id., at Chapter 9.1.42.
119. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 5.1.
120. See also Report of the Secretary-General, Constitutional Framework note 49, at para. 24, which mentions the “power to veto Assembly legislation, where necessary.”
121. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 9.2.4(a).
122. Id., at Chapter 9.2.4(b).
123. Id., at Chapter 8.1(b).
124. Id., at Chapter 8.1(i).
125. Id., at Chapter 8.1(m).
126. Id., at Chapter 9.2.9.
127. Id., at Chapter 9.3.14.
128. Id., at Chapter 9.3.15.
129. Id., at Chapter 9.3.5.
130. Id., at Chapter 9.3.10.
131. Id., at Chapter 6.
132. Id., at Chapter 13.
133. Id., at Chapter 9.4.2.
134. Id., at Chapter 9.4.11(a).
135. Id., at Chapter 8.1(g).
136. Id., at Chapter 9.4.7.
137. The mandate of the Ombudsperson is defined in UNMIK Reg. 2000/38 (30 June 2000). Sec. 3.1 of the Regulation authorizes the Ombudsperson to “receive and investigate complaints from any person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by the interim Civil administration.” Chapter 10 of the Constitutional Framework reiterates that the Ombudsperson may examine “human rights violations or actions constituting abuse of authority by any public authority in Kosovo” (emphasis added).
138. The Special Chamber of the Supreme Court may only examine the legality of acts adopted by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. See Constitutional Framework, Chapter 9.4.11.
139. Id., Preamble, at para. 6 (emphasis added).
140. See also the critical remarks by Chopra, comparing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor with “a pre-constitutional monarch in a sovereign kingdom.” Cf. J. Chopra, The UN's Kingdom of East Timor, 42 Survival 27, at 29 (2000).
141. See on this issue, T.M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992). For the proclamation of the right to democracy as a human right, see UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1999/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/57 (27 April 1999).