Suspects, defendants and victims in the french criminal process: The context of recent reform

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 781-815

  Hodgson, Jacqueline ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84996159134     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/51.4.781     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. The career trained judiciary of the procureur, the juge d'instruction and the trial judge.
2. See, eg, F Belloni and J Hodgson, Criminal Injustice: An Evaluation of the Criminal Justice Process in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), ch 10.
3. Offences are classed as crimes (the most serious, such as murder)
4. délits (such as assault or burglary)
5. contraventions (the least serious). These classifications represent a hierarchy of gravity and will determine the trial venue.
6. See further, J Hodgson, ‘The police, the prosecutor and the juge d'instruction: Judicial Supervision in France, Theory and Practice’ (2001), British Journal of Criminology 41(2), 342–61
7. J. Bell, French legal Cultures (London: Butterworths, 2001)
8. P. Legrand (1996) ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’ (2001) ICLQ, 52.
9. On the dangers of glib comparisons, J Hodgson, ‘Comparing Legal Cultures: The Comparativist as Participant Observer’, in D Nelken (ed), Contrasting Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 139–56.
10. On the importance of legal culture, see also D Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth. 1997).
11. For other examples, see J Bell, ‘The French Pre-Trial System, in C Walker a K Starmer’ (eds), Miscarriages of Justice: A Review of Justice in Error (London: Blackstone Press, 1999), 354–70 at 365 n 35
12. Bell, (above at n 10), at 111
13. J.-P. Marguénaud (2000) ‘La dérive de la procédure pénale française au regard des exigences européennes’ Dalloz (Chroniques), 249–55.
14. See, eg, Poitrimol ECHR 23 Nov 1993
15. Omar and Guérin ECHR 29 July 1998
16. Khalfaoui ECHR 14 Dec 1999.
17. Like the celebrated instance of Maurice Papon, M Khalfaoui had requested and been refused special dispensation not to appear. See further J-P Delmas Saint Hilaire (2001) ‘Affaire Maurice Papon. La justice pénale française avait encore des choses à dire … Deux étranges non-lieux à statuer’, Dalloz, (Jurisprudence), 3222.
18. See, eg, the discussion reported in Le Monde 16 Feb 2000.
19. See also Reinhardt and Slimane Kaïd v France ECHR 31 Mar 1998
20. Slimane Kaïd v France ECHR 25 Jan 2000
21. Voisin v France ECHR 8 Feb 2000.
22. The right to legal representation, even where the defendant is absent, has now been accepted by the full chamber of the Cour de cassation in the case of Dentico heard on 2 Mar 2001 (00–81.388, No 473 P). This reverses a long line of decisions and is significant in holding that Art 410 CPP (which allows the case to be heard in the defendant's absence) is contrary to Art 6 ECHR if the defence is unrepresented. See Jean Pradel's case note (2001) ‘Le prévenu cité à personne, absent, et non excusé, a droit néanmoins à l'assistance d'un avocat.’ Dalloz (Commentaires) (24), 1899–1901.
23. See further, Marguénaud, 2000 (above n 13) for a discussion of some of the most important findings against France which, he argues, demonstrate the growing discrepancy between the realities of domestic practice and the way in which France presents itself to the outside world. He notes the ‘arrogant’ attitude of the higher courts and the legislature to the decisions of the European Court in Strasbourg.
24. See also J Pradel (2000) ‘La procédure pénale française à l'aube du troisième millénaire’, Dalloz (Chroniques) (1), 1–9.
25. Compare the opening paragraphs of the preliminary report of the Delmas-Marty Commission in 1989 (established because of concern over the impact of the ECHR upon French criminal procedure): ‘But the whole difficulty of criminal procedure … is that efficiency, no matter how necessary it is, cannot be pursued at any price. Even though torture may make a guilty person confess, it is clear that this could not justify its use. Moreover, constitutional principles such as international agreements undertaken by France, require that the efficiency of the process be subject to the respect of the fundamental rights of the individual. In fact, this double imperative … is not necessarily antagonistic and it would be better to talk about the ‘bipolarity’ of the criminal process’, M Delmas-Marty, La mise en état des affaires pénales: Rapport de la Commission Justice pénale et Droits de l'homme (Paris: La Documentation Française,1991), 11–12. Interestingly, the most recent circular (10 Jan 2002) to be issued by the Ministry on Justice (in response to sustained protest by the police and gendarmes concerning the difficulties in implementing the June 2000 reform) is phrased not in terms of the effectiveness of the investigation, but sees a return to rhetoric which speaks of the necessity for la répression.
