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Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 139-150

Introduction: Fiscal Policy in the European Union

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 84996218898     PISSN: 14651165     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003002001     Document Type: Editorial
Times cited : (8)

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