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‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,’ in
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Harding S., Hintikka S., Hintikka M.B., (eds), ed. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), and The Feminist Standpoint Revisited, Edited by
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Hartsock, N., “ ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,’ in ”. In Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Edited by: Harding, S., Hintikka, S., and Hintikka, M. B., ed. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), and The Feminist Standpoint Revisited
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Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
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Hartsock, N.1
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This formulation is attributed to Dorothy Smith (see Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?’ ed. [New York/London: Routledge, 1993], note 5), but Harding has adopted it so that it now strikes one as the signature of her own view. For Hardings standpoint theory, see especially Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? and ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology.’, and, eds
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Alcoff, L., and Potter, E., eds. Feminist Epistemologies This formulation is attributed to Dorothy Smith (see Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity”?’ in ed. [New York/London: Routledge, 1993], note 5), but Harding has adopted it so that it now strikes one as the signature of her own view. For Harding's standpoint theory, see especially Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? and ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology.’
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Feminist Epistemologies
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Alcoff, L.1
Potter, E.2
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G. Lukács, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), 149. Georgy Lukács emphasized and developed the significance of the Marxist notion of standpoint. See the section of History and Class Consciousness entitled ‘The Standpoint of the Proletariat’ (149–209
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History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics G. Lukács, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), 149. Georgy Lukács emphasized and developed the significance of the Marxist notion of standpoint. See the section of History and Class Consciousness entitled ‘The Standpoint of the Proletariat’ (149–209).
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History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics
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Simone de Beauvoir, trans. H.M. Parshley (London: Picador, 1953), 449
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The Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir, trans. H.M. Parshley (London: Picador, 1953), 449.
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The Second Sex
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I take it that a society is patriarchal just if most of the positions of power, especially positions of professional and public office, are occupied by men—essentially the idea is that it is men who, rule,. Patriarchy, as the focus of second wave feminism, inevitably has a, passé, ring to it. But the term also sounds out of date for two more substantial reasons. First, there has been enormous progress the dismantling of patriarchal structures since the beginnings of the second wave. And, second, a symbolic turn much feminist theory has led to a focus not so much on the material circumstances of womens lives, but on the symbolic oppression of the feminine. Of course, there is no room for complacency. Patriarchal structures persist—a fact to be borne mind whenever material concerns are passed over for symbolic ones. Nonetheless, it is right that patriarchy is no longer the sole focus of feminism
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I take it that a society is patriarchal just if most of the positions of power, especially positions of professional and public office, are occupied by men—essentially the idea is that it is men who rule. “Patriarchy,” as the focus of second wave feminism, inevitably has a passé ring to it. But the term also sounds out of date for two more substantial reasons. First, there has been enormous progress in the dismantling of patriarchal structures since the beginnings of the second wave. And, second, a symbolic turn in much feminist theory has led to a focus not so much on the material circumstances of women's lives, but on the symbolic oppression of the feminine. Of course, there is no room for complacency. Patriarchal structures persist—a fact to be borne in mind whenever material concerns are passed over for symbolic ones. Nonetheless, it is right that patriarchy is no longer the sole focus of feminism.
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Sussex: Harvester Press, 383–84. Lukács it is quite clear that standpoint is not an empirical notion: class consciousness is identical with neither the psychological consciousness of individual members of the proletariat, nor with the (mass-psychological) consciousness of the proletariat as a whole; but it is, on the contrary, the sense, become conscious, of the historical role of the class (History and Class Consciousness, 73; original italics
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Jaggar, A., 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature Sussex: Harvester Press. 383–84. In Lukács it is quite clear that standpoint is not an empirical notion: “class consciousness is identical with neither the psychological consciousness of individual members of the proletariat, nor with the (mass-psychological) consciousness of the proletariat as a whole; but it is, on the contrary, the sense, become conscious, of the historical role of the class” (History and Class Consciousness, 73; original italics).
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(1983)
Feminist Politics and Human Nature
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Jaggar, A.1
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For an argument questioning the degree of the fidelity, see Bat-Ami Bar On, ‘Marginality and Epistemic Privilege,’ ed. (New York/London: Routledge, 1993)., and, eds
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Alcoff, L., and Potter, E., eds. Feminist Epistemologies For an argument questioning the degree of the fidelity, see Bat-Ami Bar On, ‘Marginality and Epistemic Privilege,’ in ed. (New York/London: Routledge, 1993).