26. See, eg, C Vroom (1988) ‘La liberté individuelle au stade de l'enquête de police en France et aux Etas-Unis.’ Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé (3), 487–507, who describes the underlying values of the French criminal process in crime control terms: the freedom of the individual is best protected through the provision of broad legal powers for the repression of crime.
27. I am grateful to an ICLQ reviewer for suggesting that this point be expanded upon.
28. A study conducted during 1997–9 and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, examining the investigation and prosecution of crime in France. A smaller study funded by the British Academy and the Nuffield Foundation was conducted in 1993–4. For details of the methodology see Hodgson (above n 10), 349.
29. See Marguénaud (above n 13)
30. This may also be exacerbated by the increasingly interventionist stance taken by the Court (Marguénaud (above n 13)) argues this generally.
31. J.-F. Burgelin, (2001) ‘La Cour de cassation en question’, Dalloz (12), 932–4 fears that the European Court is becoming an additional level of appeal, blurring the role of the Cour de cassation. He muses whether, just as the Euro has replaced the franc, the European Court will replace the Cour de cassation.
32. (H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties- New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act (Harlow: Longman, 2000)
33. also notes the impact of the decision in Condron v UK [2000] JCIV LIB 253 upon the role of the Court of Appeal.) This trend is unlikely to abate since the disappearance of the Commission as a preliminary filter on cases with the coming into force of Protocol 11 in Nov 1998.
34. See Marguénaud (above n 13) and for a recent ‘softening’ of approach
35. see discussion above, n 18.
36. Discours de Marylise Lebranchu, 22 Jan 2002.
37. Notably McCann v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 97.
38. In response to the Court's condemnation under Art 5(3) of the detention of a terrorist suspect for 4 days and 6 hours (Brogan v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 117) the government did not alter the law, but simply re-entered a derogation from Art 5(3) under Art 15.
39. This derogation was upheld in Brannigan and McBride v UK (1993) 17 EHRR 594.
40. eg, the Interception of Communications Act 1985 followed from the decision in Malone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14, where the Court found a breach of Art 8.
41. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] AC 696.
42. See D McGoldrick (2001) ‘The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 in Theory and Practice.’ ICLQ, 50(4), 901–53, 904.
43. See, eg, discussion in Fenwick (above, n 31), 27–29.
44. See Edwards v UK A 247-B (1992).
45. In Schenk v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 242, no breach of Art 6(2) was found when an illegally obtained tape recording was admitted as evidence.
46. Cf the later case of Teixeira de Castro v Portugal (1999) 28 EHRR 101, where the Court held that the defendant (of previous good character and showing no ‘predisposition’ to commit the offence of supplying drugs) was deprived of a fair trial because of his entrapment by police officers. The jurisprudence around the right to silence has allowed a wide margin of appreciation.
47. A breach will be found only if some penalty attaches to the failure to speak (see Saunders v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 313).
48. Anything less will not necessarily be condemned-see Murray (John) v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29
49. Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379.
50. For a discussion of the 1993 reforms see J Hodgson and G Rich (1993) ‘A Criminal Defence for the French?’ New Law Journal (143), 414
51. H. Trouille (1994) ‘A Look at French Criminal Procedure’, Criminal Law Review, 735–44.
52. The juge d'instruction is responsible for the investigation of the more serious and complex cases. More than 60,000 people each year are mis en examen, that is, investigated through the process of instruction, according to the Justice Minister in her speech to the Sénat, 15 June 1999.
53. For an account of the rise of the profession between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, followed by the loss of status from the sixteenth century when a large status gap opened up between avocats and magistrats, see L Karpik, French Lawyers: A Study in Collective Action 1274–1994 (trans Nora Scott) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), ch 1.
