Establishing international standards for physical protection of nuclear material

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 98-110

  Jenkins, Bonnie D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85008770432     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709808436725     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Mohamed ElBaradei, Keynote Speech, IAEA “International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Experience in Regulation, Implementation and Operations,” IAEA-CN-68, November 1997, Vienna.
2. “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,” 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979). The IAEA is the Depositary of the Convention.
3. “The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 7 I.L.M. 809 (1968).
4. “Convention on Nuclear Safety,” 33 I.L.M. 1514 (1994).
5. The importance the United States places on adequate physical protection is reflected in the MPC&A programs it has instituted in the newly independent states. The total MPC&A expenditures through 2002 are estimated to be $800 million. See, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Partnership for Nuclear Security: MPC&A Program Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: January 1998) [hereinafter Partnership for Nuclear Security].
6. For a further discussion of these issues, see James Goodby, “Protection of Fissile Materials: Policy Context and Issues for Consideration,” paper delivered at the Workshop on Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Material, July 28-30, 1997, Stanford University.
7. Matthew Bunn, “Security for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials: Expanding International Cooperation, Strengthening International Standards” [hereinafter “Expanding International Cooperation], paper delivered at the Workshop on Comparative Approaches to Fissile Material Protection held at Stanford University, July 28-30, 1997.
8. DOE, Partnership for Nuclear Security, p. 3. See also, Matthew Bunn
9. Kevin O’Neill, Securing Former Soviet Nuclear Assets: Many Worries, Little Progress, ISIS Report (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, May 1996). It has been noted that about four kilograms of plutonium is potentially enough to develop a nuclear weapon. About three times as much weapon-grade highly enriched uranium is potentially enough for a nuclear weapon. See, Matthew Bunn, “Expanding International Cooperation” and National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994).
10. DOD, Partnership for Nuclear Security, p. 2. Approximately one ton of weapons-grade material is separated annually in Russia from plutonium production. In addition, Russia possesses approximately 28 tons of civil plutonium, and the civil nuclear industry continues to separate 700 kilograms of material annually. O’Neill, Securing Former Soviet Nuclear Assets: Many Worries, Little Progress, p. 3.
11. George Bunn, “International Cooperation on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material: How to Strengthen International Norms Against Stealing or Smuggling of Nuclear Material?” paper delivered at the Workshop on Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile Material, July 28-30, 1997, held at Stanford University.
12. DOE, Partnership for Nuclear Security.
13. Hans Blix, former Director General of the IAEA, states in the Preface to INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 available on the Internet at http://www.un.org, February 17, 1998.
14. George Bunn, “Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Strengthening Global Norms,” paper delivered at the IAEA Conference, November 10-14, 1997. In both cases, a compromise was inserted into the Preamble to the Convention. The first compromise text notes the “importance” of physical protection of materials in domestic use and storage, and the other notes the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear materials for military purposes.
15. For more information on the provisions of the PPC, see, “The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979).
16. See Russel Hibbs and Mark Soo Hoo, “Variations on Achieving An Effective Physical Protection System,” paper delivered at the International Conference on Physical Protection on Nuclear Materials: Experience in Regulation, Implementation and Operations,” November 10-14, 1997, held at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria [hereinafter “International Conference on Physical Protection on Nuclear Materials”].
17. United States National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994).
18. Bunn, “Expanding International Cooperation.”
19. Measures Against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources—Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, GOV/INF/818, September 3, 1997.
20. Bunn, “Expanding International Cooperation.” For a good discussion on the impact of culture on the way states may address and view internal security.
21. Peter Katzenstein, “Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
22. Bunn, “Expanding International Cooperation.” Also, although an international agreement among states that sets forth minimum standards for nuclear materials would go a long way towards guaranteeing that all nuclear material is being adequately protected, states should be free to apply more stringent domestic physical protection standards to their nuclear material (and some states have standards that are already more stringent than those of INFCIRC/225).
23. “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,” 35 I.L.M. 698 (1995). In Article 10 of the ANWFZ Treaty, the parties agree to apply to the covered nuclear materials “measures of physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed by IAEA for that purpose.” Even though there is no specific reference to INFCIRC/225 in Article 10, INFCIRC/225 contains the only IAEA guidelines and recommendations for physical protection of nuclear materials.
24. Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, INFCIRC/254, Appendix, February 1978.
25. Communication Received From Certain Member States Concerning Their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549, March 16, 1998.
26. Annette Schaper, “The Case for Universal Full-Scope Safeguards on Nuclear Material,” The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Winter 1998), p. 69-80.
27. DOE, United States/Former Soviet Union Program. The programs for upgrades include material accounting and control, or MPC&A, at these facilities as well as physical protection. Other states are assisting in these upgrades (e.g., Japan, Norway, and Sweden). There are a projected 53 total sites that will receive MPC&A cooperation. See also, DOE, Partnership for Nuclear Security, p. 8.
28. L. Bartak, and J. Sedlacek, “Prevention and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials in the Czech Republic,” State Office for Nuclear Safety, Prague, Czech Republic, paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, sponsored by the IAEA, November 10-14, 1997.
29. A. Yucel, “Physical Protection Philosophy, Strengthening National Regulatory Programmes for Physical Protection and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Turkey,” Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, Ankara, Turkey, paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, sponsored by the IAEA, November 10-14, 1997.
30. K. Kovalev, “Strengthening of National Regulatory Programmes Aimed At Ensuring Physical Protection, Russian Federation,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, sponsored by the IAEA, November 10-14, 1997.
31. V.D. Kokhan, P.A. Ivanov, and Yu.I. Kuchmij, “Concept for the redesign of the physical protection equipment and systems of Goskomatom nuclear power facilities,” Goskomatom, Kiev, Ukraine, paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, sponsored by the IAEA, November 10-14, 1997.
32. Christian Gotz, “Physical Protection During Shipments of Nuclear Materials in Germany, Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety,” paper delivered at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, sponsored by the IAEA, November 10-14, 1997.
33. Bernard Weiss, Department of Safeguards, IAEA, discussions with author, April 1998.
34. Explanatory Note to the Draft Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N. General Assembly, A/AC.252/L.3, January 28, 1997.
35. U.N. General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/5I/210, December 17, 1997.
36. Nearly half of the reported illicit nuclear trafficking cases involved radioactive sources. The use of these sources by a terrorist to contaminate an area could result in significant societal panic and disturbance. Kevin O’Neill, Deputy Director, ISIS, discussions with author, April 1998.
37. United Nations, submitted by the Republic of Iran, A/AC.252/1998/W.P38, 26 February 1998.
38. See, United Nations, submitted by Syrian Arab Republic, A/AC.252/1998/W.P.24/Corr. 1, 26 February 1998.
39. Comments of the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Ad Hoc Committee Established by the General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, December 17, 1996.
40. George Bunn, “Strengthening International Norms for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,” paper presented at the International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, sponsored by the IAEA, November 10-14, 1997.
41. Matthew Bunn, discussion with author, May 8, 1998.
42. “Convention’on Nuclear Safety,” 33 I.L.M. 1514 (1994).
43. Bunn, “Expanding International Cooperation.”
44. Statement made on May 1, 1998, by U.S. representative to the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Geneva, April 27-May 8, 1998.