Direct reference and implicature

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 91, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 61-90

  Green, Mitchell S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248759485     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004212614842     Document Type: Article

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