54. As one juge d'instruction told me: ‘The lawyer, he works as a liar, to see how far he can distort the law.’ For further discussion of the importance of these contrasting legal cultures and professional ideologies, see Hodgson (above n 10).
55. A typical case before the tribunal correctionnel will attract a fee of 700FF (€100), around £70. See Le Monde 17 May 2000.
56. Karpik (above n 43), 214. ‘The typical solo practitioner, after pleading in two or three courts which are not necessarily in the same locale, after spending time at the palais taking care of the numerous details without which a case tends to bog down, after having visited clients in prison, having received clients in the office, no longer has enough time to analyse the case documents, to write up his pleadings, to prepare the advice and legal documents, without extending the limits of the ordinary working day: he or she must find the additional time early in the morning, late at night or on the weekends’
57. Karpik (above n 43), 215. The description of the lawyer's day is strikingly similar to those reported in research in England and Wales.
58. See M McConville, J Hodgson, L Bridges, and A Pavlovic, Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), at, eg, 22–4.
59. D. Cohen (1992) ‘Le droit de l'assistance effective d'un avocat de la défense’, Revue internationale de droit pénal, 63, 729–54.
60. See M McConville and J Hodgson, Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to Silence (London: HMSO, 1993)
61. McConville et al (above n 47).
62. This was described by the recent Truche Commission (P. Truche, Rapport de la commission de réflexion sur la Justice (Paris: La documentation Française, 1997) as follows: ‘It is for the parquet and the juge d'instruction to gather the evidence of any offence against the criminal law without presuming guilt. They are concerned to investigate both that which inculpates and that which exonerates, giving the suspect the benefit of any doubt. In doing this, they must respect legal procedures’, at 60.
63. See the first few paragraphs of the Ministry of Justice's ‘Exposé des motifs du projet de loi renforçant la protection de la présomption d'innocence et les droits des victimes.’
64. Compare the ten fundamental principles which the Delmas-Marty Commission, 1991 (above n 24), 113–24 proposed should appear at the start of the CPP.
65. J. Pradel (2001) ‘Les personnes suspectes ou poursuivies après la loi du 15 juin 2000: Evolution ou révolution?’ Dalloz (Doctrine) (13), 1039–1047, notes that both Belgium and Canada rejected the idea of adopting a preliminary article setting out general principles.
66. In her address to the Sénat 30 May 2000.
67. For a broad discussion of the role of the media in French criminal proceedings, see Bell (above n 10), 117–25
68. For a detailed discussion of the AIDS-contaminated blood case, which involved accusations against three former government ministers for their failure to supervise adequately the health service, see C Elliot and C Vernon, French Legal System (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 101–10.
69. See, eg, the reports in Le Monde (21 July 2000; 25 July 2000) of the juge d'instruction's interview with Jean Tiberi, the Mayor of Paris who was accused of corruption in misusing the influence of his public office.
70. More than 300,000 people are placed in police detention, garde à vue, each year according to the Justice Minister in her speech to the Sénat, 15 June 1999.
71. See Le Monde 19 June 2001.
72. See Le Figaro 9 Mar 2001.
73. CNCDH Avis sur la proposition de loi complétant la loi du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d'innocence et les droits des victimes, 24 Jan 2002.
74. C. Phillips and D Brown, Entry in to the criminal justice system: a survey of police arrests and their outcomes. Home Office Research Study No 185 (London: Home Office, 1998), found only one case out of a sample of 4,246 where detention was refused.
75. See also M Maguire and C Norris, The conduct and supervision of criminal investigations. RCCJ Study No 5. (London: HMSO, 1993), who attribute the weakness in police supervision to the fact that supervising officers are subject to the same performance pressures as fellow officers and do not wish to be seen to undermine the work of their colleagues, the arresting officers.
76. The most common reason for any discussion between the police and procureur is not to dispute detention, but to clarify legal procedure and form and to discuss avenues of enquiry. In one area, even this was precluded as all initial detention information was sent by fax and remained unread until the close of detention. See J Hodgson (2002) ‘Hierarchy, Bureaucracy and Ideology in French Criminal Justice: Some Empirical Observations’, Journal of Law and Society 29(2), 227 at p 243.
