Budgetary collective action problems: Convergence and compliance under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union

Public Administration Review

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 43-53

  Savage, James D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040154634     PISSN: 00333352     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0033-3352.00004     Document Type: Article

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