Governance and Flexibility in Family-Owned SMEs

Family Business Review

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 277-297

  Gubitta, Paolo ^a   Gianecchini, Martina ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF UDINE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84996235088     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-6248.2002.00277.x     Document Type: Article

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