77. One procureur explained the danger of a more surveillance based approach: ‘There used to be a woman in the permanence who did go down to the police station and it caused a terrible rumpus. The police were furious that she just turned up. You have to be careful when you go down-so that the police don't think it's because you're suspicious of them’, Hodgson (above n 10), 351.
78. The Collomp report (above, n 21), para 1.4.2, charged with evaluating the success of the reform, noted that of the ten parquets inspected, only four had complied fully with the requirement to visit each police station every 3 months. Three had made no visits and three had made only some. Of particular concern was the number of stations to be visited and the distances between them
79. The circular (4 Dec 2000, para 1.3.1) accompanying the June 2000 legislation anticipates that visits will be directed towards ensuring the adequacy of the material conditions of the GAV, rather than the treatment of individual suspects.
80. This is significant, as the process of interrogation and detention remains shielded from close scrutiny. LH Leigh and L Zedner, A Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Pre-Trial phase in France and Germany. RCCJ Study No 1 (London: HMSO, 1992), found that interrogation could take place for oppressive lengths of time in order to ‘break’ the suspect- although their research was conducted prior to the 1993 reforms. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2001 (above n 76) again suggested the clear need for a code of conduct to guide police in interrogating practice and standards (para 37). This is the third time that this point has been made (it was raised following the 1991 and 1996 visits) but the Government response (2001, above n 76) denies that such a code is necessary.
81. McConville et al (above n 47) found that defence lawyers rarely listened to tapes.
82. Judges reported listening to tapes in only 11 per cent of contested Crown Court cases (M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Crown Court Study. RCCJ Study No 19 (London: HMSO, 1993), ch 3) and the figures are likely to be much lower in the magistrates' court. Officers in France complain that nobody watches the recordings of interrogations of juveniles.
83. See Dray (above n 21) s 9.
84. See J Baldwin, Preparing the Record of Taped Interview. RCCJ Study No 2 (London: HMSO, 1993).
85. In the case of Stephen Miller (one of the ‘Cardiff Three’ accused of the murder of a Cardiff prostitute) the police interrogation continued despite more than 300 denials on his part. Notably, his solicitor was present throughout and was described as ‘being gravely at fault for sitting passively through this travesty of a [police] interview.’ R v Paris, Abdullahi and Miller (1993) 97 Cr App R 99.
86. See S Moston and GM Stephenson, The Questioning and Interviewing of Suspects Outside the Police Station. RCCJ Study No 22 (London: HMSO, 1993). There is a strong incentive for such unofficial questioning: the authors found that 74.5 per cent of such cases resulted in some form of admission, compared to 58.8 per cent of official interviews (p 34).
87. Opinion on the proposed legislation 24 Jan 2002, above n 67
88. See eg D Dixon, K Bottomley, C Coleman, M Gill, and D Wall (1989) ‘Reality and rules in the construction and regulation of police suspicion.’ International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 17, 185
89. M. McConville, A Sanders, and R Leng, The Case for the Prosecution (London: Routledge, 1991), for early evaluations of the impact of PACE.
90. See J Hodgson and G Rich (1995) ‘L'avocat et la garde à vue: experience anglaise et reflexions sur la situation actuelle en France’, Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé (2), 319–29.
91. See, eg, P Waquet (1991) ‘Réflexions sur les rapports de la Commission Justice pénale et droits de l'homme’, Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé, 3, 518–25
92. M. Gendrel (1992) ‘Garde à vue et droit de l'individu. La défense doit-elle commencer dans les locaux de gendarmerie ou de police?’, Droit pénal (Mars), 1–3.
93. See further Dixon et al (above n 84)
94. McConville et al (above n 84) for an account of the effect of PACE upon investigations
95. McConville and Hodgson (above n 50) for an evaluation of custodial legal advice.
96. See, eg, T Bucke and D Brown, In police custody: police powers and suspects' rights under the revised PACE codes of practice. Research Study No 174 (London: Home Office, 1997). Whilst the police were found initially to adopt a number of ploys to dissuade suspects from requesting legal advice (such as failing to mention that it was free, or most effectively, warning that it would increase the length of time spent in custody) changes in the Codes of Practice sought to minimise this. The low take-up rate appears to be a result of a low request rate, rather than any refusal on the part of the police to allow access.
97. Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Chaired by Viscount Runciman of Doxford (1993) Cmnd 2263. London: HMSO.
98. See L Bridges and J Hodgson (1995) ‘Improving Custodial Legal Advice’, Criminal Law Review, 95
99. L. Bridges and S Choongh, Improving Police Station Legal Advice: The Impact of the Accreditation Scheme for Police Station Legal Advisers (The Law Society and Legal Aid Board, 1998), for evaluations of the scheme.
100. Cf Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29, where the European Court held that denying access to legal advice for 48 hours to a terrorist suspect was incompatible with the fair trial provisions of Art 6 ECHR.
101. A similar decision was reached in Magee v UK (2000) HRCD 277. Both of these cases involved the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 which allows the court to draw adverse inferences from silence, making legal advice arguably more important.)
102. No specific figures are provided, but the official evaluation report notes only a slight increase in the number of suspects attended by a defence lawyer. Collomp (above n 21), para 1.4.1
103. See, eg, Le Monde 19 June 2001. One officer told the reporter: ‘I have also noticed that the arrival of the lawyer, straightaway, that releases the tension of really furious suspects who would sometimes take three or four hours to calm down. And for us, that is real progress.’
104. See Le Monde, 19 June 2001.
105. Circular 10 Jan 2002-see esp para 1, 1.1, 1.2.
106. Dray (above n 21). The report suggested a practical interpretation to guide officers, which was provided in the circular 10 Jan 2002.
107. See, eg, the report on the implementation of the 2000 reforms, Collomp (above n 21), para 1.4.2
108. Le Monde, 19 June 2001.
109. Interestingly, those who are silent are likely to be disciplined for their non-cooperation-see Le Monde 13 Feb 2001.
110. The CNCDH (above n 67) denounced the clause as placing pressure on the suspect, hindering the proper organisation of her defence and resting upon no legal basis.
111. For a more detailed discussion of the reluctant accommodation of the defence lawyer within French pre-trial criminal procedure, see J Hodgson (2002a) ‘Constructing the pre-trial role of the defence in French criminal procedure: An adversarial outsider in an inquisitorial process?’ International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 6(1) 1–16. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (above n 76) recommended that the defence lawyer be present during police interrogation of suspects (para 34). This was not responded to directly in the Government's response (above n 76). The Committee also recommended that all interrogations be tape-recorded (para 38), as did the Truche Commission (above n 51). The Government noted that videotaping would be considered, though 6 months later in January 2002, it announced that this has been ruled out for the moment.
112. See C Blatier (1999) ‘Juvenile delinquents in France: Main Components of the Evolution of Justice for Minors’ British Journal of Criminology, 39 (2) 240–52, for an account of the legal regime governing juveniles in France. But note also the repressive measures proposed by the new government in July 2002 (above n 62).
113. Art 4 of ordonnance number 45–174 of 2 Feb 1945 concerning juvenile crime. The video will only be viewed if the content of the statement is contested.
114. Videotaping the interrogation has not relieved officers of the requirement to make a written record. Dray reports that officers felt that they were working to no purpose, given the additional effort required to make a recording which nobody will see. Dray (above n 21) s 9.
115. eg, the short-lived introduction of the juge délegué in 1993.
116. Many of the current reform proposals emanate from the 1997 report (above n 51) of the Commission de réflexion sur la Justice (chaired by Pierre Truche, who, notably, also sat on the 1991 Delmas-Marty Commission, above n 24), which was charged with examining the protection of the presumption of innocence and the independence of the office of public prosecutor.
117. See Collomp (above n 21)
118. Le Monde 10 May 2001.
119. Le Figaro 9 Mar 2001.
120. See Le Monde 26 Oct 2001 relating to the release of Jean-Claude Bonnal in December 2000, subsequently suspected of committing six murders, two of the victims being police officers. Interestingly, some have suggested that this decision was in protest at the late hour at which the suspect was presented. This problem was specifically highlighted in the official evaluation of the reforms-Collomp (above n 21), para 2.1.1.
