U.S. standards for protecting weapons-usable fissile material compared to international standards

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 137-143

  Bunn, George ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010549262     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709808436742     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. James Goodby, “Protection of Fissile Materials: Policy Context and Issues for Consideration,” Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials (Proceedings of the Workshop at Stanford University, July 28-30,1997) (Livermore, Ca.: Livermore National Laboratory, 1998) [hereinafter Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials], pp. 7-8.
2. George Bunn, “Physical Protection ofNuclear Materials: Strengthening Global Norms,” IAEA Bulletin 39 (December 1997) [hereinafter “Strengthening Global Norms”], pp. 4-5.
3. George Bunn, “Strengthening Global Norms”.
4. Bonnie D. Jenkins, “Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Spring-Summer 1998), p. 98.
5. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994) [hereinafter National Academy Report], p. 5.
6. National Academy Report, p. 31. In the Holdren-Velikov Commission Report, it was agreed that the “highest standards of materials protection, control and accounting—as appropriate to the threat of theft or diversion— should be applied to excess weapons plutonium at all storage, processing, and transport steps until it reaches the spent-fuel standard.” Summary of Recommendations, par. A.3.
7. National Academy Report, p. 139.
8. Matthew Bunn, Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, pp. 20-24.
9. George Bunn, “Strengthening International Norms for Physical Protection ofNuclear Material,” Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Experience in Regulation, Implementation and Operations: Proceedings of an International Conference, Vienna, 10-14, November 1997 [hereinafter “IAEA Proceedings”], p. 17.
10. Matthew Bunn, Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, pp. 20-21. Matthew Bunn was the “Study Director” on the staff of the National Academy Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the time that committee made its stored weapons standard recommendations. See National Academy Report, p. 3.
11. Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapon-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Services: 1997), pp. 36-37.
12. National Academy Report, pp. 31, 70.
13. George Bunn, “Evolving International Standards,” IAEA Bulletin 39 (December 1997), [hereafter “Evolving International Standards”], p. 6. See the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRCy274, Rev. 1 (1980), Art.2.1).
14. IAEA, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Information Circular (INFCIRC)/225/Rev.3, September 1993 [hereinafter INFCIRC/225/Rev.3].
15. George Bunn, “Evolving International Standards,” p. 7.
16. W Jenkins, “Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” p. 98.
17. For differing cultural views of armed guards and background investigations for “trustworthiness” see Matthew Bunn, Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, p. 15.
18. Hiroshi Kurihara, “The Protection of Fissile Materials in Japan,” Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, p. 104.
19. William C. Potter, “Physical Protection of Fissile Materials: The Experience of Post Soviet States,” Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, p. 1.
20. Kevin Harrington and Katya Drozdova, “Analysis of the Workshop on Comparative Analysis of Approaches to Protection of Fissile Materials,” Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, p. 31.
21. M. Gegusch, “Trustworthiness of Nuclear Power Station Employees,” IAEA Proceedings, p. 305.
22. Matthew Bunn, Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, p. 15.
23. Recommendations to the IAEA conference on how to define a non-“worst case” design basis threat for a physical protection system were made by NRC officials responsible for applying NRC physical protection standards. See J.J. Davidson and R. S. Warren, “Development and Maintenance of a Design Basis Threat for Use in Designing Nuclear Physical Protection Systems,” IAEA Proceedings, p. 147.
24. For a description of the threats from terrorists for a reactor in Peru, see J.H. Medina Ramos, “Safety Strategy at the RACSO Nuclear Center,” IAEA Proceedings, p. 73.
25. Matthew Bunn, Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, p. 15.
26. Hiroyoshi Kurahara, Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Materials, pp. 106-109.
27. H. Nakata, T. Misaka, H. Tsuruta, “Experiences in the Implementation of Physical Pro-tection Measures of Nuclear Material at the Jaeri Tokai Establishment,” IAEA Proceedings, pp. 195-200.
28. Bernard Weiss of the IAEA, e-mail to author, August 21, 1998.
29. Jenkins, “Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” pp. 100-101.
30. Physical Protection Convention, Art 16, 20.
31. Jenkins, “Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” pp. 104-106.
32. Jenkins, “Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” pp. 103-104.
33. George Bunn, “Strengthening International Norms for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” IAEA Proceedings, pp. 20-21.