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Feminist Epistemologies
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Alcoff, L.1
Potter, E.2
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the original paper Hartsock does sound a cautionary note about the issue: addressing the institutionalized division of labour, I propose to lay aside the important differences among women across race and class boundaries and instead search for central commonalities…Still, I adopt this strategy with some reluctance, since it contains the danger of making invisible the experience of lesbians or women of color (‘The Feminist Standpoint,’ 290). But a cautionary note cannot dispel the difficulty
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In the original paper Hartsock does sound a cautionary note about the issue: “In addressing the institutionalized division of labour, I propose to lay aside the important differences among women across race and class boundaries and instead search for central commonalities…Still, I adopt this strategy with some reluctance, since it contains the danger of making invisible the experience of lesbians or women of color” (‘The Feminist Standpoint,’ 290). But a cautionary note cannot dispel the difficulty.
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Hartsock begins to say something about how the subject of standpoint may be pluralized the final section of
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The Feminist Standpoint Revisited Hartsock begins to say something about how the subject of standpoint may be “pluralized” in the final section of
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The Feminist Standpoint Revisited
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‘A Sociology for Women,’ in
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Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 166; quoted Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 373.,. In
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Smith, D. E., 1979. “ ‘A Sociology for Women,’ in ”. In The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 166; quoted in Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 373.
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(1979)
The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge
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Smith, D.E.1
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Although the idea of womens nature is often taken to be something biological, I see no reason to think this must be the case. Certainly, somethings essence need not be anything biological, given that an essential property of a (type of) thing is any property whose possession is necessary for its being the (type of) thing it is. For a helpful discussion of key anti-essentialist arguments, see Charlotte Witts ‘Anti-Essentialism Feminist Theory,’ 23:2 (1995): 321–44 (special issue, Feminist Perspectives on Language, Knowledge, and Reality, ed. S. Haslanger
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Philosophical Topics Although the idea of women's nature is often taken to be something biological, I see no reason to think this must be the case. Certainly, something's essence need not be anything biological, given that an essential property of a (type of) thing is any property whose possession is necessary for its being the (type of) thing it is. For a helpful discussion of key anti-essentialist arguments, see Charlotte Witt's ‘Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory,’ 23:2 (1995): 321–44 (special issue, Feminist Perspectives on Language, Knowledge, and Reality, ed. S. Haslanger).
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Philosophical Topics
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Conscious human practice, then, is at once both an epistemological category and the basis for Marxs conception of the nature of humanity itself. To put the case even more strongly, Marx argues that human activity has both an ontological and epistemological status, that human feelings are not ‘merely anthropological phenomena,’ but are ‘truly ontological affirmations of being*’. Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint,’ 306, n. 5
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Conscious human practice, then, is at once both an epistemological category and the basis for Marx's conception of the nature of humanity itself. To put the case even more strongly, Marx argues that human activity has both an ontological and epistemological status, that human feelings are not ‘merely anthropological phenomena,’ but are ‘truly ontological affirmations of being*’.” Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint,’ 306, n. 5.
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See, for instance, 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1990); and J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). Searles account is perhaps more properly categorized as a species of conventionalism than a hermeneutical view, but I use ‘hermeneutical’ the broadest possible sense to capture the basic idea that social facts are dependent upon some human practice of meaning. The differences between approaches within this broad category are not of present concern. For a discussion of the different approaches, see F. Collin, Social Reality (London/New York: Routledge, 1997
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Taylor, C., Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers See, for instance, 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1990); and J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). Searle's account is perhaps more properly categorized as a species of conventionalism than a hermeneutical view, but I use ‘hermeneutical’ in the broadest possible sense to capture the basic idea that social facts are dependent upon some human practice of meaning. The differences between approaches within this broad category are not of present concern. For a discussion of the different approaches, see F. Collin, Social Reality (London/New York: Routledge, 1997).
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Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers
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Taylor, C.1
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Anscombe M., Rhees R., Anscombe G.E.M., (eds), (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), section 241. Quoted Scheman N., ‘Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,’ The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, e Sluga d. H. and D. Stern G. 2d ed., ed. G.E. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 386., Edited by
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Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations Edited by: Anscombe, M., Rhees, R., and Anscombe, G. E.M., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), section 241. Quoted in Scheman N., ‘Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, e Sluga d. H. and D. Stern G. 2d ed., ed. G.E. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 386.
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Philosophical Investigations
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There is, of course, more to be said on this subject, but this is not the place to try to say it.
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There is, of course, more to be said on this subject, but this is not the place to try to say it.
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A different species of epistemic injustice is identified my ‘Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology,’ (1998): Part 2, 157–77
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society A different species of epistemic injustice is identified in my ‘Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology,’ (1998): Part 2, 157–77.
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
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