121. Also Le Monde 5 Dec 2001 relating to the release on bail of a Congolese man found in possession of 1 kg of heroin and a quantity of cocaine. He failed to appear before the juge d'instruction the next day or subsequently. Government proposals set out in July 2002 (see above n 62) would require the juge d'instruction to give written reasons when not following the parquet's request for a remand in custody and would provide the procureur with a right of appeal against the juge d'instruction's decision to release the suspect on bail.
122. The témoin assisté cannot be the subject of bail or détention provisoire and neither can she be sent for trial. She must first be mis en examen before these procedures can be invoked (Art 113–5 CPP). However, as she is not a party to the proceedings, neither can she appeal against the judgment of the chambre d'instruction. See Cour de cassation., 13 Nov 2001, 01–85. 506 (No 7146) Dalloz 2002 (4) 372
123. See further J Pradel (2001) ‘ ‘L'appel’ contre les arrêts d'assises: un apport heureux de la loi du 15 juin 2000.’ Dalloz, Doctrine (25), 1964–72.
124. See speech of Justice Minister to Sénat (29 Mar 2000).
125. Courts sitting after midnight are reported in the official report-Collomp (above n 21), para 2.1.1
126. The requirement to visit police stations every 3 months has not been possible in some areas where only a few procureurs must cover a wider area. One example given was of 296 visits per year, covering 18,000 km-Le Figaro 22 Jan 2001.
127. See also Collomp (above n 21), para 1.4.2.
128. See Collomp (above n 21), paras 1.2.2, 2.1.1. Some additional resources have been promised after strong protests. See above n 20.
129. Several officers are currently mis en examen for the murder of a 16-year-old who tried to drive through a road block in December 1997. See Le Monde, 8 Sept 1999.
130. The report (2001, above n 76) expresses concern over the treatment of suspects and detainees, especially foreign nationals and those held on suspicion of terrorist activity (paras 14–21, 37, 39).
131. Selmouni v France ECHR 28 July 1999.
132. See Le Monde 31 Sept 1999. The court found that the sexual assault had not been proved.
133. See Hodgson (above n 10), esp pp 350–4. This is especially surprising given that 40 per cent of questionnaire respondents reported suspecting that violence or excessive pressure had sometimes been used against suspects held in police custody.
134. See, eg, the speech of the then Justice Minister, Madame Guigou, to the Sénat, 30 May 2000.
135. Historically, this has been the function of an independent defence in general: ‘[the judiciary] set aside a space of its own and imposed an operating rule that was almost magical, in that it postulated the neutralization of the effects of real society, declared the equality of the parties, and guaranteed the impartiality of the judgment. If lawyers’ independence was a constituent condition from the outset, it is because it was regarded as the condition, and soon as the sign, of an independent judiciary’, Karpik (above n 43), 146–7.
136. See also the Delmas-Marty report (above n 24).
137. Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty has been the most prominent in this respect. See, eg, M Delmas-Marty (1990) ‘Réformer: anciens et nouveaux débats.’ Pouvoirs, 55, 5–21
138. ‘The Juge d'Instruction: Do the English Really Need Him?’, in BS Markesinis (ed), The Gradual Convergence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 46–58.
139. See also Pradel (above n 54).
140. On the day that most of the reforms came into operation, Mme Gilles-William, the president of the association ‘droit à la sécurité’ told Le Figaro (1 Jan 2001), ‘The root of the problem is that we are aping the American system, when our own law does not lend itself to that. The overall result will be negative.’
141. Art 5(3) ECHR requires that a person who is arrested or detained be immediately brought before a judge who is empowered to exercise judicial functions.
142. Huber v Suisse 1990 (23 Oct 1990. Series A, 188)
143. See Elliot and Vernon (above n 58), 150.
144. See, eg, B McKillop (1998) ‘Readings and Hearings in French Criminal Justice: Five cases in the Tribunal Correctionnel’, American Journal of Comparative Law, 46, 757–83.