FRS 13 and corporate governance: a fund management perspective

Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 17-42

  Mallin, Chris ^a   Dunne, Theresa ^b   Helliar, Christine ^b   Ow Yong, Kean ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Financial reporting; Fund management

Indexed keywords

EID: 84992975956     PISSN: 11766093     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/11766090410813346     Document Type: Article

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