Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 23, Issue 6, 2016, Pages 1961-1967

  Kusev, Petko ^a   van Schaik, Paul ^b   Alzahrani, Shrooq ^c   Lonigro, Samantha ^a,d   Purser, Harry ^e  

^a KINGSTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b TEESSIDE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^d SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^e UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Accessibility; Judgments; Moral dilemmas; Rational choice; Utility

Indexed keywords

ADULT; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MORALITY; PHYSIOLOGY;

ADULT; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MORALS;

EID: 84999836336     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-016-1029-2     Document Type: Article

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