Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice

Episteme

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 101-113

  Coady, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010172604     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2010.0001     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Daukas Nancy. 2006. “Epistemic Trust and Social Location.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 3(1): 109–24.
2. Fricker Miranda. 1998. “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98(2): 159–77.
3. Fricker Miranda. 1999. “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Suppl. 25: 191–210.
4. Fricker Miranda. 2003. “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing.” Metaphilosophy 34(1–2): 154–73.
5. Fricker Miranda. 2006. “Powerlessness and Social Interpretation.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 3(1–2): 96–108.
6. Fricker Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Goldman Alvin I. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Goldman Alvin I. 2002. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues.” In Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public, pp. 51–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. James William. 1897/1978. “The Will to Believe.” In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10. McConkey Jane. 2004. “Knowledge and Acknowledgement: ‘Epistemic Injustice’ as a Problem of Recognition.” Politics 24(3): 198–205.