The genealogy of epistemic virtue concepts

Philosophical Papers

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 345-369

  Thomas, Alan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85009593179     PISSN: 05568641     EISSN: 19968523     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/05568640809485226     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (London: Faber, 1985). (Cited below as ELP.)
2. John McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, Monist, vol. 62, no. 3, 1979, pp. 331-350
3. David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978)
4. Alan Thomas, Value and Context: the Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)
5. Williams, ELP, p. 147.
6. Williams, ELP, p. 170.
7. J.E.J. Altham, ‘Reflection and Confidence’ in J.E.J. Altham and T.R. Harrison (eds) World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 156-169.
8. Williams, ELP, p. 154
9. A.W. Moore, ‘Realism and the Absolute Conception’ in Alan Thomas, (ed.) Bernard Williams, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 24-46.
10. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 21
11. Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)
12. Williams, ELP, pp. 217-218, fn. 7.
13. Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 15-16.
14. Bernard Williams, ‘What Does Intuitionism Imply?', Making Sense of Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 182-191 at p. 187.
15. Williams, ELP, pp. 147-155
16. A.W. Moore, ‘Can Reflection Destroy Knowledge?', Ratio, no. 4, (1991), pp. 97-107
17. ‘Williams on Ethics, Knowledge and Reflection’, Philosophy, vol. 78, no. 3, (2003), pp 337-354
18. Alan Thomas, Value and Context. Chapter 6.
19. Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, ‘Introduction’ to Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (Oxford: Blackwells, 2003), pp. 1-12 at p. 3
20. Bernard Williams, ‘Deciding to Believe’ in Problems of the Self, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 136-151
21. T&T, p. 135.
22. Williams, T&T, p.45.
23. Williams, T&T, p. 87.
24. Williams, T&T, p. 88.
25. Williams, ELP, pp. 10-11
26. Alan Thomas ‘Reasonable Partiality and the Agent’s Personal Point of View’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, (2005), pp. vol. 8. nos. 1-2, pp. 28-43.
27. Alan Thomas, ‘Consequentialism, Integrity and Demandingness’ in Tim Chappell, (ed.) Ethical Demandingness, (Palgrave-Macmillan, forthcoming)
28. Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1994), p. 177
29. Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 153-7.
30. Guy Axtell, ‘Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach’, Philosophical Papers, vol. 37, no. 1, March, (2008) pp. 51-87 at p. 72.
31. Christopher Hookway, ‘Regulating Inquiry’ in Guy Axtell, (ed) Knowledge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 149-160
32. ‘How to be a Virtue Epistemologist’ in Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (eds) Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 183-202
33. ‘Epistemology and Inquiry: the Primacy of Practice’in Stephen Heatherington, (ed.) Epistemology Futures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 95-110.
34. Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
35. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 31, fn. 3.
36. Colin McGinn, ‘Isn’t It the Truth?', New York Review of Books, vol. 50, no. 6, April 10, (2003)
37. Linda Zagzebski, ‘Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth’, in DePaul and Zagzebski, (eds) Intellectual Virtue, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 135-54.
38. Christine Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
39. Rae Langton, ‘Objective and Unconditioned Value’, Philosophical Review, vol. 116, no. 2, (2007) pp. 157-185.
40. Williams, T&T, p. 59.
41. Williams, T&T, p. 89.
42. Williams, T&T, p. 120
43. Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Truthfulness, Lies and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn from Mill and Kant?', in Petersen, Grethe B., (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 16, (1995)
44. Williams, T&T, p. 125, p. 127.
45. Williams, T&T, p. 141.
46. Williams, T&T, p. 90.
47. Williams, T&T, p. 114.
48. Hookway, ‘How to be a Virtue Epistemologist’, p. 194.
49. Adam Morton, ‘Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity’, Nous, no. 38, (2002), pp. 481-502(22)
50. Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Science and Civility in Seventeenth Century England, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)
51. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 21.
52. Adrian Moore, ‘Realism and the Absolute Conception’, in Alan Thomas, (ed.) Bernard Williams, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 24-46.
53. A.W. Moore, Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty, (London: Routledge, 2005)
54. Bernard Williams, ‘Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology’ in Making Sense of Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 65-77 at p. 76.
55. Williams, T&T, p. pp. 92-3, p. 150.
56. ‘Reason, Virtue and Knowledge’, in Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 15-29 at p.15.